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2.1 IC Design Process. The typical IC design process starts with a behavioral
description of the design, and ends with a fabricated and packaged chip.
All stages in the design process are often heavily augmented with CAD
tools. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Hardware Trojan Taxonomy. A hardware Trojan is an undesired al-
teration to an IC design for the purpose of modifying its functionality.
Hardware Trojans can be classified based on the construction of their two
main components: trigger and payload [34, 75, 194]. . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 IC Supply Chain Attack Vectors. Given current economic trends [19,
58, 94, 169, 170, 184, 202], there are two main attack points in the IC
supply chain resulting from out-sourcing fabrication and design respec-
tively: A) fabrication-time and B) design-time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1 IC Floorplan. Typical IC floorplan created during the place-and-route
design phase. The floorplan consists of an I/O pad ring surrounding the
chip core. Within the core is the placement grid. Circuit components are
placed and routed within the placement grid. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2 Trojan Placement Difficulty. Assume an attacker is attempting to in-
sert 6 additional Trojan components that consume a total of 9 placement
sites (as shown). If inserting these components on the Trivial placement
grid (left), they can be placed adjacent to each other to simplify intra-
Trojan routing. If inserting these components on the Difficult placement
grid (middle), they must be scattered across the grid, making intra-Trojan
routing more challenging. The Not Possible placement grid (right) does
not have enough empty placement sites to accommodate the Trojan com-
ponents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
xii
3.3 Challenges of Victim/Trojan Integration. The supervisor bit signal of
the OR1200 processor SoC is the data input to the supervisor register
of the OR1200 CPU. The supervisor register stores the privilege mode
the processor is currently executing in. Changing the value on this net
changes the privilege level of the processor allowing an attacker to exe-
cute privileged instructions. The more congested the area around this net,
the more difficult it is for a foundry-level attacker to attach (or route in
close proximity) a rogue wire to it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.4 ICAS Work Flow. ICAS consists of two tools, Nemo and GDSII-Score,
and fits into the existing IC design process (Fig. 2.1) between PaR and
fabrication. Nemo analyzes a gate-level (PaR) netlist and traces the fan-
in to security-critical nets in a design. GDSII-Score analyzes a GDSII file
(i.e., an IC layout) and computes metrics quantifying its vulnerability to
a set of foundry-level attacks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.5 Net Blockage Algorithm. A) Same-layer net blockage is computed by
traversing the perimeter of the security-critical net, with granularity g,
and extension distance d, and determining if such points lie inside another
component in the layout. B) Adjacent-layer net blockage is computed
by projecting the area of the security-critical net to the layers above and
below and determining the area of the projections that are occupied by
other components. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.6 Trigger Space Results. Trigger Space distributions for 15 different OR1200
processor IC layouts. Core density and max transition time parameters
are varied across the layouts, while target clock frequency is held con-
stant at 1 GHz. The boxes represent the middle 50% (interquartile range
or IQR) of open placement regions in a given layout, while the dots rep-
resent individual open placement region sizes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.7 Net Blockage Results. Overall Net Blockage results computed across
20 different OR1200 processor IC layouts. A target density of 50% was
used for all layouts, while target clock frequency and max transition time
parameters were varied. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.8 Route Distance Results. Heatmaps of routing distances across six unique
IC layouts of the OR1200 processor. Core density and max transition
times are labeled. Each heatmap is to be read column-wise, where each
column is a histogram, i.e, the color intensity within a heatmap col-
umn indicates the percentage of (critical-net, trigger-space) pairs that are
within a (y-axis) distance apart. Overlaid are rectangles, indicating re-
gions on each heatmap a given attack can exploit, and numbers indicating
the number of unique attack implementations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
xiii
3.9 Effectiveness of Layout-Level Defenses. Routing Distance heatmaps
across three IC designs, with and without the placement-centric defense
described in [9, 10]. Heatmaps should be interpreted similar to Fig. 3.8. . 42
3.10 ICAS Coverage of Trojans. I assume that, at the very least, layout-
level additive Trojans require adding rogue wires to the layout3. Whether
the Trojan design is integrated (requires connecting to a host circuit) or
standalone, or requires additional transistors, the difficulty of inserting it
into a victim IC layout can be captured by our three metrics: 1) Trigger
Space (TS), 2) Net Blockage (NB), and 3) Route Distance (RD). . . . . . 46
4.1 T-TER is a preventive layout-level defense against fabrication-time Tro-
jans. T-TER deploys tamper-evident guard wires around security-critical
wires in a circuit layout—in a pattern similar to variant A or B—to pre-
vent attackers from attaching Trojan wires to them. . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.2 Three Dimensional IC Layout. Typical 3D physical IC layout designed
during the place-and-route IC design phase (Fig. 2.1). On the bottom is a
device layer, and stacked above are several routing layers. . . . . . . . . . 55
4.3 There are three ways an attacker could bypass T-TER guard wires to con-
nect a Trojan wire to a security-critical wire, color-coded by attacker dif-
ficulty: A) delete guard wire(s), B) move an intact set of guard wires, or
C) jog guard wires out of the way. I study the jog attack to assess de-
fensive sensitivity, as it strikes a balance in attacker difficulty, and is the
most difficult to detect. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.4 T-TER is an automated toolchain consisting of three phases. My toolchain
first identifies which wires are security-critical, determines potential (un-
blocked) attachment points, and routes guard wires to block all attach-
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ABSTRACT
Over the past several decades, computing hardware has evolved to become smaller, yet
more performant and energy-efficient. Unfortunately, these advancements have come at a
cost of increased complexity, both physically and functionally. Physically, the nanometer-
scale transistors used to construct Integrated Circuits (ICs), have become astronomically
expensive to fabricate. Functionally, ICs have become increasingly dense and feature-rich
to optimize application-specific tasks. To cope with these trends, IC designers outsource
both fabrication and portions of Register-Transfer Level (RTL) design. Outsourcing, com-
bined with the increased complexity of modern ICs, presents a security risk: we must trust
our ICs have been designed and fabricated to specification, i.e., they do not contain any
hardware Trojans.
Working in a bottom-up fashion, I initially study the threat of outsourcing fabrication.
While prior work demonstrates fabrication-time attacks (modifications) on IC layouts, it is
unclear what makes a layout vulnerable to attack. To answer this, in my IC Attack Surface
(ICAS) work, I develop a framework that quantifies the security of IC layouts. Using ICAS,
I show that modern ICs leave a plethora of both placement and routing resources available
for attackers to exploit. Next, to plug these gaps, I construct the first routing-centric defense
(T-TER) against fabrication-time Trojans. T-TER wraps security-critical interconnects in
IC layouts with tamper-evident guard wires to prevent foundry-side attackers from modi-
fying a design.
After hardening layouts against fabrication-time attacks, outsourced designs become
the most critical threat. To address this, I develop a dynamic verification technique (Bomber-
xxv
man) to vet untrusted third-party RTL hardware for Ticking Timebomb Trojans (TTTs). By
targeting a specific type of Trojan behavior, Bomberman does not suffer from false nega-
tives (missed TTTs), and therefore systematically reduces the overall design-time attack
surface. Lastly, to generalize the Bomberman approach to automatically discover other
behaviorally-defined classes of malicious logic, I adapt coverage-guided software fuzzers
to the RTL verification domain. Leveraging software fuzzers for RTL verification enables
IC design engineers to optimize test coverage of third-party designs without intimate imple-
mentation knowledge. Overall, this dissertation aims to make security a first-class design






Since the inception of the Integrated Circuit (IC), modern computing capabilities have
been closely tied to advancements in hardware. Through the era of Moore’s Law [113]
and Dennard scaling [44], computer architects realized most performance gains from peri-
odic, exponentially shrinking, transistor sizes. However, as transistors have gotten smaller,
they have become increasingly expensive to manufacture. For example, TSMC’s latest IC
fabrication facility, slated for completion in 2023, is expected to cost $19.6 billion [46].
Similarly, when transistor scaling became challenging due to fundamental physical lim-
its, computer architects responded by increasing the amount of on-chip parallelism, first,
through (homogeneous) multi-core designs, and second, through (heterogeneous) domain-
specific accelerators [37, 55, 78, 106, 118, 141]. Unfortunately, with increased heteroge-
neous parallelism, comes increased verification complexity. Today, to completely design
and verify an IC of moderate complexity on an advanced silicon node requires an estimated
500 engineering years, or one year’s time from 500 engineers working together [53, 92].
Of this time, it is estimated that up to 70% is spent verifying design correctness [47], rather
than implementing the design itself.
1
1.2 Hardware Development Trends
In response to these challenges, hardware development trends have shifted. First, to
cope with rising fabrication costs, most semiconductor companies have become fabless.
While they still have the financial resources to design custom hardware, they outsource its
fabrication. Today, only two companies remain that are capable of fabricating leading edge
silicon at scale (≈40,000/wafers a month): Samsung and TSMC1 [95]. Second, to con-
tinue building increasingly complex designs, while maintaining expected time-to-market,
semiconductor companies have outsourced portions of the design/verification process by
purchasing third-party IP blocks [171].
1.3 Research Challenges & Thesis Statement
Unfortunately, outsourcing combined with the size and complexity of modern ICs presents
a security risk. How do we know untrusted third parties will design and fabricate ICs ac-
cording to specification? In other words, how can we be certain our designs will be free of
malicious modifications, i.e., hardware Trojans?
Thesis Statement:
In this dissertation, I present techniques to harden IC designs against the threats of in-
creased outsourcing through security-driven design and verification.
Specifically, I address the security risks associated with outsourcing: 1) fabrication and 2)
design.
1As of writing this dissertation, Intel does not fabricate third-party designs at scale, but they have recently
announced plans they will in the near future [158].
2
1.4 Dissertation Contributions
1.4.1 Security-Driven (Layout) Design
In the first half of my dissertation, I tackle the challenge of designing secure hardware
in the face of an untrusted foundry. To fundamentally understand how to address this
issue, in Chapter III I study the susceptibility of IC layouts to fabrication-time modification,
i.e., fabrication-time attacks. First, I enumerate the challenges a foundry-side adversary
faces when attempting to insert a hardware Trojan into an IC layout. From there, I design,
implement, and open-source a framework, called IC Attack Surface (ICAS) [169], that
estimates the difficulty—i.e., resources—required to mount a fabrication-time attack. ICAS
provides back-end IC design engineers with an automated toolchain to assess the risk of a
fabrication-time attack, before sending their designs to the foundry. I demonstrate the utility
of ICAS by analyzing over 60 real-world IC layouts with and with-out existing layout-level
defenses. ICAS results indicate that even with defenses deployed, IC layouts still leave tens
to thousands of possible Trojan attack points available for foundry-side attackers to exploit.
To fill these defensive gaps, I proceed in designing and implementing the first routing-
centric layout-level defense against fabrication-time attacks—Targeted Tamper-Evident Rout-
ing (T-TER)—in Chapter IV. T-TER deploys tamper-evident guard wires—similar to those
used for cross-talk reduction [60, 61]—around all sides of security-critical nets in a lay-
out to prevent foundry-side attackers from connecting rogue Trojan wires to, or nearby,
them [170]. The analog characteristics of T-TER guard wires are then analyzed post-
fabrication, using continuity checks and Time-Domain Reflectometry (TDR), to nonde-
structively determine if any guard wires were manipulated at the foundry. Using the ICAS
framework (Chapter III), I show that with T-TER, back-end design engineers can com-
pletely close the fabrication-time attack surface with regard to the security-critical features
they care about.
3
1.4.2 Security-Driven (RTL) Verification
After securing the layout, the next critical threat in modern ICs is the integration of
untrusted third-party IP. In the second half of my dissertation, I tackle this threat by
proposing a new technique—Bomberman—for vetting third-party IP for hardware Tro-
jans (Chapter V). Unlike prior Trojan verification techniques [58, 184, 202], Bomberman
is TTT-specific, and aims to systematically constrict the overall design-time attack surface
by provably eliminating the threat of TTTs. To achieve this, Bomberman starts by assum-
ing all components in the design are suspicious (part of a TTT), and only marks compo-
nents as benign if they violate any TTT-specific behavioral invariants during verification
simulations. As a result, false negatives are impossible. Moreover, by carefully crafting
verification test vectors, I demonstrate Bomberman’s false positive rate is less than 1.2%
across four real-world hardware designs, including: an AES accelerator [136], a Universal
Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter (UART) core [121], an OR1200 processor [121], and
a RISC-V processor [193].
While Bomberman demonstrates the effectiveness of Trojan-specific verification, its
success (false positive rate) is largely determined by a verification engineer’s ability to craft
test vectors that exercise potential TTT logic. Unfortunately, doing so requires verification
engineers have intimate knowledge of the DUT’s implementation, which is rarely the case
when analyzing third-party designs. To address this issue, and generalize attack-specific
verification techniques to automatically discover other behaviorally-defined security vul-
nerabilities, I propose a new DV technique called hardware fuzzing in Chapter VI. In this
work, I borrow recent advancements in the software testing community, namely coverage-
guided greybox fuzzing [20, 201], to optimize RTL DV test generation for maximal design
coverage. Rather than re-implementing software fuzzing techniques in the hardware do-
main, I develop a mechanism to fuzz software models of RTL hardware directly in a design
agnostic manner. Moreover, I demonstrate over two orders-of-magnitude improvement in
coverage convergence over existing CRV techniques.
4
1.5 Road Map
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter II, I discuss perti-
nent background information regarding the IC design process, the construction of hardware
Trojans, and two hardware supply chain threat models that are the focus of this disserta-
tion. Next, in Chapters III–IV, I present two works that address the threat of outsourcing
IC fabrication by making security a first-class design objective during IC layout. Follow-
ing this, in Chapters V–VI, I present two additional works that address security concerns
stemming from rising design complexities by making security a primary objective during
RTL verification. Lastly, I conclude with a summary of my dissertation work in the context




2.1 IC Design Process
In order to design complex ICs, like the Apple A13 Bionic chip that contains 8.5 billion
transistors [43], the design process is broken down into several phases (Fig. 2.1) and heavily
augmented with Computer Aided Design (CAD) tools. To design complex ICs, while min-
imizing time-to-market, hardware designers often first purchase existing IP blocks from
third parties to integrate into their designs. Next, designers integrate all third-party IP
blocks, and describe the behavior of any custom circuitry at the RTL, using HDLs like
Verilog. Next, CAD tools synthesize the HDL into a gate-level netlist (also described
using HDL) targeting a specific process technology, a process analogous to software com-
pilation. After synthesis, designers place the circuit components (i.e., logic gates) on a
3-dimensional grid and route wires between them to connect the entire circuit. CAD tools
encode the physical layout in the Graphics Database System II (GDSII) format, which is
then sent to the fabrication facility. Finally, the foundry fabricates the IC, and returns it to
the designers who then test and package it for mounting onto a printed circuit board.
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Figure 2.1: IC Design Process. The typical IC design process starts with a behavioral
description of the design, and ends with a fabricated and packaged chip. All





















Figure 2.2: Hardware Trojan Taxonomy. A hardware Trojan is an undesired alteration
to an IC design for the purpose of modifying its functionality. Hardware Tro-
jans can be classified based on the construction of their two main components:
trigger and payload [34, 75, 194].
2.2 Hardware Trojans
A hardware Trojan is a malicious modification to a circuit designed to alter its operative
functionality [16]. It consists of two main building blocks: a trigger and payload [34, 75,
169, 194]. Prior work provides hardware Trojan taxonomies based on the type of trigger
and payload designs they employ [34, 75, 194]. I adopt this taxonomy, depicted in Fig. 2.2.
2.2.1 Trojan Trigger
The trigger is circuitry that initiates the delivery of the payload when it encounters a
specific state. The goal of the trigger is to control payload deployment such that it is hidden
from test cases (stealthy), but readily deployable by the attacker (controllable). Triggers are
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created by adding, removing, and/or manipulating existing circuit components [90, 142,
162, 196], and can be digital or analog [85, 135, 196]. The ideal trigger—e.g., A2 [196]—
achieves stealth and controllability while being small (i.e., requiring few additional circuit
components).
2.2.2 Trojan Payload
The payload is circuitry that, upon being signaled by the trigger, alters the functionality
of the victim (host) circuit. Like the trigger, the payload can be analog or digital, and
has a variety of possible malicious effects. Prior work demonstrates Trojan payloads that
leak information [101], alter the state of the IC [196], and render the IC inoperable [142].
One attribute all documented controllable hardware Trojans have in common is that they
must route a rogue wire to, or directly adjacent to, a security-critical wire within the victim
IC [169].
2.3 Threat Models
There are two main threats to the IC supply chain given current economic trends [19,
58, 94, 169, 170, 184, 202]: 1) out-sourced fabrication and 2) out-sourced design. As a
result, in this thesis I focus on two threat models, or IC supply chain attack points: 1)
fabrication-time attacks and 2) design-time attacks, as shown in Figure 2.3.
2.3.1 Fabrication-Time Attacks
In the fabrication-time attack threat model, all phases of the IC design process are
trusted except fabrication (Fig. 2.3A). This threat model stems from the extreme ramp-up
costs associated with fabricating leading-edge silicon [94, 95] that make outsourcing IC
fabrication a necessity—even for nation states. In line with previous untrusted foundry
threat models [101, 135, 162, 169, 196], I assume the worst case: that any fabrication-
time modifications are carried out by a malicious actor within the foundry (or any foundry
8






























































Figure 2.3: IC Supply Chain Attack Vectors. Given current economic trends [19, 58, 94,
169, 170, 184, 202], there are two main attack points in the IC supply chain re-
sulting from out-sourcing fabrication and design respectively: A) fabrication-
time and B) design-time.
partners) that has access to the entire physical layout of the IC in the form of a GDSII file,
the output of the Place-&-Route (PaR) phase in Figure 2.1.
Inserting a hardware Trojan at fabrication-time is different from inserting a Trojan dur-
ing the front-end design. Unlike behavioral or structural-level attackers that maliciously
modify the HDL or gate-level netlist, respectively [5, 74, 184], the fabrication-time at-
tacker only has access to the physical-level representation of the IC design (i.e., output of
the PaR phase in Fig. 2.1). Specifically, they must edit the geometric representation of the
circuit layout, e.g., the GDSII file. While this is more challenging than editing the design
at the behavioral- (HDL) or structural-level (netlist), where design specific semantics are
more readily interpretable, it is even more difficult to defend. The post-fabrication defender
receives a literal black box from the foundry. Comprehensively inspecting each fabricated




In the design-time attack threat model, the untrusted phase is the front-end-design
phase, where third party IP is integrated. In order to decrease time-to-market in and
maintain feature rich designs, companies favor a reliance on untrusted third parties and
large design teams [19]. Moreover, without a trusted front-end design, any result of back-
end design and fabrication cannot be trusted. Similar to prior design-time attack stud-
ies [69, 99, 151, 181–183, 191], I focus on malicious modifications that are embedded
in third party HDL (Fig. 2.3B). I assume that a design-time adversary has the ability
to add, remove, and modify the HDL of the core design or IP block in order to imple-
ment hardware Trojans. This can be done either by a single rogue employee at a hard-
ware design company, or by entirely rogue design teams. Lastly, I assume that any mali-
cious circuit behavior induced by Trojan trigger activation is caught via verification test-
ing [58, 69, 183, 184, 191, 202].
Compared with fabrication-time attacks, design-time attacks are easier to implement,
as the attacker has access to semantically rich HDL. However, design-time attacks are also
easier to detect. A defender has full visibility into the design and its functionality, and there
is no notion of analog behavior. A defender can use heuristics based tools [58, 99, 151, 171,





The relationship between complexity and security seen in software also holds for In-
tegrated Circuits (ICs). Since the inception of the IC, transistor sizes have continued to
shrink. For example, compare the 10 µm feature size of the original Intel 4004 proces-
sor [71] to the 10 nm feature size of Intel’s recently announced Ice Lake processor fam-
ily [4]. Smaller transistors enable IC designers to create increasingly complex circuits
with higher performance and lower power-usage. However, continuing this trend pushes
the laws of physics and comes at a substantial cost: building a 3 nm fabrication facility is
estimated to cost $15–20B [94].
Such costs are prohibitive for not only most semiconductor companies, but also nation
states. Thus, most hardware design houses are fabless, i.e., while they are able to fully
design and lay out an IC, they must outsource its fabrication. Outsourcing combined with
the black-box nature of testing a fabricated IC requires fabless semiconductor companies to
trust that their physical designs will not be altered maliciously by the foundry, also known
as a fabrication-time attack. Previous work demonstrates several ways a fabrication-time
attacker can insert a hardware Trojan into an otherwise trusted IC [17, 90, 196]. A2 [196]
demonstrates the most stealthy and controllable IC fabrication-time attack to date, whereby
a hardware Trojan with a complex, yet stealthy, analog trigger circuit is inserted into the
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finalized layout of a processor. Even though the inserted Trojan is small, the attacker can
trigger it and escalate to a persistent software-level attack (i.e., a hardware foothold [85])
using only user-mode code.
Early work focuses on post-fabrication detection of hardware Trojans in ICs [162].
Broadly, there are two classes of detection: 1) side-channel analysis and 2) Trojan-activation
via functional testing. Side-channel (power, timing, etc.) analysis [3, 75, 117, 131] assumes
that the Trojan’s trigger is complex (i.e., many logic gates), and thus noticeably changes
the physical characteristics of the chip. For example, inserting the large amount of extra
logic required by a complex trigger into a design alters the power signature of the device.
Alternatively, Trojan-activation via functional testing assumes that the Trojan’s trigger is
simple (i.e., few logic gates [17, 90]), and is thus easily activated by test vectors. Unfortu-
nately, layering detection classes is not sufficient as it is shown possible to create an attack
that is both small and stealthy [196].
To address the gaps left by post-fabrication Trojan detection schemes, recent work fo-
cuses on pre-fabrication, IC layout-level, Trojan prevention [9, 40, 195]. IC layout-level
defenses work by:
1. increasing placement & routing resource utilization
2. increasing congestion around security-critical design components.
The lack of resources deprives the attacker of the required transistors needed to implement
their Trojan trigger/attack circuits, and the increased congestion around security-critical
wires acts as a barrier for the attacker attempting to integrate their Trojan into the vic-
tim design. Ideally, defenders utilize just enough resources and create enough congestion
such that the attacker cannot implement and insert their attack, while keeping the design
routable. Short of that, the added barriers require the attacker to expend significantly more
resources (e.g., time) to insert their attack into an IC layout.1
1Time is the most critical resource for the attacker as IC fabrication is usually bounded in terms of
turnaround time.
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Two IC layout-level defensive approaches exist: undirected and directed. Undirected
approaches aim to (probabilistically) increase resource utilization and congestion across
the entire layout by altering existing place-and-route parameters (e.g., core density [195])
that will likely result in increased resource utilization and congestion. More recently, a
line of directed approaches have emerged [9, 10] that systematically increase utilization
of specific-regions of the device layer, i.e., nearby security-critical components. Given that
it is infeasible to occupy the entire device layer in a tamper-evident manner [9, 10], both
classes of approaches may leave IC layouts vulnerable to attack by an untrusted foundry.
To identify gaps in existing defenses and guide future IC layout-level defenses, I design
and implement an extensible measurement framework that estimates the susceptibility of
an IC layout to foundry-level additive Trojan attacks. Our framework, IC Attack Surface
(ICAS), estimates resilience in three dimensions that capture the essence and difficulty of
inserting a hardware Trojan at an untrusted foundry:
1. Trojan logic placement: finding unused space to place additional circuit compo-
nents
2. Victim/Trojan integration: attaching hardware Trojan payload to security-critical
logic
3. Intra-Trojan routing: connecting the trigger and payload portions of the hardware
Trojan
A successful attack requires all three steps.
Using ICAS, I analyze over 60 different IC layouts across three fully-functional ASIC
designs: an AES accelerator, a DSP accelerator, and an OR1200 processor. For each layout,
ICAS reports the coverage against four additive Trojan attacks [58, 85, 136, 196] that span
the digital and analog domain as well a range of attack outcomes. ICAS’s analysis reveals
that all existing IC layout-level defenses are incomplete, leaving 1000’s of opportunities
for an attacker at an untrusted foundry to insert a hardware Trojan. An additional finding is
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that even though most existing countermeasures do increase the complexity of inserting a
hardware Trojan, some countermeasures are ineffective. Lastly, ICAS’s analysis suggests
that focusing on exhausting resources on the device layer (i.e., transistors) is an incomplete
defense; future defenses should also aim to increase congestion around security-critical
wires.
This chapter makes the following contributions:
• I propose an extensible methodology that estimates the difficulty of inserting additive
hardware Trojans into an existing IC layout by an untrusted foundry.
• I design, implement, and open-source [110, 111] our extensible framework, ICAS,
that computes various layout-specific security metrics. The ICAS framework pro-
vides an interface to programmatically query the physical layout of an IC (encoded
in the GDSII format) to compute various security metrics with respect to attacks-of-
interest.
• I use ICAS to estimate the effectiveness and expose the gaps of previously-proposed
untrusted foundry defenses by analyzing over 60 IC layouts of three real-world hard-
ware cores.




IC layouts consist of multiple layers. The bottom layers are device layers, while the
top layers are metal layers. Device layers are used for constructing circuit components
(e.g., transistors), and the metal layers are used for routing (e.g., vias and wiring). The
first stage of PaR is creating a floorplan. Figure 3.1 illustrates an IC floorplan. To create
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Figure 3.1: IC Floorplan. Typical IC floorplan created during the place-and-route design
phase. The floorplan consists of an I/O pad ring surrounding the chip core.
Within the core is the placement grid. Circuit components are placed and routed
within the placement grid.
a floorplan, the dimensions of the overall chip are specified and the core area is defined.
Typically a ring of I/O pads is then placed around the chip core, while a placement grid is
drawn over the core. Each tile in the placement grid is known as a placement site. Circuit
components (e.g., standard cells) are then placed on the placement grid, occupying one or
more placement sites, depending on the size of the component. Lastly, all components are
routed together, using one or more routing layers. The output from the back-end design is
a Graphics Database System II (GDSII) file that is a geometric description of the placed-
and-routed circuit layout. The GDSII file is then sent to a fabrication facility where it is
manufactured. The final step is testing and packaging.
3.2.2 Fabrication-Time Trojan Implementations
There are three types of hardware Trojans a malicious foundry can craft into an oth-
erwise trusted IC layout: additive, substitution, and subtractive. Additive Trojans involve
inserting additional circuit components and/or wiring into an existing design. Substitution
Trojans require removing logic with low observability to make room for additional Trojan
circuit components and/or wiring in an existing circuit design. Lastly, subtractive Trojans
require removing circuit components and/or wiring to alter the behavior of a existing cir-
cuit design. The focus of this chapter is estimating the susceptibility of a circuit layout
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to additive Trojan attacks. Substitution and subtractive Trojans, while intriguing, remain
largely unexplored by the community. I do not know of any demonstrably stealthy and con-
trollable substitution or subtractive Trojans and when researchers do create such an attack,
there exists orthogonal mitigation strategies [190].
Inserting an additive Trojan at an untrusted foundry requires modifying two fundamen-
tal characteristics of an IC’s physical layout—placement and routing—regardless of how an
attacker implements the Trojan’s trigger and payload. I define Trojan placement to be the
act of placing additional hardware components into an IC layout for the purpose of crafting
a Trojan trigger and payload, Victim/Trojan integration to be wiring the Trojan’s payload
to, or in the vicinity, of a security-critical net in the victim IC layout, and intra-Trojan
routing to be the act of wiring the hardware Trojan together. The most challenging aspect
of inserting a hardware Trojan at fabrication-time is finding empty space on the IC’s device
layer to insert the trigger and payload components (Trojan placement), AND routing the
payload to a security-critical net (Victim/Trojan integration). ICAS estimates each of
these fundamental tasks, in turn identifying weak points in the IC layout that an attacker
might exploit.
3.3 Threat Model
In this chapter, I adopt the threat model for foundry-side attacks—§2.3.1 and Fig-
ure 2.3A—that assumes all steps in the IC design process can be trusted, except for all
of the processes performed by a foundry, and its sub-contractors. I further restrict this
threat model to fabrication-time attacks involving additive Trojans, i.e., hardware Tro-
jans that require inserting additional circuitry into a physical IC design. Previous work
on substitution/subtractive hardware Trojans shows that such Trojan insertion methods are
addressable by measuring the controllability and observability of logic at the behavioral
and/or structural level of the IC design, for which several methods have already been pro-
posed [51, 58, 137, 138, 184, 202]. Orthogonally, this work fills the void of quantifying the
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susceptibility of an IC design to additive hardware Trojan insertion at the physical level of
the IC design process by an untrusted foundry.
Focusing on additive hardware Trojans, an adversary can only insert additional compo-
nents/wires. They cannot increase the size of the chip to make additional room for the im-
plants because this is readily caught by defenders. As a result, an attacker has two choices:
find open space in the design large enough to accommodate the additional circuitry, or
create open space in the design by moving circuitry around. The latter is extremely chal-
lenging due to its recursive nature, it runs the risk of violating fragile timing constraints
and manufacturing design rules, and it increases fabrication turnaround time (which is usu-
ally set to three months); any of which could expose the Trojan. Therefore, my focus is
identifying open spaces suitable for hardware Trojan implementation.
3.4 Untrusted Foundry Defenses
To protect IC layouts against insertion of a hardware Trojan by attackers at an untrusted
foundry, two classes of defenses exist: undirected and directed. Undirected defenses
leverage existing tuning knobs available during the IC layout process, but do not differ-
entiate between security-critical and general-purpose wires and logic. Thus, undirected
approaches provide probabilistic protection. On the other hand, directed defenses require
augmenting existing PaR tool flows to harden the resulting IC layout, focusing on deploying
defenses systematically around security-critical wires and logic. Thus directed approaches
provide targeted protection, but increase the complexity of the place-and-route process.
This section provides an overview of the landscape of undirected and directed de-
fenses. The focus is the mechanism each defense uses to increase the complexity faced
by a foundry-level attacker. I use the results of the defensive analysis in this section to
develop a set of unifying coverage metrics in the next section. Finally, in the evaluation,




The lowest cost approach for protecting an IC layout from a foundry-level attacker is to
take advantage of existing physical layout parameters (e.g., core density, clock frequency,
and max transition time) offered by commercial CAD tools [195]. The goal is to increase
congestion across the component layer and the routing layer. Ideally, this also results in
increased congestion around security-critical logic and wires. Practically, increases in con-
gestion around security-critical logic and wires is probabilistic.
Increased congestion is a symptom of increased resource utilization; hence, there are
fewer resources available to the attacker. The most obvious resource that an attacker cares
about are placement sites on the component layer. Increasing the density, decreases unused
placement sites. Without sufficient placement sites, the attacker cannot implement their
Trojan logic. A less obvious resource is attachment points on security-critical wires that
serve as victim/Trojan integration points. Increasing routing layer congestion (via density
and/or timing constraints) increases the blockage around security-critical wires, meaning
there are less integration points.
3.4.2 Directed
To address the shortcoming of undirected approaches, recent defenses advocate focus-
ing on security-critical logic and wires. Specifically, the approaches aim to prevent the
attacker from being able to implement their hardware Trojan by occupying unused place-
ment sites (i.e., transistors) [9, 10]. The challenge is that the filler cells used by these
defenses must be tamper-evident, i.e., a defender must be able to detect if an attacker re-
moved filler cells to implement their Trojan. Previous work shows that filling the entire
component layer with tamper-evident filler cells (e.g. [195]) is infeasible due to routing
congestion [10]. To make routing feasible, the most recent placement-centric defense fo-
cuses on filling the unused placement sites nearest security-critical logic first [9, 10].
Such placement-centric defenses increase the complexity faced by the attacker in two
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ways. First, it is harder for the attacker to find contiguous unused placement sites to im-
plement their Trojan’s logic. Second, an indirect complication is increased intra-Trojan
routing complexity. The more distributed the attacker’s placement sites, the more long
(i.e., uses upper routing layers) routes the attacker must create. Additionally, since the
unused placement sites are far away from security critical logic, the attacker must make a
longer, more complex, route to connect their hardware Trojan to the victim security-critical
wire.
3.5 Unified Attack Metrics
Drawing from existing untrusted foundry defenses, I create an extensible set of IC lay-
out attack metrics. I unify the objectives of existing defenses by decomposing the act of
inserting a hardware Trojan into ICs at an untrusted foundry into three fundamental tasks
and corresponding metrics:
1. Trojan logic placement: Trigger Space
2. Victim/Trojan integration: Net Blockage
3. Intra-Trojan routing: Route Distance
These tasks and accompanying metrics are the foundation for our methodology of assessing
defensive coverage of an IC layout against an untrusted foundry. I implement our method-
ology as ICAS.
3.5.1 Challenges of Trojan Placement
The first phase of mounting a fabrication-time attack is Trojan placement. This requires
locating unused placement sites on the placement grid to insert additional circuit compo-
nents. While prior work [9, 10, 195] employs the notion of limiting the quantity of unused
placement sites as a defense against fabrication-time attacks, how can I characterize unused
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placement sites to gain insight into the feasibility of a fabrication-time attack on a given IC
layout?
Only 60–70% of the placement cites are occupied in a typical IC layout to allow space
for routing [196]. To facilitate intra-Trojan routing, an attacker prefers open placement sites
form contiguous (adjacent) regions. This allows the attacker to drop-in a pre-designed Tro-
jan, or if one had not been pre-designed, it minimizes the intra-Trojan routing complexity
by confining the intra-Trojan routing to the lowest routing layers, i.e., reducing the jump-
ing and jogging of nets. Such adjacency is classified in image processing as “4-connected”.
Therefore, a key factor that determines the difficulty of mounting fabrication-time attacks
is the difficulty of inserting additional circuit components into a finalized IC design. I rank
this difficulty in increasing order as follows.
1. Trivial: the Trojan components fit within a single contiguous group of 4-connected
placement sites.
2. Difficult: the Trojan components must be split across multiple contiguous groups
of 4-connected placement sites. The more placement site groups required, the more
difficult intra-Trojan routing becomes.
3. Not Possible: the total area required by the hardware Trojan exceeds that of available
placement sites.
Figure 3.2 illustrates these difficulty levels. The susceptibility of an IC design to
fabrication-time attack can therefore be partially quantified by the size and number of con-
tiguous open sites on the placement grid. This is the basis for ICAS’ Trigger Space metric.
3.5.2 Challenges of Victim/Trojan Integration
Routing the Trojan payload to the targeted security-critical net requires the attacker to
locate the nets of interest in the IC layout. I assume the worst case: the attacker has knowl-
edge of all security-critical nets in the design, particularly, the nets they are trying to extract
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Figure 3.2: Trojan Placement Difficulty. Assume an attacker is attempting to insert 6
additional Trojan components that consume a total of 9 placement sites (as
shown). If inserting these components on the Trivial placement grid (left),
they can be placed adjacent to each other to simplify intra-Trojan routing. If
inserting these components on the Difficult placement grid (middle), they must
be scattered across the grid, making intra-Trojan routing more challenging. The
Not Possible placement grid (right) does not have enough empty placement sites
to accommodate the Trojan components.
information from or influence. An example of such a net in the OR1200 processor [121] is
the net that holds the privilege bit. The attacker can acquire this knowledge either through
a design-phase co-conspirator or through advanced reverse-engineering techniques [196].
No matter how the attacker gains this information, I assume they have it with zero addi-
tional effort.
I extend this threat to include nets that influence security-critical nets. To increase
stealth, an attacker could also trace backwards from the targeted security-critical net, through
logic gates, to identify nets that influence the value of the targeted security-critical net. This
is called the fan-in of the targeted net. By connecting in this way, the attacker sacrifices
controllability for stealth as their circuit modification is now physically separated from the
security-critical net. To gain back controllability, attackers must create a more complex
(hence larger) trigger circuit—decreasing the Trigger Space score, as well as increasing the
likelihood of visual and/or side-channel detection. This trade-off limits how many levels
back the attacker can integrate their payload.
No matter if the attacker is attacking the targeted security-critical wire directly or indi-
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Figure 3.3: Challenges of Victim/Trojan Integration. The supervisor bit signal of the
OR1200 processor SoC is the data input to the supervisor register of the
OR1200 CPU. The supervisor register stores the privilege mode the processor
is currently executing in. Changing the value on this net changes the privi-
lege level of the processor allowing an attacker to execute privileged instruc-
tions. The more congested the area around this net, the more difficult it is for a
foundry-level attacker to attach (or route in close proximity) a rogue wire to it.
rectly, the attacker must attach to some victim wire or route directly adjacent to it. Since
an IC layout is three-dimensional, it is possible for the attacker to attach to any open point
on the victim wire, either on the same layer (i.e., North, South, East, West) or from an
adjacent layer (i.e., above or below). In the worst case, there are no other nets blocking the
attacker from attaching to the targeted security-critical net or its N-level-deep influencers.
In the best case, all attachment points are blocked by other nets. To quantify the number of
points along, above, and below a targeted security-critical wire—and its N-deep fan-in—I
implement the Net Blockage metric. Figure 3.3 shows the open (unblocked) integration
points for the privilege net on the OR1200 processor.
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3.5.3 Challenges of Intra-Trojan Routing
The final phase of a fabrication-time attack is Intra-Trojan routing. Intra-Trojan routing
requires connecting the components that comprise the trigger and payload portions of the
hardware Trojan together—including connecting to the integration point with the victim—
to form a complete hardware Trojan. In the worst case, the attacker is able to find a single
contiguous region to place the trigger and payload components that is nearby the victim
security-critical net. Thus, routing the trigger and payload components will be trivial and
the wire used to inject the payload will be short. In the best case, the attacker will have
to implement their attack using many 4-connected placement regions (i.e., low Trigger
Space score) and the only integration point on the targeted security-critical net (i.e., high
Net Blockage score) is as far away from the open placement regions. Hence, I focus on
quantifying the difficulty of routing the payload output to open attachment points on tar-
geted security-critical nets (and its N-deep fan-in). To this end, I identify two challenges of
intra-Trojan routing:
• Comply with design and fabrication rules
• Meet Trojan and payload-delivery timing requirements
3.5.3.1 Complying with Design Rules
For each process technology, there are many rules associated with how wires and com-
ponents must be laid out in a design. Some of these rules are defined in the Library Ex-
change Format (LEF) [29] and contained in files that are loaded by modern Computer
Aided Design (CAD) tools throughout the IC design process. There are two types of design
rules: 1) those regarding the construction of circuit components (i.e., standard cells), and
2) those regarding routing. I classify these as component design rules and routing design
rules, respectively. As technology nodes shrink, both rule sets are becoming increasingly
complex [147].
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It is vital for an attacker to comply with these design rules as violating them risks ex-
posure. If an attacker inserts additional logic gates (standard cells) by making copies of
existing components in a design, they can avoid violating component design rules involved
with Trojan placement. However, to connect a wire from the Trojan payload to security-
critical target net(s), they must perform custom Trojan routing. Therefore, complying with
routing design rules is a concern. Routing design rules include specifications for the mini-
mum distance between two nets on a specific routing layer, the minimum width of nets on
a given layer, etc. Complying with these rules becomes easier for an attacker if security-
critical net(s) are not blocked by other wires or components. The higher the Net Blockage
score, the more difficult it is to make a connection, the more complex—and error prone—
the route.
3.5.3.2 Meeting Timing Requirements
Every wire in an IC has a resistance and a capacitance, making it behave like an RC cir-
cuit, i.e., there is a time delay associated with driving the wire high (logic 1) or low (logic
0). The longer the wire, the more time delay there is [45]. If the security-critical net(s)
has timing constraints (e.g., setup and hold times) that dictate when the payload signal
must arrive for the attack to be successful, the Trojan routing must meet these constraints.
Furthermore, the farther the security-critical net is from the payload circuit, the more ob-
stacles that must be routed around, increasing the routing distance even further. This is the
basis for ICAS’ Route Distance metric. A natural limit for Route Distance is dictated by
the clock frequency of the victim circuit, as most attacks must operate synchronously with
their victim.
3.6 Extensible Coverage Assessment Framework
The ICAS framework is comprised of two tools, Nemo and GDSII-Score, as shown in
Figure 3.4. Nemo identifies security-critical wires based on designer annotations and circuit
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dataflow, while GDSII-Score assesses the defensive coverage of a given IC layout against a
set of attacks. ICAS takes as input four sets of files: 1) gate-level netlist (generated after all
physical layout optimizations), 2) process technology files, 3) physical layout files, and 4)
set of attacks. The process technology files include a Library Exchange Format (LEF) file
and layer map file [27, 29]. The physical layout files include a Design Exchange Format
(DEF) file and the GDSII file of an IC layout [29, 31]. The attack files are are a list of
properties for each attack to assess coverage against: number of transistors, security-critical
wire(s) to attach to, and timing constraints. All ICAS input files except the attack files
are either generated-by or inputs-to the back-end IC design phase, and hence are readily
available to back-end designers.
Though ICAS is extensible, our implementation includes three security metrics that
capture the challenges faced by a foundry-level attacker looking to insert a hardware Trojan:
amount and size of open-placement regions (Trigger Space), quantity of viable attachment
points to targeted security-critical (and influencer) nets (Net Blockage), and the proximity
of open placement regions to targeted security-critical net(s) (Route Distance). Together
with the attack requirements, these metrics quantify the complexity an attacker faces for
each step of inserting specific hardware Trojans into the given IC layout. I describe the
implementation of both ICAS components below.
3.6.1 Nemo
Nemo is the first analysis tool in the ICAS framework. It bridges the semantic gap be-
tween the human readable RTL netlist and post-PaR netlist. Additionally, Nemo broadens
the set of “security-critical” nets by performing a fan-in analysis of root security-critical
nets. This is necessary since the inter-connected nature of signals within a circuit design
means an adversary could influence the state of security-critical nets by controlling a net
that is a part of its fan-in. Nemo takes as input a Verilog netlist and automatically iden-
tifies security-critical nets in the post-PaR netlist HDL, which it outputs in the form of a
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Figure 3.4: ICAS Work Flow. ICAS consists of two tools, Nemo and GDSII-Score, and
fits into the existing IC design process (Fig. 2.1) between PaR and fabrica-
tion. Nemo analyzes a gate-level (PaR) netlist and traces the fan-in to security-
critical nets in a design. GDSII-Score analyzes a GDSII file (i.e., an IC layout)
and computes metrics quantifying its vulnerability to a set of foundry-level at-
tacks.
Graphviz dot file. Similar to prior work [74, 102, 205], Nemo assumes that a unique sig-
nal name prefix (within the RTL HDL) has been appended to various signals considered
“security-critical”. I make this assumption since determining what signals are “security
critical” requires contextual knowledge of how the design will be used.
3.6.1.1 Annotating Security-Critical Signals in the RTL Netlist
The process of uncovering and annotating security-critical signals in the RTL netlist
is Security-Critical Component Identification (SCCI). While SCCI is an active area of re-
search in the hardware security community, orthogonal to addressing the untrusted foundry
problem, there are two approaches I are aware of: manual and semi-autonomous identifica-
tion. The first, and most traditional, is manual identification. Manual identification requires
a human expert to study the design’s specification (e.g., Instruction Set Architecture in the
case of a processor), and identify properties that are critical to the security of software
or other hardware utilizing the design [59, 74]. The second, and current state-of-the-art
developed by Zhang et al. [205], is semi-autonomous identification. Semi-autonomous
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identification involves two steps. First, a program observes a variety of test-benches ex-
ercising the design to generate a large set of possible invariants defined over the hardware
specification. Second, a pre-trained penalized logistic regression classifier is used to clas-
sify which invariants, or portions of the specification, are security-critical. This method
of SCCI is semi-autonomous, as it requires the classifier model be pre-trained with either
existing published errata on previous versions of the hardware design, or using manual
identification. While I perform manual SCCI, results reported by Zhang et al. [205] sug-
gest that their tool would result in a similar set of root security-critical signals.
3.6.1.2 Identifying Security-Critical Signals in the PaR Netlist
While there are existing (aforementioned) techniques for identifying and annotating
security-critical components in the RTL netlist, unfortunately, these techniques do not track
security-critical signals past the RTL design phase and do not capture data-flow. Thus,
Nemo’s core task is to bridge the semantic gap and uncover duplicated or renamed security-
critical signals in the post-PaR netlist. Fortunately, while synthesis and layout tools do
modify a netlist by duplicating and removing signals and components (as part of opti-
mization and meeting performance requirements), they do not completely rename existing
signals. This makes it possible for Nemo to identify root security-critical signals (flagged
at the behavioral level) by name at the physical level. To avoid removal of security-critical
signals, I modify synthesis and layout scripts to essentially lock them in place. Nemo
works backwards from root security-critical signals to identify the fan-in to these signals.
The search depth is a configurable parameter of Nemo.
3.6.1.3 Implementation
Nemo is implemented as a back-end target module to the open-source Icarus Verilog
(IVL) [192] Verilog compiler and simulation tool written in C++. The IVL front-end ex-
poses an API to allow third-parties to develop custom back-end target modules. Nemo is a
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custom target module (also written in C++) designed to be loaded by IVL. Since gate-level
netlists are often described with the same HDL that was synthesized to generate the netlist
(e.g., Verilog), I utilize the IVL front-end to interpret the Verilog representation of the
netlist and our custom back-end target module, Nemo, to perform a breadth-first search of
the post-PaR netlist. I open-source Nemo [111] and release instructions on how to compile
and integrate Nemo with IVL.
3.6.2 GDSII-Score
GDSII-Score is the second analysis tool in the ICAS framework. GDSII-Score is an
extensible Python framework for computing security metrics of a physical IC layout. It
takes as input the following: Nemo output, GDSII file, DEF file, technology files (LEF
and layer-map files), and attacks description file. First, GDSII-Score loads all input files
and locates the security-critical nets within the physical layout. Next, it computes security
metrics characterizing the susceptibility of an IC design to each of the input attacks. Specif-
ically, the three security metrics that I implement are: 1) Trigger Space: the difficulty of
implementing the hardware Trojan, 2) Net Blockage: the difficulty of Trojan/victim inte-
gration, and 3) Route Distance: the difficulty of meeting Trojan timing constraints. I open
source the GDSII-Score framework and our security metric implementations [110].
3.6.2.1 Metric 1: Trigger Space
The Trigger Space metric estimates the challenges of Trojan placement (§3.5.1). It
computes a histogram of open 4-connected regions of all sizes on an IC’s placement grid.
The more large 4-connected open placement regions available, the easier it is for an attacker
to locate a space to insert additional Trojan circuit components at fabrication time. A
placement site is considered to be “open” if the site is empty, or if it is occupied by a filler
cell. Filler cells, or capacitor cells, are inserted into empty spaces during the last phase of
layout to aid fabrication. Since they are inactive, an attacker can create empty placement
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sites by removing them, without altering the functionality or timing characteristics of the
victim IC.
To compute the trigger space histogram, GDSII-Score first constructs a bitmap repre-
senting the placement grid. Placement sites occupied by standard cells (e.g., NAND gate
transistors) are colored while those that are open are not. Information about the size of the
placement grid and the occupancy of each site in the grid is available in the Design Ex-
change Format (DEF) file produced by commercial PaR tools. GDSII-Score then employs
a breadth-first search algorithm to enumerate the maximum size of all 4-connected open
placement regions.
3.6.2.2 Metric 2: Net Blockage
The Net Blockage metric estimates the challenges of integrating the hardware Trojan’s
payload into the victim circuit (§3.5.2). It computes the percent blockage around security-
critical nets and their influencers. The more congested the area surrounding security-critical
nets, the more difficult it is to attach the Trojan circuitry to these nets. There are two types
of net blockage that are calculated for each security-critical net: same-layer and adjacent-
layer.
Same-layer blockage is computed by traversing points around the perimeter (North,
South, East, West) at a granularity of g, at a specific distance, d, around the security-
critical net and determining which points lie within other circuit components, as detailed in
Figure 3.5a. To determine if a specific point along the perimeter lies within the bounds of
another circuit component, I utilize the point-in-polygon ray-casting algorithm [66]. The
extension distance, d, around the security-critical path element and the granularity of the
perimeter traversal, g, are configurable in our implementation. However, I default to an
extension distance of one wire-pitch and a granularity of 1 database units, respectively, as
defined in the process technology’s LEF file. The IC designs used in our evaluation are
built using a 45 nm process technology, for which 1 database units is equivalent to 0.5 nm.
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Additionally, an open region is considered “blocked” if it is not wide enough for a minimal
width wire to be routed through while maintaining the minimal amount of wire spacing
required on that metal layer, as defined in the LEF file. The percentage of the perimeter
length that is blocked by other circuit components is considered the same-layer blockage
percentage.
Adjacent-layer blockage is computed by analyzing the area directly above and below a
security-critical net, and computing the total area of overlap between other components, as
detailed in Figure 3.5b. To calculate this overlap area I utilize an overlapping sliding win-
dow approach. Additionally, any un-blocked regions above or below the security-critical
net are considered “blocked” if they are not large enough to accommodate the smallest
possible via geometry allowed on the respective via layer, as defined in the LEF file. The
percentage of the total top and bottom area that is blocked by nearby circuit components is
the adjacent-layer blockage percentage.
The same-layer and adjacent-layer blockage percentages are combined via a weighted
average to form a comprehensive overall net blockage percentage where 66% is based on
same-layer blockage (north, south, east, and west) and 33% is based on adjacent-layer
blockage (top and bottom). I weight the same-layer blockage by 66%, or 23 , because 4 out
of 6 total sides of a wire (north, south, east, west, top, and bottom) are on the same layer.
Likewise, I weight the adjacent-layer blockage by 33%, or 13 .
Lastly, a total same-layer, adjacent-layer, and overall net blockage metric is computed
for the entire IC design. For an IC design with n security-critical nets, the same-layer
(bsame), adjacent-layer (badjacent), and overall (boverall) net blockage metrics are computed










Figure 3.5: Net Blockage Algorithm. A) Same-layer net blockage is computed by travers-
ing the perimeter of the security-critical net, with granularity g, and extension
distance d, and determining if such points lie inside another component in the
layout. B) Adjacent-layer net blockage is computed by projecting the area of
the security-critical net to the layers above and below and determining the area






















3.6.2.3 Metric 3: Route Distance
The Route Distance metric combines the Net blockage and Trigger Space metrics (thus
is correlated with these metrics) to estimate the difficulty of of meeting Trojan and at-
tack timing constraints (§3.5.3). It computes a conservative estimate, i.e., Manhattan dis-
tance, for the minimal routing distance between open trigger placement sites and the n
least blocked integration sites on the targeted security critical nets. It cross-references each
Manhattan distance with the distribution of net lengths within the entire IC design. Net
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length can impact whether or not the Trojan circuit will meet timing constraints and func-
tion properly. Understanding where in the distribution of net lengths the Trojan routing falls
provides insights into the ability of the Trojan circuit to meet its timing requirements and
is an opportunity for outlier-based defenses. In summary, the more Manhattan distances
that fall within one standard deviation of the mean net length, the easier it is to carry out an
attack.
I implement the Route Distance metric as follows. First, the Net Blockage and Trigger
Space metrics are computed. Next, the the distribution of all net-lengths within the IC lay-
out are computed. Then, two-dimensional Manhattan distances between all unblocked nets
(< 100% overall net blockage) and trigger spaces are calculated. The Manhattan distance
calculated is the minimum distance between a given trigger space and security-critical net,
i.e., the minimum distance between any placement site within the given trigger space and
any unblocked location on the targeted security-critical net. Lastly, each Manhattan dis-
tance is reported in terms of standard deviations away from the mean net-length in the
given IC layout.
3.7 Evaluation
I use ICAS to quantify the defensive coverage of existing defensive layout techniques—
revealing that gaps persist. First, I analyze the effectiveness of undirected defenses [195].
Specifically, I measure the impact of varying both physical and electrical back-end design
parameters of the same IC layout on its susceptibility to attack. Second, I analyze the ef-
fectiveness of directed defenses [9, 10]. Specifically, I measure the coverage of existing,
placement-oriented, defensive layout schemes in preventing the insertion of an attack by
the foundry. Beyond revealing gaps, our results reveal that there is an opportunity for im-
proving both directed and undirected defenses that systematically eliminates Trojan/victim
integration points. Lastly, our evaluation also demonstrates that ICAS is design-agnostic,
works with commercial tools, and scales to complex IC layouts.
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A2 Analog [196] 2 20 7
A2 Digital [196] 91 1444 3
Privilege
Escalation [58, 85] 25 342 3
Key Leak [136] 187 2553 3
3.7.1 Experimental Setup
I utilize three IC designs for our evaluations: OR1200 processor SoC, AES accelerator,
and DSP accelerator. The OR1200 processor SoC is an open-source design [121] used
in previous fabrication-time attack studies [196]. The AES and DSP accelerator designs
are open-sourced under the Common Evaluation Platform (CEP) benchmark suite [108].
The OR1200 processor SoC consists of a 5-stage pipelined OR1200 CPU that implements
the 32-bit OR1K instruction set and Wishbone bus interface. The AES accelerator sup-
ports 128-bit key sizes. The DSP accelerator implements a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT)
algorithm.
All designs target a 45nm Silicon-On-Insulator (SOI) process technology. I synthesize
and place-and-route all designs with Cadence Genus (version 16.23) and Innovus (version
17.1), respectively. In our first evaluation (§3.7.2) the design constraints (clock frequency,
max transition time, core density) used for both synthesis and layout are varied as noted.
However, in our second evaluation (§3.7.3) the same design constraints (100 MHz clock
frequency, 100 ps max transition time, 60% core density) were used for both synthesis and
layout to form a common baseline. All ICs are synthesized and placed-and-routed on a
server with 2.5 GHz Intel Xeon E5-2640 CPU and 64 GB of memory running Red Hat
Enterprise Linux (version 6.9).
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3.7.1.1 Security-critical Signals
The first tool in the ICAS flow is Nemo. Nemo tracks security-critical signals from the
HDL level to the IC layout level. The first step is flagging root security-critical signals at
the RTL level, for each IC design. For the OR1200 processor SoC, the supervisor bit signal
supv is flagged. I select this signal because one can alter the state of this bit to escalate the
privilege mode of the processor [196]. For the AES accelerator, I flag all 128 key bits as
security-critical. The next out signal within the DSP accelerator was flagged as security-
critical. The next out signal of the DSP accelerator indicates to external hardware when an
FFT computation is ready at the output registers. Tampering with the next out signal allows
the attacker to hide specific outputs of the DSP accelerator. Lastly, Nemo marks, for each
design’s IC layout, all root security-critical nets and their 2-deep fan-in as security-critical
nets.
3.7.1.2 Hardware Trojans
Table 3.1 lists the hardware Trojan designs that I use in our evaluation. The first two
Trojan designs (analog and digital variants of A2) are attacks on the OR1200 processor
and DSP accelerator ICs. With respect to the OR1200, the A2 attacks act as a hardware
foothold [85] for a software-level privilege escalation attack. With respect to the DSP
accelerator, the A2 attacks suppress the next out signal (§3.7.1). The Privilege Escalation
Trojan targets solely the OR1200 and the Key Leak solely the AES accelerator.
3.7.1.3 Build Environment
Both ICAS tools (Nemo and GDSII-Score) were run on the same server as the synthesis
and place-and-route CAD tools. Nemo and Icarus Verilog were compiled from source
using GCC (version 4.4.7). For increased performance, GDSII-Score was executed using
the PyPy Python interpreter with JIT compiler (version 4.0.1).
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3.7.2 Undirected Defense Coverage
As detailed in §3.4.1, a defensive strategy for protecting an IC layout from foundry-
level attackers is to exploit physical layout parameters (e.g., core density, clock frequency,
and max transition time) offered by commercial CAD tools to increase congestion—hopefully
around security-critical wires. The tradeoff is that while this is a low cost defense in that
CAD tools already expose such knobs, the entire design is impacted and there is no guar-
antee that security-critical wires will be protected. I use ICAS and its three security metrics
to quantify the effectiveness of such undirected approaches [195].
To uncover the impact of each parameter, I start by generating 60 different physical
layouts of the OR1200 processor design by varying:
1. Target Core Density (%): 50, 70, 90
2. Clock Frequency (MHz): 100, 200, 500, 1000
3. Max Transition Time (ps): 100, 150, 200, 250, 300
Target core density is a measure of how congested the placement grid is. Typically, de-
signers select die dimensions that achieve ∼60–70% placement density to allow space for
routing [196]. Target clock frequency is the desired speed at which the circuitry should
perform. Typically, designers select the clock frequency based on performance goals. Max
transition time is the longest time required for the driving pin of a net to change logical
values. Typically, designers choose a value for max transition time based upon power con-
sumption and combinational logic delay constraints.
For each of the 60 layout variations I compute ICAS metrics. Figures 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8
provide a visual representation for each metric. Overlaid on Figure 3.8 are the number of
unique attack (color-coded) implementations for each Trojan (Tab. 3.1) at six parameter
configurations. Across the 60 IC layouts, the time it took ICAS to complete its analyses
ranged from 38 seconds to 18 minutes. On average, this translates to less than 10% of the
35
combined synthesize and place-and-route run-times. These run-time results demonstrate
the deployability of ICAS as a back-end design analysis tool. Overall, our evaluation indi-
cates that while some of these layout parameters do increase attacker complexity, none are
sufficient on their own. I break down the results metric-by-metric.
3.7.2.1 Trigger Space Analysis
Figure 3.6 shows the distributions of open trigger spaces across 15 unique OR1200 lay-
outs. I vary target core density and max transition time parameters across layouts, while I
fix the target clock frequency at 1 GHz. A trigger space is defined as a contiguous region
of open placement sites on the device layer placement grid and is measured by number
of contiguous “4-connected” placement sites. Each box represents the middle 50%, or
interquartile range (IQR), of open trigger space sizes for a given IC layout. The dots rep-
resent individual data points within and outside the IQR. Our empirical results affirm prior
notions [9, 10, 195] that increasing the target core density of an IC layout results in fewer
large open spaces to insert hardware Trojans. Additionally our results indicate that at lower
densities, decreasing the max transition time constraint decreases the median trigger space
size. Similar trends occur at lower clock frequencies. While results show that modulat-
ing target core density is effective, observe that even in the best case, large trigger spaces
remain.
From our Trigger Space analysis, I conclude future undirected defenses should mod-
ulate layout parameters that both 1) shrink the trigger space IQR, and 2) shift the median
towards one. In doing so, defenders: 1) minimize the variation in sizes of contiguous open-
spaces available to the attacker—therefore limiting their Trojan design (size) options, and
2) force the attacker to have to distribute Trojan components across the die making Trojan
logic placement and intra-Trojan routing more challenging.
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Figure 3.6: Trigger Space Results. Trigger Space distributions for 15 different OR1200
processor IC layouts. Core density and max transition time parameters are
varied across the layouts, while target clock frequency is held constant at 1
GHz. The boxes represent the middle 50% (interquartile range or IQR) of open
placement regions in a given layout, while the dots represent individual open
placement region sizes.
3.7.2.2 Net Blockage Analysis
Figure 3.7 shows the Net Blockage metric (Eq. 3.3) computed across 20 unique OR1200
layouts. I fix the target density at 50% across all layouts, while the target clock frequency
and max transition time are varied (as listed above). The results show that at lower clock
frequencies a smaller max transition time parameter corresponds to increased Net Block-
age. This corresponds to less open Trojan/victim integration points available to the attacker.
However, as clock speed increases, the correlation between max transition time and overall
Net Blockage deteriorates. Intuitively, smaller max transition times should lead to smaller
average net-lengths within the design, as transition time is a function of the capacitive load
on the net’s driving pin [45]. Shorter net-lengths result in more routing congestion as com-
ponents cannot be spread-out across the die. However, capacitive load (on a driving pin)
is inversely proportional to frequency, thus at higher clock frequencies the max-transition
time constraint is more easily satisfied, and altering it has less effect on the Net Blockage.
Given these results, the effectiveness of modulating transition time is context dependent
and—even in the best case—open integration points remain.
From our Net Blockage analysis, I conclude future undirected defenses should mod-
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Figure 3.7: Net Blockage Results. Overall Net Blockage results computed across 20 dif-
ferent OR1200 processor IC layouts. A target density of 50% was used for all
layouts, while target clock frequency and max transition time parameters were
varied.
ulate layout parameters that both 1) shrink overall security-critical wire lengths, and 2)
maximize routing congestion in the vicinity of security-critical wires. In doing so, defend-
ers minimize the Victim/Trojan integration attack surface.
3.7.2.3 Route Distance Analysis
Figure 3.8 shows the Route Distances across six various OR1200 layouts in the form
of heatmaps that capture the trade space between layout parameters. Core density and
max transition times were varied across the layouts (indicated in the labels), while clock
frequency was held constant at 100 MHz. Each heatmap describes several (column-wise)
histograms of Route Distances in terms of standard deviations from the mean net length ob-
served in that particular IC layout (y-axis). The Route Distances reported are those between
any unblocked security-critical nets, and trigger spaces large enough to hold an attack of a
given size range (x-axis). That is, the color intensities within in a given heatmap column
indicate the percentage of (security-critical-net, trigger-space) pairs in that column that are
within a range of distance apart. Additionally, overlaid on each heatmap are rectangles
indicating the region of the heatmap where a given attack (Tab. 3.1) can be implemented,
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Figure 3.8: Route Distance Results. Heatmaps of routing distances across six unique IC
layouts of the OR1200 processor. Core density and max transition times are
labeled. Each heatmap is to be read column-wise, where each column is a his-
togram, i.e, the color intensity within a heatmap column indicates the percent-
age of (critical-net, trigger-space) pairs that are within a (y-axis) distance apart.
Overlaid are rectangles, indicating regions on each heatmap a given attack can
exploit, and numbers indicating the number of unique attack implementations.
and the number of possible attack configurations, (security-critical-net, trigger-space) pairs,
that can be exploited.
If timing is critical to the operation of an attacker’s desired Trojan, (critical-net, trigger-
space) pairs with routing distances significantly greater than the average net length in the
IC layout are less likely to be viable candidates for constructing hardware Trojans. IC
layouts with few desirable (critical-net, trigger-space) pairs are much more time-consuming
to attack. Namely, the IC layouts with heatmaps that indicate a higher percentages of far-
apart (critical-net, trigger-space) pairs, where the trigger spaces are small, are most secure.
From Figure 3.8, I conclude that at high density, max transition time has little affect on
IC layout security; while at lower densities, lower max transition time designs are more
secure. Similar trends exist across other layout parameters, as shown in Figures A.1–A.3
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in Appendix A.
From our Route Distance analysis, I conclude future undirected defenses should mod-
ulate layout parameters that maximimze the distance between security critical wires and
open trigger spaces. In doing so, defenders: 1) maximize intra-Trojan routing difficulty,
and 2) restrict attackers from implanting timing-critical Trojans.
3.7.2.4 Cost of Varying Layout Parameters
The results indicate that increasing core density is effective, but incomplete, and in-
creasing clock frequency and decreasing max transition time is marginally effective and
incomplete. While tuning these parameters is low cost to the designer, there is a cost to
the design in terms of complexity and power requirements. I elucidate by discussing how
varying each design parameter (density, clock frequency, and max transition time) impacts
non-security characteristics of a circuit design.
While increasing core density to 90% makes placing-and-routing a Trojan more diffi-
cult, it also makes placing-and-routing the rest of the design more challenging. Specifically,
it can become nearly impossible to meet timing closure for the entire design if there is not
enough space within the core area to re-size cells and/or add additional buffer cells. De-
pending on performance and security requirements, a layout engineer may choose to relax
timing constraints in order to achieve a higher core density. Alternatively, a layout en-
gineer may attempt to surround security-critical nets with areas of high densities, while
maintaining a lower overall core density, as previously suggested [9, 10].
Decreasing the maximum transition time and increasing the clock speed of an entire cir-
cuit design makes it more difficult to place-and-route a functional Trojan that meets timing
constraints, but also directly impacts the performance characteristics of the circuit. Addi-
tionally, it is important to note that max transition time is related to the clock frequency,
so varying one without the other changes performance tolerances. While increasing the
performance of the design might increase security, it comes at the cost of increasing power
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consumption. Depending on the power-consumption requirements of the design, it may be
possible for a designer to over-constrain these parameters for added security.
3.7.3 Directed Defense Coverage
As an alternative to probabilistically adding impediments to the attacker inserting a
hardware Trojan, recent works proposes a directed approach. As detailed in §3.4.2, placement-
centric directed defenses [9, 10] attempt to prevent the attacker from implementing their
Trojan by occupying all open placement sites with tamper-evident filler cells. The limita-
tion with such defenses is that it is infeasible to fill all open placement sites with tamper-
evident logic [10]. Thus, the defenses focus their filling near security-critical logic, leaving
gaps near the periphery of the IC layout. Whether these open placement sites near the
periphery are sufficient to implement an attack is an open question.
The goal of this evaluation is to determine not only if it is still possible for a foundry-
level attacker to insert a hardware Trojan, given placement-centric defenses, but to quantify
the number of viable implementations available to the attacker—to act as a surrogate for
attacker complexity. For the evaluation, I use our three IC designs (OR1200 processor
SoC, AES accelerator, and DSP accelerator). For each design, I create two IC layouts:
(1) unprotected and (2) protected. For the protected IC layout, I use the latest placement-
centric defense [9]; using the identified security-critical wires (§3.7.1) to direct the defense.
I lay out all IC designs using these parameters: target clock frequency of 100 MHz, max
transition time of 100 ps, and a target core density of 60%.
I then use ICAS to asses the defensive coverage of each of the six IC layouts. This anal-
ysis has two goals: (1) determine whether the IC is vulnerable to attack and (2) understand
the impact of applying the defense. I answer both questions in an attack-centric manner
using the hardware Trojans in Table 3.1 to asses defensive coverage against. For each at-
tack/IC layout combination I plot the number of (security-critical-net, trigger-space) pairs
that could be used in implementing each Trojan. A (security-critical-net, trigger-space) pair
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Figure 3.9: Effectiveness of Layout-Level Defenses. Routing Distance heatmaps across
three IC designs, with and without the placement-centric defense described
in [9, 10]. Heatmaps should be interpreted similar to Fig. 3.8.
is considered a viable candidate for implementing a Trojan if:
1. the trigger space size is at least as large as the minimum number of placement sites
required to implement the desired hardware Trojan design
2. the security-critical net is less than 100% blocked
3. if the hardware Trojan is “Timing-Critical”, i.e., it must function at the design’s core
operating frequency, then the distance between the trigger space and open integration
point on the security-critical net must be ≤ 3 standard deviations from average net
length; otherwise, any distance is allowed.2
Figure 3.9 shows the defensive coverage for each IC design. Overlaid on each heatmap
2Three standard deviations from the average net length is the threshold for Trojan-to-integration-point
routing without violating timing constraints, because it accounts for 99.7% of the designs’ wires—outliers
tend to be power wires. For an exact calculation, it is possible to extract parasitics for a target Trojan’s route
to determine if it violates timing constraints.
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are rectangles (and numbers) indicating unique possible attack implementations. These
results show that existing placement-centric defenses are effective at reducing an IC’s
fabrication-time attack surface, compared to no defense—but gaps persist. Given that fill-
ing placement sites with tamper-evident logic is already maximized, these results point to
systematically adding congestion around security-critical wires as a means to close all re-
maining defensive gaps; i.e., a directed version with similar effect to existing undirected
defenses.
3.8 Discussion
ICAS is the first tool to provide insights into the security of physical IC layouts. It
is extensible across many dimensions including CAD tools, process technologies, secu-
rity metrics, and fabrication-time attacks and defenses. To demonstrate ICAS’ capabilities
I implemented three security metrics (net blockage, trigger space, and routing distance)
using it. The focus of this paper is using these metrics to estimate the coverage of exist-
ing untrusted foundry defenses, which show that IC designs are still vulnerable to attack.
I envision uses for ICAS beyond this, as an integral part of the IC design process using
commercial tools.
3.8.1 ICAS-Driven Defensive Layout
ICAS provides an added notion of security to the IC layout (place-and-route) process to
enable researchers to explore countermeasures against fabrication-time attacks. To the best
of our knowledge, the existing targeted defensive IC layout techniques [9, 10, 195] are en-
tirely placement-centric, i.e., filling unused space on the device layer with functional logic
cells. While ICAS is capable of evaluating placement-centric defensive layout techniques,
its security-insights also asses routing-centric defensive layout techniques. For example,
layout engineers can leverage ICAS to create high degrees of routing congestivity in close
proximity to security-critical nets. ICAS’ security metrics enable IC layout designers to
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optimize the security of both the placement and routing of their designs.
3.8.2 Constrained Security Metrics
In its primary state, ICAS focuses on computing metrics that reason about the spa-
tial resources required to implant hardware Trojans in IC layouts. While our metrics are
unconstrained and thus conservative, it is trivial to extend, and constrain, ICAS metrics
to account for other layout resources that may impact an attacker’s decision process. For
example, even with a plethora of spatial resources available to insert Trojan components,
doing so in certain areas of the chip may impact local power consumption enough to disrupt
normal operating behavior. Alternatively, inserting a hardware Trojan nearby un-shielded,
fast toggling, interconnects may negatively impact the Trojan’s signal integrity, rendering it
benign. I recognize it is impractical to consider all possible constraints, and hence I design
ICAS to be extensible.
3.8.3 Extensibility of Security Metrics
GDSII-Score is the ICAS tool that computes security metrics from an IC layout. It loads
several files describing the IC layout to instantiate a single Python class (called “Layout”)
that contains query-able data structures containing a polygon representation of all compo-
nents in the layout. Additionally, GDSII-Score contains several subroutines that compute
spatial relationships between polygon objects and points within the layout. From these
data structures and the provided subroutines, it is trivial to integrate additional metrics into
GDSII-Score. To facilitate additional metrics, I open-source GDSII-Score [110], and our
three example metrics that demonstrate how to query the main “Layout” data structure.
3.8.4 Extensibility of CAD Tools
Almost all steps of the IC design process utilize CAD tools. ICAS integrates into
a commercial IC design process after placement-and-routing (Figure 2.1). While ICAS is
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validated with IC layouts generated by Cadence tools, integrating ICAS with other vendors’
CAD tools does not require any additional effort due to the common process technology
(LEF) and GDSII specifications used by ICAS.
3.8.5 Extensibility of Process Technologies
I test ICAS using IC layouts built with a 45 nm SOI process technology; however,
ICAS is agnostic of process technology. The LEF and layer map files (§3.6) are the only
ICAS input files that are dependent on the process technology. A LEF file describes the
geometries and characteristics of each standard cell in the cell library, and the layer map file
describes the layer name-to-number mappings, respectively, for a given process technology.
ICAS adapts to different process technologies provided that all input files adhere to their
specifications [27, 29].
3.8.6 Limitations
The goal of ICAS is to estimate the susceptibility of circuit layouts to additive hardware
Trojans, thus there are limitations. First, as implemented, ICAS is not capable of estimating
the susceptibility of a circuit layout to subtractive or substitution Trojans. I are unaware of
any stealthy and controllable subtractive hardware Trojans, but should researchers develop
such an attack, metrics will need to be added to ICAS to enable detection. Dopant-level
Trojans are the closest example of substitution Trojans [17, 90]. Though their non-existent
footprints make them difficult to detect via side channels, post-fabrication imaging tech-
niques that can identify such Trojans have been proposed [152]. Lastly, our implemented
metrics do not capture the threat of via-only additive Trojans. A via-only attack shorts two
vertically-adjacent wires for the purpose of leaking information. I feel the possibility of
such pernicious attacks in the future highlights the importance of ICAS’s extensibility.

















TS = Trigger Space; NB = Net Blockage; RD = Route Distance 
Add Transistors?
Figure 3.10: ICAS Coverage of Trojans. I assume that, at the very least, layout-level
additive Trojans require adding rogue wires to the layout3. Whether the Trojan
design is integrated (requires connecting to a host circuit) or standalone, or
requires additional transistors, the difficulty of inserting it into a victim IC
layout can be captured by our three metrics: 1) Trigger Space (TS), 2) Net
Blockage (NB), and 3) Route Distance (RD).
3.8.7 Justification for Metrics
As a first step in estimating risk, I chose to implement three metrics that capture our
decade worth of experience in implementing hardware Trojans: net blockage, trigger space,
and route distance. These metrics capture the challenges I faced when inserting various
types of additive Trojans into circuit layouts, i.e., Trojan logic placement, victim/Trojan
integration, intra-Trojan routing. To facilitate mapping our metrics to specific Trojans I
provide a taxonomy in Figure 3.10. To summarize the taxonomy: if a Trojan needs to attach
to a victim wire (i.e., an integrated Trojan), our Net Blockage metric provides coverage;
if the Trojan requires transistors to implement logic, our Trigger Space metric provides
coverage; and if the Trojan needs to be near the victim wire (for capacitive coupling in
the case of a standalone Trojan or to meet timing requirements in the case of a integrated
Trojan), our Route Distance metric provides coverage. Additionally, as our evaluation with
existing Trojans and real IC layouts shows, our metrics are both Trojan- and IC-layout-
sensitive. Lastly, the metrics are hardware design agnostic. While I do not suggest that
the implemented metrics are all-encompassing, our results suggest that these metrics are a
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viable first step towards estimating a circuit’s susceptibility to additive hardware Trojans.
3.9 Related Work
Fabrication-time attacks and defenses have been extensively researched. Attacks have
ranged in both size and triggering-complexity [17, 90, 101, 142, 196]. Defenses against
these attacks include: side-channel analysis [3, 13, 75, 117], imaging [2, 209], on-chip
sensors [48, 97], and preventive measures [9, 10, 40, 195]. The most pertinent attacks and
defenses are highlighted below.
3.9.1 Untrusted-foundry Attacks
The first foundry-level attack was conceived by Lin et al. [101]. This hardware Trojan
was comprised of approximately 100 additional logic gates and designed to covertly leak
the keys of an AES cryptographic accelerator using spread spectrum communication to
modulate information over a power side channel. While the authors only demonstrated this
attack on an FPGA, they are the first to mention the possibility of this type of Trojan circuit
being implanted at an untrusted foundry.
The A2 attack [196] is the most recent fabrication-time attack. A2’s analog triggering
mechanism is stealthy, controllable, and small. It prevents the Trojan from being exposed
during post-fabrication testing, or unintentionally through common usage. The attack re-
quires only two additional standard cells and evades every known detection mechanism to
date. ICAS quantifies the defensive coverage to these and other fabrication-time attacks.
3.9.2 Untrusted-foundry Defenses
Most untrusted foundry defenses rely on post-fabrication detection schemes [2, 3, 13,
48, 75, 97, 117, 209]. ICAS aims to guide innovation in preventive defenses against
fabrication-time attacks, for which few mechanisms currently exist [9, 10, 40, 195]. I high-
light some of these preventive measures and how ICAS could measure their effectiveness.
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While preventive security-by-design was first explored at the behavioral (RTL) level by
of Jin et al. [74], Xiao et al. were the first to demonstrate security-by-design at the layout-
level with their BISA (Built-In Self-Authentication) scheme [195]. The undirected BISA
approach attempts to eliminate all unused space on the device layer placement grid, and
create routing congestion, by filling the device layer with interconnected tamper-resistant
fill cells. Alternatively, recognizing the impracticality of filling 100% of the empty place-
ment sites in complex circuit designs, Ba et al. take a directed approach to filling empty
placement cites [9, 10]. Specifically, they only fill empty placement sites in close proximity
to security-critical nets.
3.10 Conclusion
ICAS is an extensible framework that I use to expose and quantify gaps in existing de-
fenses to the threat posed by an untrusted foundry. ICAS has two high-level components:
Nemo, a tool that bridges the semantic gap across IC design processes by tracking security-
critical signals across all stages of hardware development and GDSII-Score, a tool that
estimates the difficulty a foundry-level attacker faces in attacking security-critical logic.
Experiments with over 60 IC layouts across three open-source hardware cores and four
foundry-level hardware Trojans reveal that all current defenses leave the IC design vulner-
able to attack—and some are totally ineffective. These results show the value of a tool like
ICAS that can help designers identify and address defensive gaps.
From a high level, ICAS is momentus in that it makes security a first-class concern
during IC layout (in addition to power, area, and performance): ICAS allows IC designers
to measure the security implications of tool settings and design decisions. ICAS fits well
with existing IC design tools and flows, allowing them to consider security. ICAS is a
critical measurement tool that enables the systematic development of future physical-level
defenses against the threat of an untrusted foundry.
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Integrated circuits (ICs) are the foundation of computing systems. Security vulnerabili-
ties in silicon are devastating as they subvert even formally verified software. For almost 50
years, the transistors within ICs have continued to shrink, enhancing performance while re-
ducing power and area usage. However, these advances that push the laws of physics come
with a financial cost: the price to build a 3 nm fabrication facility capable of producing
ICs at a commercial scale is estimated to be $15–20B [94]. Even when entities can afford
to make such an investment, they must continually run the IC fabrication line (approxi-
mately 40,000 wafers/month) as many fabrication processes cannot be readily stopped and
restarted.
This extreme cost forces most semi-conductor companies, and even nation states, to
become “fabless”, i.e., they outsource fabrication. Today, only 3 companies in the world
(Intel, Samsung, and TSMC) have capabilities to fabricate ICs at the 10/7 nm process
nodes [95]. This presents a security threat: fabless semiconductor companies and nation
states must trust these three manufacturers (and their partners) not to alter their designs at
any point throughout the fabrication process (i.e., implant a hardware Trojan).
The most stealthy and controllable hardware Trojans involve inserting additional1 cir-
1Additive hardware Trojans are a class of Trojan designs that require additional hardware to be added to a
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cuit components designed to maliciously subvert the functionality of the chip (i.e., an addi-
tive hardware Trojan). Specifically, the A2 Trojan [196] utilizes only two additional cells—
one analog capacitor and one digital logic gate— to provide a hardware foothold [85] within
a microprocessor IC for an attacker to gain unauthorized supervisor privileges with user-
mode code.
There are now only two ways of defending against hardware Trojans implanted at
fabrication-time: post-fabrication detection [3, 48, 75, 97, 131, 209] and pre-fabrication
prevention [9, 195]. The former tries to detect the presence of Trojan components after the
chip has been fabricated, while the latter attempts to alter the IC’s physical layout, at design
time, in a way that makes foundry-side alterations challenging to an attacker.
Detection is more commonly studied than prevention and consists primarily of two
techniques [162]: 1) side-channel analysis and 2) functional testing. Side-channel analysis
attempts to detect noticeable deviations in power usage, electromagnetic (EM) emanations,
performance (timing), etc. [3, 75, 117, 131]. It often requires a “golden” reference chip to
be effective, and can only detect the side-channel signature deviations greater than those
caused by process variation (i.e., the hardware Trojan must have a large physical footprint).
Alternatively, functional testing attempts to inadvertently trigger the Trojan by activating
as many logic paths through the circuit as possible. Functional testing does not require
any “golden” reference chip, but it requires the Trojan’s trigger to be activated by the IC’s
common mode operation, as exhaustive testing of even a moderately complex integrated
circuit is infeasible.
Albeit less studied, prevention is another defense against fabrication-time hardware
Trojans. To prevent such attacks, I advocate that the placement and routing of security
critical circuit elements should be a first-class part of an IC’s back-end design, on the
level of performance, power, and cost. To the best of my knowledge, only three preventive
circuit design. I are unaware of any documented stealthy and controllable subtractive or substitution Trojans.
Dopant-level Trojans [17, 90, 142] are the closest to such; however, they have limited controllability and are
detectable [152].
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Figure 4.1: T-TER is a preventive layout-level defense against fabrication-time Trojans.
T-TER deploys tamper-evident guard wires around security-critical wires in a
circuit layout—in a pattern similar to variant A or B—to prevent attackers from
attaching Trojan wires to them.
fabrication-time defenses have been explored [9, 10, 195]. All of them are placement-
centric, attempting to increase the device layer (core) density by filling empty spaces with
with tamper-evident logic gates, thus making it challenging for an attacker to find open
space in the design to insert their Trojan components (cells/gates). However, there are sev-
eral problems with placement-centric defenses. As Ba et al. [10] point out, the BISA cell
approach [195] is infeasible as it requires 100% placement density. Contrast this with the
60-80% density of current IC layouts that ensures routability. If 100% density were fea-
sible, every IC design would be manufactured that way to save cost. Alternatively, Ba et
al. [9, 10] suggest targeted filling: only filling placement sites that are located closest to
“security-critical” logic. While prioritizing security-critical logic is a significant improve-
ment, focusing on the device layer only impedes attacks due to inflated timing require-
ments, it does not prevent them, as §4.6.2.2 shows.
Unfortunately, no single technique is effective in detecting, and/or preventing the inser-
tion of the stealthiest known additive hardware Trojan, the A2 Trojan [196], which requires
only two additional cells. To fill this gap, I propose Targeted Tamper-Evident Routing (T-
TER), a routing-centric defense that prevents foundry-side attackers from routing Trojan
wires to, or directly adjacent to, security-critical wires. I define T-TER as any routing
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method that protects security-critical wires from fabrication-time alterations. Specifically,
I leverage concepts from the signal-integrity domain [60, 61] and apply them to a secu-
rity domain (addressing several technical challenges along the way): I route “guard wires”
around security-critical wires that make it infeasible for an attacker to tap any such wire
without detection (i.e., tamper-evident), something characteristic of additive Trojans [169]
(Fig. 4.1). Extending signal-integrity domain techniques to the security domain entails two
technical challenges:
1. completely shielding all surfaces of critical wires,
2. and be tamper-evident.
Contrary to placement-centric defenses, which focus on preventing attack implementation,
T-TER focuses on preventing attack integration, and thus, does not require filling all the
empty space in an IC design to be effective.
I make the following contributions:
• Targeted Tamper-Evident Routing (T-TER): a routing-centric, preventative, defense
against stealthy IC fabrication-time attacks. T-TER places tamper-evident guard
wires alongside security-critical wires, making fabrication-time modifications to such
wires infeasible and/or detectable post-fabrication.
• Characterization of possible guard wire bypass attacks.
• Attack-driven design of designed-in guard wires. Designed-in guard wires are added
during the place-and-route phase of the IC design process for the sole purpose of
defending security-critical wires. They have minimal routing constraints and can
guard all surfaces of designer-targeted wires.
• Automated routing toolchain for deploying guard wires within an IC layout that in-
tegrates with commercial and open-source VLSI CAD tools.
• Evaluation of the effectiveness of T-TER compared to previous defenses against both
digital and analog A2 Trojans embedded in a System-on-Chip intended to be a sur-
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rogate for DoD systems of interest [108], using a recently published fabrication-time
threat assessment tool [169]. The results indicate T-TER is more effective than ex-
isting placement-centric defenses [9, 10, 195], and is capable of thwarting even the
stealthiest additive hardware Trojans, including A2 [196].2
4.2 Background
4.2.1 Fabrication-Time Attack Steps
As described in §3.2.2, implanting a hardware Trojan into an IC layout at fabrication-
time requires three steps [169]:
1. Trojan Placement,
2. Victim/Trojan Integration, and
3. Intra-Trojan Routing.
Trojan Placement is the process of finding empty space on the IC’s device layer (Fig. 4.2)
to add additional circuit components, e.g., logic gates, to construct the Trojan trigger and
payload. Victim/Trojan Integration requires attaching a rogue Trojan wire, or routing it
directly adjacent, to an unblocked surface on a security-critical wire(s). Lastly, Intra-Trojan
Routing involves routing the Trojan circuit components to the Victim/Trojan integration
point—the unblocked security-critical wire segment.
4.2.2 Layout-Level Defenses.
Prior work attempts to thwart fabrication-time attacks by increasing the difficulty of
Trojan Placement: filling empty space on the IC’s device layer with temper-evident func-
tional logic gates [9, 10, 195]. As shown in [169], this approach is only effective for Trojans
2It is important to note that routing-centric and placement-centric defenses are compatible (belt and sus-






















Figure 4.2: Three Dimensional IC Layout. Typical 3D physical IC layout designed dur-
ing the place-and-route IC design phase (Fig. 2.1). On the bottom is a device
layer, and stacked above are several routing layers.
with large footprints, as filling all placement sites is infeasible [10], and even targeting fill
around security-critical logic [9] leaves the IC layout vulnerable to Trojans with small foot-
prints [196]. Orthogonally, T-TER targets Victim/Trojan Integration by directing protection,
at the routing level, around wires Trojans want to attach to.
4.2.3 Time-Domain Reflectometry (TDR)
Time-domain reflectometry (TDR) is an electrical analysis technique used to measure
physical characteristics about a transmission line (i.e., a wire) such as length, number and
distance between impedance discontinuities (e.g., bends), propagation delay, dielectric con-
stant, etc. [56, 64]. Foundries already use TDR to perform root cause analysis on chips that
fail post-fabrication testing—often during bring-up of a new process node. TDR works by
characterizing a wire within a circuit by injecting a single rising pulse down that wire and
analyzing its reflection(s).
4.2.4 IC Interconnect Models
There are two ways to model IC wires (interconnect): lumped and transmission-line
models [12]. Lumped interconnect models approximate interconnects using networks of
resistors and capacitors. Transmission-line models approximate interconnects as transmis-
sion lines with a characteristic impedance and propagation delay.
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The choice of interconnect model is a function of maximum frequency component to
wire length [153]. A common rule of thumb for IC interconnects is: a wire is considered
a transmission line if its length is greater than ≈10% of the wavelength of the maximum
frequency component it transmits [153]. In digital electronics, it is common to think of
signals in terms of rise and fall times, rather than maximum frequency component. Thus,
one can modify the prior rule of thumb to: a wire is considered as a transmission line if the
transmitted signal rise time, Trise, is less than twice the wire’s propagation delay, Tpd [153].
Eq. (4.1) captures this rule of thumb.
Model =

Transmission Line, Trise < 2Tpd
Lumped RC, otherwise
(4.1)
Choosing the right model is vital to understanding operational limitations and ensuring
signal integrity within an IC layout. For example, an interconnect that carries a high-speed
signal transitions will observe signal reflections from impedance discontinuities that are
destructive to the signal integrity of the overall system. Modeling such interconnects using
a lumped RC model can hide these destructive effects, while a transmission-line model
would not.
4.2.5 TDR for IC Fault Analysis
By Eq. (4.1), the faster the rising edge of TDR’s incident pulse, the finer-grain of propa-
gation delay changes are detectable. TDR was first developed as a fault-analysis technique
for long transmission lines, such as telephone or optical communication lines [129, 146].
As commercial TDR systems became more advanced, TDR became a standard IC packag-
ing fault analysis tool [36, 119, 144]. Researchers have now demonstrated terahertz- level
TDR systems capable of locating faults in IC interconnects to nanometer-scale accuracies
[30, 115, 160, 164]. With such fine-grain resolution, TDR is an ideal tamper-analysis
technique for ensuring the integrity of the guard wires used in T-TER (§4.6.4).
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4.3 Threat Model
Again, in this chapter, I adopt the threat model for fabrication-time attacks—§2.3.1 and
Figure 2.3A. While there are many types of hardware Trojans [135] (§2.2), in this chapter,
I again focus on additive Trojans, rather than subtractive or substitution Trojans. Additive
Trojans require implanting additional circuit components and wiring into the IC design. I
focus on additive Trojans as there are no documented stealthy and controllable examples of
subtractive or substitution Trojans that I are aware of. The closest example of such Trojans
are dopant-level Trojans [17, 90, 142], all of which have limited controllability and are
detectable with optical microscopy [152].
Previous work shows that to successfully implement an additive hardware Trojan, the
adversary must complete the three steps—Trojan Placement, Victim/Trojan Integration,
and Intra-Trojan Routing [169]—without being exposed. Namely, they must 1) find empty
space on the device layer to insert the Trojan’s components (logic gates/cells), 2) locate an
unblocked segment on a security-critical wire to attach the Trojan to, and 3) route the Tro-
jan components to that unblocked wire segment. They are restricted from modifying the
dimensions of the chip and/or violating manufacturing design rules that would risk their
exposure. They are allowed to move components and/or existing wiring around, but are
constrained by available resources (e.g., time) and correctness from making mass pertur-
bations to the layout. As process technologies scale, manufacturing design rules become
increasingly complex [147]. Thus, rearranging components and/or existing wiring comes
at a substantial cost. The time to complete any layout modifications, and verify such mod-
ifications have not violated design correctness, cannot disrupt the fabrication turn-around
time expected by their customers.3 Additionally, the attacker avoids any modifications that
are detectable using existing test-case or side-channel based defenses. While it would be
trivial for an attacker with infinite time and resources to reverse-engineer the physical lay-
out into HDL, add a Trojan, and re-run the design through the entire IC design process
3Typically, fabrication turn-around times are ≈3 months [93, 173].
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(Fig. 2.1) thus generating an entirely new layout, such an attack will be infeasible within
the hard time limits of fabrication contracts, thus outside the scope of our threat model.
4.4 Targeted Tamper-Evident Routing (T-TER)
T-TER aims to make the second step of Trojan insertion—Victim/Trojan Integration
(§4.2.1)—intractable by shielding the surfaces of targeted wires (interconnects) with tamper-
evident guard wires (§4.2.2), creating an additional obstacle for adversaries to overcome.
Similar to prior work [9, 10, 102, 169], T-TER is made practical by leveraging the obser-
vation that, for most hardware designs, only a subset of the IC is security-critical [59, 74,
102, 167, 205, 207], or the target of a hardware Trojan. In designing T-TER, I pose three
questions:
1. Which wires in the design are security-critical (should be guarded)?
2. How can an attacker bypass T-TER guard wires?
3. How do I design guard wires that are tamper-evident with respect to bypass attacks?
4.4.1 Identifying Security-Critical Nets to Guard
While identifying security-critical features in a design is an orthogonal problem—and
an ongoing area of research [59, 74, 102, 167, 205, 207]— identifying the nets (wires)
that comprise said features is the first step in deploying T-TER. Currently, there exist
two techniques for identifying security-critical nets: 1) manual [59, 74, 102] or 2) semi-
autonomous [205, 207]. In manual identification, a human expert analyzes the design’s
specification, and the corresponding HDL, and flags nets that implement features critical
to the security of software or other hardware that interface to the design [59, 74, 102]. Al-
ternatively, in semi-autonomous identification, a set of security-critical nets for a specific
design are first manually identified [59, 74], or mined from a list of published errata [205],
and either: 1) used to train a classifier that identifies similar nets in other designs [205],
2) expanded using information flow [167] or fan-in analyses [169], or 3) translated to an
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entirely different design [207]. In this chapter, I adopt the most common approach in this
area of semi-autonomous identification [9, 169].
4.4.2 Guard Wire Bypass Attacks
With T-TER deployed, attackers must bypass guard wires—by exposing the surface
of a security-critical wire(s)—to complete Victim/Trojan Integration, i.e., connect a rogue
Trojan wire to a security-critical wire(s) (§4.2.1). Given a set of interconnected guard wires
(Fig. 4.1), there are three ways an attacker can bypass them, color-coded by attacker dif-
ficulty (Fig. 4.3): A) delete, B) move, or C) jog attacks. In a deletion attack (Fig. 4.3A),
entire guard wire(s) are removed from the layout. While this attack is easy to implement, it
is also easy to defend. A post-fabrication continuity check of a connected set of guard wires
will detect a deletion attack. In a move attack (Fig. 4.3B), all interconnected guard wires
are left intact, but translated to another location on the chip. Move attacks are the most
difficult to implement: an attacker must find a contiguous group of unused routing tracks
to translate each set of guard wires too. Even then, a post-fabrication cross-talk analysis
between security-critical and guard wires would expose this attack [60, 131]. Lastly, in a
jog attack, guard wires are lengthened to make room for a rogue Trojan wire to connect to
a security-critical wire using a via. Jog attacks strike a compromise in terms of implemen-
tation difficulty, and are the stealthiest of all bypass attacks. They are easier to implement
than move attacks, and are undetectable with post-fabrication continuity tests or cross-talk
analyses. The only artifacts of a jog attack are: 1) a change in the number of bends in the
guard wire, i.e. number of impedance discontinuities, and/or 2) an increase in the guard
wire’s length. However, nanometer scale TDR [115, 160] detects these changes (§4.6.4).
4.4.3 Tamper-Evident Guard Wires
While techniques for detecting all three bypass attacks exist, each of them requires the
ability to measure physical characteristics (e.g., continuity, cross-talk, and length) about a
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A) Delete B) Move C) Jog
Security-Critical Wires Guard Wires Attack Point
Figure 4.3: There are three ways an attacker could bypass T-TER guard wires to connect
a Trojan wire to a security-critical wire, color-coded by attacker difficulty: A)
delete guard wire(s), B) move an intact set of guard wires, or C) jog guard wires
out of the way. I study the jog attack to assess defensive sensitivity, as it strikes
a balance in attacker difficulty, and is the most difficult to detect.
guard wire post-fabrication. How do I design guard wires whose physical characteristics
are tamper-evident post-fabrication? Based on these considerations, I take a straw-man
approach in designing guard wires capable of preventing even the stealthiest of attacks.
4.4.3.1 Naı̈ve Approach: Re-purpose Existing Wires
One idea for constructing guard wires is to re-purpose existing non-security-critical
wires, inherent to the host IC design, as guard wires. Such an approach creates hyper-local
routing densities nearby security-critical wires, thus limiting or eliminating the locations
where an attacker can attach rogue Trojan wires. By re-purposing pre-existing wires as
guard wires, the guard wires incur no hardware overhead. Unfortunately, there are addi-
tional routing constraints (e.g., toggle frequency, length, layer, location, timing sensitive,
and spacing) that limit the pool of candidate guard wires. Even when such constraints are
met, the guard wires are only tamper-evident with respect to deletion and move attacks.
For an existing wire to also be tamper-evident with respect to the more stealthy jog and
bypass attacks, it must be timing-critical (i.e., if it is made longer, then it will cause timing
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violations that manifest as run-time errors). As Fig. 4.5 shows, deployment using existing
guard wires is challenging. Namely, the lack of suitable wires in many designs makes it
infeasible to block all surfaces of all security-critical wires.
4.4.3.2 Designed-in Guard Wires
To fill the gaps of existing wires, I propose designed-in guard wires. Designed-in guard
wires are not inherent to the host IC design. Rather, they are added to the design during the
place-and-route IC design phase (Fig. 2.1). Since they do not implement any circuit func-
tionality, they have fewer routing constraints. As I show in Fig. 4.5, completely blocking
the accessible surface area of all security-critical wires is trivial. While designed-in guard
wires incur hardware overhead, i.e., additional wires, they completely block an attacker
from attaching a Trojan wire at fabrication time (Victim/Trojan Integration, §4.2.1), as
shown in Fig. 4.6. Additionally, designed-in guard wires are tamper-evident with respect
to all bypass attacks, when coupled with post-fabrication analysis techniques like con-
tinuity checking, cross-talk analysis, and time-domain reflectometry (§4.2.3 and §4.6.4),
respectively.
There are several designed-in guard wire architectures that may be deployed, listed
in order of increasing difficulty of deployment: 1) fully-disjoint, 2) partially-connected,
and 3) fully-connected. Fully-disjoint designed-in guard wires are not connected between
sides, i.e., the guard wires on each side of a security-critical wire are never connected to
one another. Partially-connected guard wires allow for a single guard wire to be utilized on
multiple sides. For example, a security-critical wire could be guarded on the north, east,
and west sides by a single guard wire that wraps around the security-critical wire. Lastly,
fully-connected guard wires are formed when a single guard wire is routed around all sides
of all security-critical wires, as shown in Fig. 4.1.
To detect tampering of designed-in guard wires post-fabrication, their analog charac-
teristics of must be observable. This can be implemented either on-chip, e.g., with internal
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sensors [82] or ring oscillators [208], or off-chip, e.g., with two I/O pins and a one-time
programmable fabric [102]. If fully-joint or partially-connected designed-in guard-wires
are deployed, the one-time programmable fabric could be randomly programmed to route
both ends of a single (fully-disjoint) or single-set (partially-connected) of guard wire(s) to
the two pins. If fully-connected designed-in guard wires are deployed, the one-time pro-
grammable fabric is not needed, as both ends of the guard wires set can be routed to the
two pins.
4.5 Implementation
I develop an automated toolchain for deploying T-TER in modern IC designs. My
toolchain integrates with existing IC design flows (Fig. 2.1) that utilize commercial VLSI
CAD tools. Specifically, I implement the T-TER toolchain around the Cadence Innovus Im-
plementation System [25], a commercial place-and-route (PaR) CAD tool. The toolchain
is invoked by modifying a place-and-route TCL script,4 as shown in Fig. 4.4.
4.5.1 Place-&-Route Process
The PaR design phase (Fig. 2.1) is typically automated by a CAD tool, programmat-
ically driven by TCL script(s). There are several steps to PaR that are performed in the
following order: 1) floor-planning, 2) placement, 3) clock tree synthesis, 4) routing, and
5) filling. To ensure that all guard-wires are routed optimally, I modify the order of these
PaR steps. Specifically, after floor-planning (1), I use my automated toolchain to place
identified components and route identified wires and their guard wires. My toolchain then
permanently fixes the locations of these components and wires to prevent the PaR CAD tool
from modifying their positions and/or shapes throughout the remainder of the PaR process.
Lastly, I utilize the PaR CAD tool to place all other components (2), synthesize the clock
4Tool Command Language (TCL) scripts are the standard programmatic interface to commercial VLSI
CAD tools. IC designers often develop a set of scripts for driving the CAD tools that automate most of the
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Guard Unblocked Wire Surfaces
Figure 4.4: T-TER is an automated toolchain consisting of three phases. My toolchain first
identifies which wires are security-critical, determines potential (unblocked) at-
tachment points, and routes guard wires to block all attachment points. Identi-
fied components & wires are placed & routed before phase (A) of my toolchain
is invoked. Before continuing with the traditional PaR flow, the protected nets
and their guard wires are locked in-place to ensure they are untouched through-
out the remainder of the layout process.
tree (3), route remaining wires(4) and fill the design with filler (capacitor) cells.
4.5.2 Automated Toolchain
The T-TER toolchain automates the insertion of either existing or designed-in guard
wires around wires in need of protection. The toolchain consists of three main phases
(Fig. 4.4). The first phase (A) identifies security-critical nets. The second phase (B) iden-
tifies the unblocked surfaces of all of these nets within a GDSII-encoded layout. The last
phase (C) guards the nets and their influencer nets by routing guard wires nearby. I provide
additional implementation details on all three stages of the T-TER toolchain below.
4.5.2.1 Identifying Nets.
The first phase of T-TER requires identifying nets in the design to guard, i.e., nets that
are security-critical. Phase A of my toolchain (Fig. 4.4A) utilizes a semi-autonomous ap-
proach to identifying such nets (§4.4.1). Specifically, my toolchain assumes the designer
has manually flagged a set of root security-critical nets in the behavioral-level HDL by ap-
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pending a unique prefix—secure —to each signal (net) name. During PaR, my toolchain
performs a data-flow analysis of the circuit netlist to locate the direct fan-in—to a con-
figurable depth—of each root net. Since the netlist is often modified by PaR CAD tools
to meet various design constraints (e.g., power, performance, and area), I disable the op-
timization of all root nets during PaR. Given the interconnected nature of nets within an
IC design, an adversary may elect to target a net that influences a root net, rather than the
root net itself. My toolchain addresses this indirection, using an autonomous approach that
widens the set of targeted nets to the root nets and those that influence root nets (to a de-
signer configurable degree). The remainder of my tool flow focuses on protecting this set
of targeted nets.
My fan-in analysis tool is a custom-backend to the Icarus Verilog (IVL) front-end Ver-
ilog compiler [192], and is implemented in C++. It performs a breadth-first search over the
circuit-level data-flow graph generated by IVL. I release my fan-in analysis tool under an
open-source license.
4.5.2.2 Identifying Unblocked Wire Surfaces.
The second phase of T-TER is identifying the unblocked surfaces of targeted nets in a
physical IC layout, i.e., potential locations of Trojan wire attachment. To do so, I imple-
ment, and open-source, a Python tool that analyzes the GDSII layout file containing only
the placed-and-routed targeted components and wires. My tool implements a 3-D scanning
window approach to search the 3-D boundary surrounding each targeted wire, and compute
the areas on each wire’s surfaces that are not blocked by other wires or circuit components.
While it is traditional for designers to only route wires on defined routing tracks, i.e., on
a pre-defined routing grid, it may be possible for an attacker to route Trojan wires off this
grid, so long as they maintain the minimum spacing requirements dictated by the manu-
facturing design rules. Thus, my tool takes a conservative approach when scanning for
unblocked wire surfaces, only scanning the 3-D boundary surrounding each targeted wire
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that extends up to the minimum-spacing requirements defined for the given, and adjacent
(top/bottom), routing layers. If and only if another component or wire overlaps a region
of the 3-D boundary surrounding a targeted wire, that surface region will be considered
blocked. The output of this stage of my toolchain is a list of coordinates within the 3-D
place-and-route grid that must be filled with guard wires during the next phase in the T-TER
toolchain.
4.5.2.3 Guard Unblocked Wire Surfaces.
The last stage of the T-TER toolchain (Fig. 4.4) is a custom guard wire routing tool,
also implemented in Python. It takes as input exact locations of targeted wires and their
unblocked sides (output from Phase B, §4.5.2.2) and generates a TCL script that integrates
with the Cadence Innovus Digital Implementation platform [25] to automatically route
the guard wires. This TCL script is executed immediately after the targeted wires have
been routed, but before placing the remaining components. Depending on the guard wires
being deployed, existing or designed-in, different guard wire TCL scripts are generated
(described below).5 Note, in either case, my toolchain routes guard wires that are compliant
with all manufacturing design rules.
There are numerous ways existing guard wires can be implemented. Since commercial
PaR CAD tools do not offer an interface to enable fine-grain constraints between two un-
related signal wires, I develop an indirect method for implementing existing guard wires.
I implement existing guard wires by constraining placement and routing resources nearby
targeted wires. First, I identify all circuit components (i.e., logic gates) connected to all
targeted wires, i.e., targeted components. Next, I draw a bounding box around these com-
ponents and extend this boundary vertically by Y% of the overall box height, and horizon-
tally by X% of the overall box width. Then, I set placement and routing density screens in
5While existing guard wires fail to defend against all types of guard wire attacks (§4.4.3.1), I implement
a tool to deploy them in order to empirically show they are also inferior to designed-in guard wires in terms
of surface-are coverage (Figs. 4.5 & 4.6), and thus should not be used in a security context.
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the portion of the IC layout that lies outside the bounding box. These constraints limit the
placement and routing resources outside the bounding box, thus forcing more components
and wiring within the bounding box. With increased routing density nearby targeted wires,
they are less accessible by Trojan payload delivery wires. The values of X, Y, and density
screen configuration settings are optimized to maximize the net blockage metric computed
by the GDS2Score metric.
Designed-in guard wires are more straightforward to implement. The automated guard
wire deployment toolchain locates all unblocked surfaces (north, south, east, west, top, and
bottom) of all targeted wires and routes guard wires in these regions. After all guard wire
segments are routed, they are connected according to the architecture chosen (§4.4.3.2).
4.6 Evaluation
I evaluate T-TER in three areas. First, I explore the effectiveness of T-TER at closing
the fabrication-time attack surface of three security-critical features within an open-source
System-on-Chip (SoC), with regard to the stealthiest additive Trojan known: the A2 Tro-
jan [196]. I compare the capabilities of T-TER with existing state-of-the-art layout-level
defenses [9, 10, 195]. Next, I demonstrate the practicality of T-TER, analyzing its power,
performance, and area overheads. Finally, I perform a threat assessment, demonstrating
how guard wires are tamper-evident.
4.6.1 Experimental Setup
4.6.1.1 Surrogate SoC
I utilize the open-source Common Evaluation Platform (CEP) SoC design [109] for my
evaluation. The CEP platform is designed as a surrogate SoC system for testing a vari-
ety of DoD-oriented IC technologies. It contains a general-purpose processor core, five
cryptographic cores, four digital signal processing cores, and a GPS core. I focus on three
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cores from in the SoC: the processor core, the DFT core, and the AES core. The OR1200
processor6 is a 5-stage pipelined CPU that implements a 32-bit OR1K instruction set and
Wishbone bus interface [121], and is the same design used in previous fabrication-time
attack studies [169, 196]. It supports Linux via BusyBox [178]. The AES core supports
128-bit key sizes. The DFT accelerator implements a Discrete Fourier Transform algo-
rithm, a common component of radar and other sensing systems.
I target a 45 nm Silicon-On-Insulator (SOI) process technology with 10 available rout-
ing layers. I synthesize my design with Cadence Genus (v16.23), and placed-and-route it
using Cadence Innovus (v17.1). All layout variations of my SoC target a 100 MHz clock
frequency and a core density of 60–80%. All CAD tools are run on a server with 2.5 GHz
Intel Xeon E5-2640 CPU and 64GB of memory, running Red Hat Enterprise Linux (v6.9).
4.6.1.2 A2 Trojan
The goal of T-TER is to protect security-critical features within SoCs from the stealth-
iest additive Trojan currently known, the A2 Trojan [196]. The A2 Trojan is stealthy, i.e.,
evades current prevention and detection defenses, due to its small size and complex trig-
gering mechanism. When implemented within my surrogate SoC, in a 45 nm process, the
analog variant of the A2 Trojan [196] requires only two additional cells that occupy 20
placements sites, while the entirely digital variant of the same attack requires 91 additional
cells that occupy 1,444 placement sites. The analog A2 attack is not timing critical: the
Trojan components may be placed anywhere on the placement grid, at any distance from
the Victim/Trojan integration point. Conversely, the digital A2 attack is timing-critical:
the length of the interconnect between the Trojan components and the Victim/Trojan in-
tegration point must be within three standard deviations from the mean net length in the
6I use the OR1200 version of the CEP rather RISC-V version since the OR1200 is the processor used in
the A2 Trojan [196]. I are not aware of similar Trojans available in the RISC-V. I expect similar results for
the RISC-V version of the CEP since both processors are RISC-based, in-order, scalar, pipelined, capable
of running Linux, and operate at similar clock frequencies. Thus, from an IC layout perspective, they have
similar features (e.g., wire lengths) and will have similar hardware overheads.
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A2 Analog [196] 2 20 7
A2 Digital [196] 91 1444 3
overall SoC (this is an entirely worst-case estimate borrowed from [169]). I summarize
the placement and routing resource requirements for the two variants of the A2 Trojan in
Table 4.1.
4.6.1.3 Exemplar Nets of Interest
For this evaluation, I need to protect nets that my example Trojan might want to use as
integration points. Leveraging existing hardware Trojan payloads, I select three reference
integration targets within my SoC design to protect with T-TER:
1. processor supervisor bit (supv),
2. DFT computation ready interrupt (next out),
3. cryptographic key bits (key [0:127]).
The most popular hardware Trojans leverage the supervisor (supv) net as part of privilege
escalation attacks [58, 85, 196]. Alternatively, hardware Trojans can also hide specific
computations or state transitions, e.g., a Trojan that disables the DFT computation-ready
interrupt signal (or next out signal) that informs the CPU when a DFT computation is
ready. Lastly, another popular hardware Trojan seeks to leak cryptographic key bits via
side channels [101]. The A2 trigger can be attached to any of the nets that carry these
signals to mount an attack, so I protect the interconnects that comprise these nets.
The initial stage (Fig. 4.4A) of my automated T-TER toolchain assumes the designer
has manually annotated the root nets they have chosen to target with T-TER (§4.5.2.1).
Thus, I manually annotate the above net (signal) definitions with the prefix secure within
my SoC design’s RTL. I then synthesize and place-and-route my design prior to generating
a final, optimized, netlist for which my toolchain computes the fan-in to each manually
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annotated net—to a depth of two layers of logic gates—thereby expanding the final set
of all targeted nets (i.e., those guarded by T-TER). Fig. 4.7 (far right) shows the number
of interconnect wires that comprise each set of nets that implement the aforementioned
features within my surrogate SoC.
4.6.2 Effectiveness
I first evaluate the effectiveness of T-TER in thwarting the insertion of hardware Tro-
jans at fabrication time. I compare the degree of protection provided by T-TER with that
provided by deploying the current state-of-the-art preventive defense suggested by Ba et
al. [9, 10]. This placement-based defense involves filling as many empty placement sites
as possible (they show filling 95% of all placement sites is the max feasible), prioritizing
empty sites nearest security-critical nets. I use my automated toolchain (§4.5.2) to deploy
both types of guard wires (existing and designed-in). I assume the best case scenario for Ba
et al.’s placement defense [9, 10] by filling 95% of the device layer with inverter cells—the
smallest cells in my 45 nm cell library, for fine grain filling.
I use the ICAS framework [169] to quantify the effectiveness of each defense. ICAS
analyzes the physical layout of an IC (encoded in a GSDII file), and computes security
metrics detailing the IC layout’s fabrication-time attack surface. Namely, it computes three
metrics: 1) trigger space, 2) net blockage, and 3) route distance. The trigger space met-
ric characterizes the open space on the device layer (empty placement sites) available for
an attacker to add their Trojan components. The net blockage metric computes the per-
centage of surface area of identified nets that are blocked by other circuit components
or wiring. Lastly, the route distance metric computes the minimal distance between un-
blocked identified nets and unused placement sites that an adversary would have to route
a rogue Trojan wire to “connect” the hardware Trojan to the host IC. The trigger space
metric quantifies the difficulty of performing Trojan Placement, the net blockage quantifies






Figure 4.5: Plot of the net blockage [169] computed across three different sets of targeted
nets within my SoC layout, with and without guard wires.
tifies the difficulty of performing Intra-Trojan Routing (§4.2.1). Of the three ICAS metrics,
the net blockage metric is most adept to quantifying the deployability of each guard wire
type (existing and designed-in), i.e., how effective each guard wire type is at shielding all
targeted nets. Alternatively, the route distance metric is the adept at comparing T-TER
with Ba et al.’s placement defense, as it is essentially a combination of the trigger space
metric—an entirely placement-focused metric—and the net-blockage metric—an entirely
routing-focused metric. Therefore, I utilize these two ICAS metrics in the following eval-
uation.
4.6.2.1 Net Blockage Results
Both existing and designed-in guard wires attempt to block targeted nets to prevent
attackers from attaching rogue wires to them, thus minimizing/eliminating possible Vic-
tim/Trojan Integration points (§4.2.1). I use the net blockage metric to compute the surface-
area-coverage differences between existing and designed-in guard wires. Fig. 4.5 compares
the net blockage computed across three total IC layouts of the same SoC design, includ-
ing: three guard wires variations—without guard wires, with existing guard wires, and with
designed-in guard wires—across three different sets of targeted nets. All net-blockage re-
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sults are with respect to each set of targeted nets in the SoC.
Across all three sets of targeted nets, designed-in guard wire provide more protection
than existing guard wires, as expected. Specifically, for all nets, designed-in guard wires
achieve 100% net blockage. This means that there is no place on any targeted net within the
SoC where an attacker can attach a rogue wire. Existing guard wires are unable to achieve
100% coverage due mainly to having to meet their own routing constraints which prevents
my tool from locating enough nets to block all surfaces of all targeted nets, making them
ineffective at thwarting attacks.
4.6.2.2 Route Distance Results
Since T-TER only limits the routing resources needed to insert a Trojan at fabrication
time, it is vital to understand how T-TER reduces the overall fabrication-time attack surface,
i.e., both Trojan routing and placement resources. I use the route distance metric to locate
all possible combinations of unused placement sites and unblocked targeted nets—i.e., all
possible Trojan attack configurations [169]. I use the route distance metric to illustrate the
attack surface across each core within my SoC where that contains the root net of interest.
I analyze the route distance metric with respect to each containing core, as it is common
practice for IC layout engineers to lay out each core separately, before integrating them,
plus this increases the clarity of presentation.
Fig. 4.6 shows the route distance metric as computed across all three containing cores,
with and without layout-level defenses including: 1) T-TER (both existing and designed-
in guard wires) and 2) defensive placement. Each heatmap is intended to be analyzed
column-wise, where each column is a histogram of the distances between unblocked tar-
geted nets and trigger-spaces7 within a size range. Namely, each heatmap illustrates the
fabrication-time attack surface of each IC layout. If a circuit has no attack configurations,
i.e., all targeted nets are blocked or there are no trigger-spaces, the route distance heatmap
7Trigger spaces are contiguous groups of placement sites that are empty, or contain (removable) capacitive
fill cells [169]
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Figure 4.6: Plot of the ICAS route distance metric [169] computed across four different lay-
outs of each core within my surrogate SoC, with and without guard wires and
Ba et al.’s defensive placement [9, 10]. Each heatmap illustrates the percentage
of (targeted net, trigger-space) pairs (possible Trojan layout implementations)
of varying distances apart. The heatmaps are intended to be analyzed by col-
umn, as each column encodes a histogram of possible attack configurations
with trigger-spaces of a given size range (X-axis). Route distances (Y-axis)
are displayed in terms of standard deviations from mean net length in each re-
spective design. Heatmaps that are completely dark indicate no possible attack
configurations exist, i.e., no placement/routing resources to insert any Trojan.
Overlaid on each heatmap are rectangles indicating regions on the heatmap a
given A2 Trojan (Tab. 4.1) may exploit, and markers (checks and x-marks) in-
dicating if a non-zero number of specific Trojan layout implementations are
possible.
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is completely dark (column ratios of 0). If it is impossible to eradicate all attack configu-
rations, the most secure layout for such a circuit would have maximum distances between
unblocked targeted net and trigger-spaces, i.e., a heatmap with the top row the lightest color
(top row ratios of 1). This is because larger distances increase the signal delay for the hard-
ware Trojan; increasing the challenge of the attacker to meet timing constraints for their
attack. Overlaid on each heatmap are rectangles indicating the region of the attack surface
that is exploitable by the color-coded Trojan, and check- or x-marks indicating whether any
possible attack configurations exist for that attack. A check-mark indicates there are zero
possible Trojan layouts (success)), where an x-mark indicates the opposite (vulnerable).
Designed-in guard wires outperform existing guard wires and placement-centric de-
fenses. For all three example attack payloads, designed-in guard wires were able to close
the fabrication-time attack-surface by completely blocking all targeted nets (Fig. 4.5). There-
fore, even the stealthiest A2 Trojan [196] cannot be utilized to attack the features-of-interest
within my SoC.
4.6.3 Practicality
T-TER is effective, but is it practical? I evaluate the cost of deploying T-TER across
three exemplar security-critical features within my SoC that have been subject to attack.
Specifically, I analyze the power, route density, and performance (timing) overheads in-
curred by deploying both existing and designed-in guard wires from §4.6.2. Note, while
T-TER guard-wires can be deployed on any routing layer, I chose to prioritize routing
security-critical nets on metal layers three and four (out of 10 total layers) to measure over-
heads in the worst case, i.e., guard wires routed on layers 2–5. Measurements are taken
with respect to each feature’s containing core, similar to the route distance measurement.
While it is common to analyze power, performance, and area, of an IC design, I instead an-
alyze power, performance and route density. Area measurements refer to the device-layer
area, i.e., width and length, since the height (number of routing layers) is fixed for a given
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Figure 4.7: T-TER hardware overheads. The far right plot shows the number of wire (route)
segments that implement the labeled security-critical feature (set of nets) in my
surrogate SoC.
process technology. Since T-TER does not require additional logic gates, I do not increase
the width and height (area) of the core area, rather T-TER alters the total wire length in the
design. Thus, measuring routing density overhead is more meaningful. I use the built-in
features of Cadence tools to compute these overheads.
Fig. 4.7 shows my results. Power and timing overheads were both less than 1%. In
some cases, the timing was better for the guard wire designs. This is expected as T-TER
does not require any additional logic gates, nor lengthen existing wires. Rather, the guard
wires increase routing constraints that can push the PaR CAD tool to produce more optimal
routing solutions. The route density overhead was less than 1% for all existing guard wires,
and similar for designed-in guard wires when the number of targeted nets to guard is small,
namely the supv and next out nets. Intuitively, the more guard wires inserted, the higher
the routing density increase. Keeping route density low is important to ensure automated
CAD tools can route each design. However, even though all layouts targeted a placement
density (density of logic gates on the device layer) of 60–80%, route density was relatively
low even with guard wires. This was due to the characteristics of the designs and process
technology (i.e., back-end-of-line metal stack option).
It is worth noting that in addition to low power, performance, and area overheads,
deploying T-TER guard wires has minimal impact on the run-time of layout CAD tools.
Without DR, the tools lay out each SoC core in less than 10 minutes, and with DR they lay
out each core in less than 11 minutes. Tool run-time overheads are more impacted by the
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magnitude of features requiring protection than on circuit complexity.
4.6.4 Threat Analysis of Bypass Attacks
Lastly, I provide a threat analysis of T-TER. Recall, of the three ways an attacker can
bypass T-TER guard wires to carry out a fabrication-time attack (Fig. 4.3 and §4.4.2), the
jog attack is the stealthiest. An attacker mounts a jog attack by jogging, or moving, a
portion of a guard wire to a nearby routing track, in order to make room for a rogue Trojan
wire to attach to a targeted net (Fig. 4.3C). In such an attack, the guard wire is lengthened,
or bends are added/removed. To evaluate the detectability of such an attack, I ask three
questions:
1. What is the smallest jog attack, i.e., the minimum alteration in a guard wire’s length
and/or number of bends?
2. Is the smallest jog attack masked by process variation?
3. Can modern TDR detect the smallest jog attacks?
4.6.4.1 Smallest Jog Attack
The minimum jog attack is to jog a top (or bottom) guard wire to an adjacent rout-
ing track, and attach to the targeted net from above (or below) with a via, as illustrated
in Fig. 4.3C. This edit either increases the length of the guard wire, or adds/removes
bends—impedance discontinuities—in the guard wire to keep its overall length unchanged.
This edit is minimal because the minimal metal pitch (MMP), or (horizontal) distance be-
tween the centers of adjacent routing tracks on the same routing layer, is much smaller
than the (vertical) distance between overlapping routing tracks on adjacent routing layers.
Specifically, the smallest jog attack would either: 1) increase a guard wire’s length by:
Lattack = 2∗MMPr, where MMPr is the MMP on layer r, as defined in the design rules of
a given process technology, or 2) add/remove bend(s) in the guard wire that are at least a
75
Table 4.2: Minimum guard wire jog attack (Fig. 4.3C) edit–distances for each routing layer
in the IBM 45 nm SOI process technology.
Routing Min Wire Min Metal Min Attack TDR
Layer Spacing (um) Pitch (um) Edit (um) Detectable?
1 0.07 0.14 0.28 3
2 0.07 0.14 0.28 3
3 0.07 0.14 0.28 3
4 0.09 0.19 0.38 3
5 0.09 0.19 0.38 3
6 0.14 0.28 0.56 3
7 0.14 0.28 0.56 3
8 0.80 1.60 3.20 3
9 0.80 1.60 3.20 3
10 2.00 4.00 8.00 3
distance of Lattack apart from existing bends. In either case, a feature resolution—of overall
length or length between bends—of Lattack is required to detect the smallest jog attack. Ta-
ble 4.2 summarizes the minimal-attack-edits (Lattack distances), to a guard wire’s features
an attacker must make to bypass T-TER, according to the 45 nm process technology I target
in this study.
4.6.4.2 Process Variation vs. Smallest Jog Attack
Assume for a moment that I can measure the of overall length, or length between bends,
of a guard wire to infinite accuracy. Even then, detecting the smallest jog attack requires
the minimal attack edit distance, Lattack, be discernable from deviations between simulated
and fabricated guard wire lengths due to process variation. Fortunately, Lattack is larger
than the worst-case manufacturing process variation in a guard wire’s length. Namely,
with Ldesign as the designed length of the guard wire, and Lwc error, as the worst-case man-
ufacturing error in the actual guard wire’s length (+ or -):
Ldesign−Lwc error +Lattack > Ldesign +Lwc error (4.2)
























Figure 4.8: Worst-case manufacturing process variation (error bars) effect on unmodified
and minimal jog attacks on 100-micron guard-wires.
be deduced from the manufacturing design rules as:
Lwc error = 2∗
min spacingr
2
= min spacingr (4.3)
where min spacingr is the minimum required spacing surrounding a wire routed on metal
layer, r.
I illustrate this in Fig. 4.8, where I plot the minimum length differences between un-
modified (un-attacked) and minimally-jogged (attacked) guard wires, overlaid with error
bars indicating the worst-case range of variation in a guard wires fabricated length caused
by process variation. Even in the worst case, across all routing layers, unmodified vs at-
tacked guard wires are discernible.
4.6.4.3 Attack Detection with TDR
When IC interconnects are injected with a pulsed waveform with a rise time less than
twice the propagation delay of the interconnect, they behave like transmission lines (Eq. (4.1)).
Hence, time-domain reflectometry (TDR) can be used to measure several characteristics of
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designed-in guard wires to ensure they have not been tampered with (§4.2.3). Specifically,
the lengths of each guard wire, or lengths between bends on each guard wire, are computed
by measuring the reflection time(s) of a single incident rising pulse applied to the guard
wires under test. Once measured, the lengths can be compared with that predicted by a 3D
electromagnetic field solver [100] to detect if they have been altered. While modeling all
interconnects within a large complex IC using a field solver is computationally impractical,
it is practical to analyze only a small subset of interconnects, e.g., the guard wires and
surrounding circuit structures [115].
Prior work demonstrates terahertz TDR systems [30, 115, 160, 164] capable of measur-
ing the propagation delay of an interconnect to a resolution of ±2.6 femptoseconds ( f s).
Such systems utilize laser-driven optoelectronic measurement techniques to achieve such
high resolutions. According to the ideal transmission line model [153], the propagation
delay, Tpd , is a function of the dielectric constant, Dk, speed of light, C, and length of the
transmission line (guard wire), Lgw, as shown in Eq. (4.4).





TDR is the ideal tamper detection tool as process variation has no impact on its accuracy.
Knowing the dielectric constant, Dk, of the insulating material surrounding the guard wires—
the inter-layer dielectric (ILD)—is all that is required to compute their lengths, or the
lengths between their bends (Eq. (4.4)). Since, the dielectric constant of the ILD is not
dependent on its geometric properties, it is well controlled [21].
Using the TDR propagation delay model described in Eq. (4.4), and the previously stud-
ied resolution of optoelectrical terahertz TDR [30, 115, 160, 164], I simulate the detection
of the smallest jog attacks on guard wires across every routing layer in my target 45 nm
process. Namely, I simulate the difference in reflection times observed for single pulse
TDR waveforms applied to (unmodified) guard wires that are 100 microns long, compared
to the reflection time observed from similar guard wires that have been lengthened by the
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Figure 4.9: Number of TDR measurements required to detect the smallest jog attacks (Ta-
ble 4.2) with 95% and 99% confidence, per layer.
minimal attack edit distances, Lattack, across each routing layer (Table 4.2). I assume a
dielectric constant of 3.9, the nominal dielectric constant of silicon dioxide [86]. Taking
into account a (Gaussian) standard error (across reflection time measurements) of±2.6 f s,
as reported by [115], I compute the minimum number of TDR measurements required to
discriminate an unmodified guard wire from an attacked guard wire with confidence levels
of 95% and 99%. I plot these results in Figure 4.9. My results demonstrate that existing
terahertz TDR systems are capable of detecting the smallest jog attacks across all routing
layers (Table 4.2) in my target 45 nm process, requiring at most 14 and 24 TDR measure-
ments to achieve confidence levels of 95% and 99%, respectively.
4.7 Discussion
T-TER aims to prevent fabrication-time Trojan attacks that target specific security-
critical features in an IC design. Experiments on real circuit layouts of a SoC containing
show that T-TER is effective, deployable, and tamper-evident. Discussed below are the
limitations, scalability, signal integrity impact, flexibility, and extensibility of T-TER.
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4.7.1 Limitations
T-TER is a mitigation strategy for hardware designs where only a subset of the design
is security-critical [59, 167]. As my evaluation results show, the deployability and per-
formance overhead of T-TER is low when the overall security-critical wire length is low.
If every wire in a design is security-critical, then T-TER is not a good defensive strategy;
in fact, the motive for outsourcing fabrication in such scenarios is tenuous. If fabrication
must be outsourced, I recommend alternative mitigation strategies such as those proposed
in [9, 10, 68, 102, 195]. The tradeoff is that these strategies have limited deployability, and
a large, fixed, performance overhead that make them impractical for designs that require
only a subset of security-critical functionality be protected.
4.7.2 Scalability
There are two notions of scalability to address. The first is scalability with regard to
routability. Routing guard wires alongside security-critical wires can impact the routability
of a layout, if the 1) percentage of overall wire length to guard, and 2) route-density with-
out guard wires are both large. By placing and routing security-critical components and
wires first, before any other portions of the circuit (§4.5.1), I are able to minimize security-
critical wire length. This makes security-critical wire length scale with the total length of
security-critical wires, as opposed to the size of the overall design. As I see when going
from OR1200 and RISC-V class processor to modern x86-64 processors, the proportion
of security-critical functionality (hence wires) decreases as relatively more transistors are
spent on performance. Moreover, by deploying T-TER within advanced process nodes—
which is the motivating threat model—route density is minimized since these nodes pro-
vide multiple metallization options8 with 10 (or more) routing layers. To demonstrate this
empirically, I highlight the AES core (Fig. 4.7–Route Density), where I guard over 1000
8The metallization option defines the total number (and physical characteristics) of available routing
(metal) layers defined within an IC’s process technology.
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nets with little impact on power or performance. In fact, the reason I select the AES as
a benchmark—even though it is arguably entirely security-critical—is because its key-bit
nets exhibit a unique quality that stress tests T-TER. Specifically, they are global, highly-
connected routes that are orders-of-magnitude longer than any other nets in the layout.
The second notion of scalability is with regard to the detection of bypass attacks. Al-
though Moore’s law is near its limit, transistors continue to shrink. Only three companies
in the world are capable of manufacturing 7–10 nm transistors [95]. It is, therefore, vital
for T-TER to scale with process technology. With respect to deletion attacks (Fig. 4.3A),
T-TER scales with process technology advances as measuring interconnect continuity does
not differ across process technologies. With respect to move attacks (Fig. 4.3B), T-TER
scales with process technology advances as cross-talk is amplified when interconnects are
smaller and more densely packed. Lastly, with respect to jog attacks, T-TER also scales,
as TDR capabilities directly scale with microelectronic feature sizes, i.e., faster transistors
translates to faster TDR rise times.
4.7.3 Signal Integrity Impact
Routing long wires parallel to targeted nets increases coupling capacitance, thus cre-
ating cross-talk between the guard wires and the targeted nets they protect. However,
designed-in guard wires are not actively driven during normal chip operation, and can be
permanently grounded (using a one-time programmable fabric) after TDR analysis. Thus,
cross-talk is not an issue—in fact, designed-in guard wires decrease cross-talk by acting as
shields between targeted nets and the rest of the circuit.
4.7.4 Defense-in-Depth
While T-TER alone can thwart even the stealthiest fabrication-time attacks, its low
deployment costs also enable defense-in-depth. Layering T-TER with other preventive
measures, such as Ba et al.’s defensive placement [9, 10], provides an additional layer of
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protection.
4.7.5 Extensibility of CAD Tools
My T-TER deployment framework (§4.5) is built on top of a commercial IC CAD
tool [25] and an open-source VLSI analysis tool [169]. Extending T-TER to work across
other commercial IC layout CAD tools involves incorporating support for each vendor’s
CAD tool APIs. I foresee T-TER deployed as an integrated component of commercial
VLSI CAD tools as they focus more on IC security.
4.8 Related Work
Fabrication-time attacks and defenses have been extensively studied. Attacks have
spanned the trade-space of footprint size, stealth, and controllability. Specifically, some
attacks have demonstrated stealth and controllability, at the cost of large footprints [17,
85, 101], while others have demonstrated small (or non-existent) footprints, at the cost of
controllability and stealth [90, 142]. The most formidable attack—the A2 attack [196]—
has demonstrated all three: small footprint, stealth, and controllability. I highlight a few
notable attacks and defenses below.
On the defensive side, there are two main strategies: detective or preventive. Most
prior work has focused on detective strategies, while few works have focused on preven-
tive strategies. Detective strategies involve side-channel analysis [3, 13, 75, 117], imag-
ing [2, 209], and on-chip sensors [48, 62, 97]. Until T-TER, preventive measures have been
placement-focused [9, 10, 195].
Fabrication-time Attacks. The first fabrication-time insertion of a hardware Trojan
was developed by Lin et al. [101] who proposed a Trojan designed to leak information
over a deliberately created side channel. Specifically, they designed and implemented a
hardware Trojan, with a footprint of approximately 100 logic gates, to create an artificial
power side channel for leaking cryptographic keys. Albeit unique at the time, today such a
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large footprint makes the attack detectable via side channel defenses [3, 13, 48].
The most lethal fabrication-time attack is the A2 Trojan, developed by Yang et al. [196].
The A2 Trojan utilizes analog components to build a counter-based trigger circuit with a
footprint of less than the size of one flip-flop. Its complex triggering mechanism makes it
stealthy, i.e., unlikely to accidentally deploy during post-fabrication functional testing or
under normal chip operation, yet is controllable from user-level software. Its unique design
makes it the only Trojan to evade all detection schemes, except T-TER.
Fabrication-time Defenses. The first side-channel detection scheme was proposed by
Agrawal et al. [3]. They used power, temperature, and electromagnetic (EM) side-channel
measurements to record a fingerprint of a “golden” IC during normal, and compared this
fingerprint to one acquired from an untrusted IC. Similarly, Jin et al. [75] create a timing-
based fingerprint obtained by measuring the output delays resulting from applying vari-
ous input combinations to a given IC. While side-channel detection schemes are effective
against hardware Trojans with large footprints, they fail at detecting Trojans like A2 [196],
whose side-channel signatures are well below operational noise margins.
Of all fabrication-time Trojan defenses, R2D2 [62] is the only one that claims to detect
the A2 Trojan. R2D2 works by using on-chip sensors to monitor the toggling frequency of
a select few security-critical signals within the design. If the toggling rate of any security-
critical signals exceed a pre-determined threshold, then an alarm signal is activated to indi-
cate an A2 Trojan may have been triggered. The crux of this approach is that, unlike T-TER
guard wires, the hardware used to construct the toggle frequency monitors is not tamper-
evident. There is no way to tell if a foundry-side attacker disabled the R2D2 hardware
while inserting her Trojan.
4.9 Conclusion
T-TER is a routing-centric preventive defense against additive fabrication -time Trojans
that target security-critical hardware features. It makes routing Trojan wires to, or directly
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adjacent to, attacker-targeted wires in a victim IC intractable by surrounding their surfaces
with tamper-evident guard wires. I propose the use of designed-in guard wires in conjunc-
tion with post-fabrication terahertz time-domain reflectometry (TDR) analysis to detect
all bypass attacks I contrive (deletion, move, and jog attacks). I develop an automated
toolchain for deploying T-TER guard wire. Lastly, I evaluate the effectiveness, deployabil-
ity, and tamper-evidence of T-TER at securing multiple security-critical features within an
SoC that have been subject to attack by existing hardware Trojans. My results show that
T-TER thwarts the insertion of even the stealthiest known additive hardware Trojan—the
A2 Trojan—with power, timing, and area overheads of ≈ 1%.
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As microelectronic hardware continues to scale, so too have design complexities. To
design an IC of modern complexity targeting a 7 nm process requires 500 engineering
years [53, 92]. Because it is impractical to take 500 years to create a chip, semicon-
ductor companies reduce time-to-market by adding engineers: increasing both the size of
their design teams and their reliance on 3rd-party IP. Namely, they purchase pre-designed
blocks for inclusion in their designs, such as CPU cores and cryptographic accelerators
(e.g., AES). This year, analysts estimate that a typical System-on-Chip (SoC) will contain
over 90 IP blocks [19]. From a security perspective, this reduces trust in the final chip: with
an increased number of (both in-house and external) designers molding the design, there is
increased opportunity for an attacker to insert a hardware Trojan.
Hardware Trojans inserted during design time are both permanent and powerful. Un-
like software, hardware cannot be patched in a general-purpose manner; repercussions of
hardware flaws echo throughout the chip’s lifetime. As hardware vulnerabilities like Melt-
down [103], Spectre [88], and Foreshadow [174] show, replacement is the only compre-
hensive mitigation, which is both costly and reputationally damaging. Moreover, vulnera-
bilities in hardware cripple otherwise secure software that runs on top [85]. Thus, it is vital
that hardware designers verify their designs are Trojan-free.
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Prior work attempts to detect hardware Trojans at both design and run time. At de-
sign time, researchers propose static (FANCI [184]) and dynamic (VeriTrust [202] and
UCI [58]) analyses of the RTL design and gate-level netlists to search for rarely-used
circuitry, i.e., potential Trojan circuitry. At run time, researchers: 1) employ hardware-
implemented invariant monitors that dynamically verify design behavior matches specifi-
cation [59, 182], and 2) scramble inputs and outputs between trusted and untrusted com-
ponents [183] to make integration of a hardware Trojan into an existing design intractable.
These attempts to develop general, “one-size-fits-all”, approaches inevitably leave chips
vulnerable to attack [150, 181, 203].
Verifying a hardware design is Trojan-free poses two technical challenges. First, hard-
ware Trojan designs use the same digital circuit building blocks as non-malicious circuitry,
making it difficult to differentiate Trojan circuitry from non-malicious circuitry. Second,
it is infeasible to exhaustively verify, manually or automatically, even small hardware de-
signs [125], let alone designs of moderate complexity. These challenges are the reason why
“one-size-fits-all” approaches are incomplete and akin to proving a design is bug-free.
Instead of verifying a design is free of all Trojan classes, I advocate for a divide-and-
conquer approach, breaking down the RTL Trojan design space and systematically ruling
out each Trojan class. I begin this journey by eliminating the most pernicious RTL hard-
ware Trojan threat: the TTT. As Waksman et al. state [182, 183], when compared with
other stealthy design-time Trojans (i.e., data-based Trojans), TTTs provide “the biggest
bang for the buck [to the attacker] ... [because] they can be implemented with very little
logic, are not dependent on software or instruction sequences, and can run to completion
unnoticed by users.” Moreover, TTTs are a flexible Trojan design in terms of deploy-
ment scenarios. An attacker looking to deploy a TTT does not require any a priori
knowledge of how the victim circuit will be deployed at the system level, nor post-
deployment (physical or remote) access to the victim circuit [182, 183]. By eliminating














Figure 5.1: Ticking Timebomb Trojan (TTT). A TTT is a hardware Trojan that imple-
ments a ticking timebomb trigger. Ticking timebomb triggers monotonically
move closer to activating as the system runs longer. In hardware, ticking time-
bomb triggers maintain a non-repeating sequence counter that increments upon
receiving an event signal.
like Data Execution Prevention (DEP) and Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
in hardware, i.e., I force RTL attackers to implement Trojan designs that require post-
deployment attacker interaction. This is the hardware analog to defending against data
injection attacks in software, forcing attackers to employ more complex data reuse attacks;
a necessary part of a comprehensive, layered defense.
To ensure my defense is systematic and avoids implicit assumptions based on existing
TTTs, I first define an abstract TTT based on its behavior. At the heart of any TTT is a trig-
ger that tracks the progression of values that form some arbitrary sequence. The simplest
concrete example is a down-counter that releases the attack payload when it reaches zero.
Thus, I define TTTs as devices that track an arbitrary sequence of values constrained by
only two properties:
• the sequence never repeats a value,
• the sequence is incomplete.
Fig. 5.1 shows the basic hardware components required to implement such a sequence
counter in hardware. It has three building blocks: 1) SSCs, 2) an increment value, and 3)
an increment event.
To understand the power my definition gives to attackers, I use it to enumerate the space
of all possible TTT triggers. I define a total of six TTT variants, including distributed TTTs
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that couple together SSCs scattered across the design to form a sequence counter and non-
uniform TTTs that conceal their behavior by incrementing with inconsistent values, i.e.,
expressing what looks like a random sequence.
I leverage my definition of TTTs to locate SSCs in a design that behave like TTT trig-
gers during functional verification. Specifically, I reduce the Trojan search space of the
DUT by analyzing only the progression of values expressed by SSCs of potential TTT trig-
gers. I design and implement an automated extension to existing functional verification
toolchains, called Bomberman, for identifying the presence of TTTs in hardware designs.
Bomberman computes a DFG from a design’s HDL (either pre- or post- synthesis) to iden-
tify the set of all combinations of SSCs that could construct a TTT. Initially, Bomberman
assumes all SSCs are suspicious. As Bomberman analyzes the results obtained from func-
tional verification, it marks any SSCs that violate my definition as benign. Bomberman
reports any remaining suspicious SSCs to designers, who use this information to create a
new test case for verification, or manually inspect connected logic for malice.
I demonstrate the effectiveness of Bomberman by implanting all six TTT variants into
four different open-source hardware designs: a RISC-V CPU [193], an OR1200 CPU [121],
a UART [121] module, and an AES accelerator [136]. Even with verification simulations
lasting less than one million cycles,1 Bomberman detects the presence of all TTT variants
across all circuit designs with a false positive rate of less than 1.2%.
This chapter makes the following contributions:
• An abstract definition and component-level breakdown of TTTs.
• Design of six TTT variants, including new variants that evade existing defenses.
• Design and implementation of an automated verification extension, Bomberman, that
identifies TTTs implanted in RTL hardware designs.
• Evaluation of Bomberman’s false positive rate and a comparative security analy-
sis against a range of both TTT-focused and “one-size-fits-all” design-time hard-
1Typical verification simulations last ≈millions of cycles [182].
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ware Trojan defenses; Bomberman is the only approach capable of detecting all TTT
variants, including state-of-the-art pseudo-random [191] and non-deterministic [69]
TTTs.
• Algorithmic complexity analysis of Bomberman’s SSC Enumeration and SSC Clas-
sification stages.
• Open-source release of Bomberman and TTTs [168].
5.2 Background
5.2.1 Design-Time Hardware Trojans
In this chapter I shift my focus to design-time attacks (§2.3.2), i.e., detecting hard-
ware Trojans that are inserted at design-time [85, 101, 182, 183]. In Figure 5.2, I refine
the hardware Trojan taxonomy previously presented in Figure 2.2 to make characteriza-
tions according to 1) where in the IC design process they are inserted, and 2) their trigger
architectures [81, 162].
There are two main types of triggers: always-on and initially dormant. As their names
suggest, always-on triggers indicate a triggerless Trojan that is always activated, and are
thus trivial to detect during testing. Always-on triggers represent an extreme in a trig-
ger design trade-space—not implementing a trigger reduces the overall Trojan footprint
at the cost of sacrificing stealth. Alternatively, initially dormant triggers activate when a
signal within the design, or an input to the design, changes as a function of normal, yet
rare, operation, ideally influenced by an attacker. initially dormant triggers enable stealthy,
controllable, and generalizable hardware Trojans. As prior work shows, it is most advanta-
geous for attackers to be able to construct triggers that hide their Trojan payloads to evade
detection during testing [58, 69, 183, 184, 202], so I focus on initially dormant triggers.
Initially dormant triggers consist of two sub-categories: data-based and time-based [69,
182, 183]. Data-based triggers, or cheat codes, wait to recognize a single data value (single-
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Figure 5.2: Taxonomy of Hardware Trojans. Hardware Trojans are malicious modifica-
tions to a hardware design that alter its functionality. I focus on time-based
Trojans (TTTs) and categorize them by design and behavior.
shot) or a sequence of data values to activate. Alternatively, time-based triggers, or ticking
timebombs, become increasingly more likely to activate the more time has passed since
a system reset. While, ticking timebombs can implement an indirect and probabalistic
notion of time (§5.4), a simple ticking timebomb trigger is a periodic up-counter, where
every clock cycle the counter increments, as shown in Fig. 5.3A. In this work, I eliminate
the threat of TTTs to force attackers to implement data-based Trojans that require post-
deployment attacker interaction to trigger [182].
5.3 Threat Model
In this chapter, I focus on the design-time attack threat model (§2.3.2). Additionally I
further constrict this threat model, focusing on identifying TTTs, as I define them (§5.4),
and leave the identification of other Trojan types to existing heuristics-based [58, 184, 202],
and future design-specific defenses. My defense can be deployed at any point throughout
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the front-end design process—i.e., directly verifying 3rd party IP, after RTL design, or after
synthesis—after which the design is trusted to be free of TTTs.
5.4 Ticking Timebomb Triggers
First, I define TTTs by their behavior. Based on this definition, I synthesize the fun-
damental components required to implement a TTT in hardware. Finally, using these fun-
damental components I enumerate six total TTT variants, including previously contrived
TTTs that resemble contiguous time counters [182, 183], to more complex, distributed,
non-uniform, and sporadic [69, 191] designs.
5.4.1 Definition
I define TTTs as the set of hardware Trojans that implement a time-based trigger that
monotonically approaches activation as the victim circuit continuously operates without
reset. More succinctly, I define a ticking timebomb trigger based on two properties of the
values it exhibits while still dormant yet monotonically approaching activation:
Property 1: The TTT does NOT repeat a value without a system reset.
Property 2: The TTT does NOT enumerate all possible values without activating.
Property 1 holds by definition, since, if a TTT trigger repeats a value in its sequence, it
is no longer a ticking timebomb, but rather a data-based “cheat code” trigger [182, 183].
Property 2 holds by contradiction in that, if a TTT trigger enumerates all possible values
without triggering, i.e., no malicious circuit behavior is observed, then the device is not
malicious, and therefore not part of a TTT. Upon these two properties, I derive the funda-
mental hardware building blocks of a TTT.
Figs. 5.3A–D illustrate example ticking timebomb behaviors that are captured by my
definition, in order of increasing complexity. The most naive example of a ticking time-
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Figure 5.3: Ticking Timebomb Trigger Behaviors. There are four primitive ticking time-
bomb trigger counting behaviors, in order of increasing complexity, captured
by my definition (Properties 1 & 2 in §5.4.1). A) The simplest counting behav-
ior is both periodic and uniform. Alternatively, more sophisticated counting
behaviors are achieved by: B) encrypting the count to make the sequence non-
uniform, C) incrementing it sporadically, or D) both.
to hide the monotonically increasing behavior of a periodic up-counter by either 1) ob-
scuring the relationship between successive counter values (e.g., AES counter mode se-
quence, Fig. 5.3B), or 2) sporadically incrementing the counter (e.g., a non-deterministic
TTTs [69], Fig. 5.3). Even more sophisticated, the attacker may choose to do both (Fig. 5.3D).
5.4.2 TTT Components
From my definition, I derive the fundamental components required to implement a TTT
in hardware. Fig. 5.1 depicts these components. For TTTs to exhibit the behaviors sum-
marized in Fig. 5.3, they must implement the notion of an abstract time counter. TTT time
counters require three components to be realized in hardware: 1) State-Saving Compo-
nents (SSCs), 2) increment value, and 3) increment event.
The SSC defines how the TTT saves and tracks the triggering state of the time counter.
SSCs can be either coalesced or distributed. Coalesced SSCs are comprised of one N-
bit register, while distributed SSCs are comprised of M, N-bit registers declared across the
design. Distributed SSCs have the advantage of increasing stealth by combining a subset of
one or multiple coalesced SSCs whose count behaviors individually violate the definition of
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a TTT trigger (i.e., Properties 1 and 2), but when considered together comprise a valid TTT.
Distributed SSCs can also reduce hardware overhead through reuse of existing registers.
The TTT increment value defines how the time counter is incremented upon an incre-
ment event. The increment value can be uniform or non-uniform. Uniform increments are
hard-coded values in the design that do not change over time, e.g., incrementing by one at
every increment event. Non-uniform increments change depending on device state and op-
eration, e.g., incrementing by the least-significant four bits of the program counter at every
increment event.
Lastly, the TTT increment event determines when the time counter’s value is incre-
mented. Increment events may be periodic or sporadic. For example, the rising edge of the
clock is periodic, while the rising edge of an interrupt is sporadic.
5.4.3 TTT Variants
From the behavior of the fundamental TTT components, I extrapolate six TTT variants
that represent the TTT design space as I define. I start by grouping TTTs according to
their SSC construction. Depending on their sophistication level, the attacker may choose
to implement a simplistic coalesced TTT, or construct a larger, more complex, distributed
TTT. If the attacker chooses to implement a coalesced TTT, they have four variants to
choose from, with respect to increment uniformity and periodicity. The most naive attacker
may choose to implement a coalesced TTT with uniform increment values and periodic
increment events. To make the coalesced TTT more difficult to identify, the attacker may
choose to implement non-uniform increment values and/or sporadic increment events.
To increase stealth, an attacker may choose to combine two or more coalesced TTTs,
that alone violate the definition of being a TTT trigger, but combined construct a valid
distributed TTT. An attacker has two design choices for distributed TTTs. Seeking to
maximize stealth, the attacker may choose to combine several copies of the same coalesced
TTT with non-uniform increment values and sporadic increment events, thus implementing
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a homogeneous distributed TTT. Alternatively, the attacker may seek integration flexibility,
and choose to combine various coalesced TTTs to implement a heterogeneous distributed
TTT. For homogeneous distributed TTTs, an attacker has the same four design choices
as in coalesced TTTs. However, for heterogeneous distributed TTTs, the design space is
much larger. Specifically, the number of sub-categories of heterogeneous distributed TTTs




, with n, the number of coalesced sub-
triggers, and k, the number of unique sub-trigger types. I summarize all six TTT variants
and their behaviors in Figs. 5.2 and 5.3, respectively, and provide example implementations
in Verilog below.
In the following Verilog examples of TTT triggers, I use a three letter naming conven-
tion to describe their building blocks: SSC type (C or D), increment value (U or N), and
increment event (P or S). For example, a CNS TTT indicates a Coalesced (C) SSC, with
a Non-uniform (N) increment value, and a Sporadic (S) increment event. For TTTs com-
prised of distributed SSCs I use the “D-<type>” naming convention to indicate the type:
homogeneous or heterogeneous. This list is not comprehensive, but rather a representative
sampling of the TTT design space. Note, all examples assume a processor victim circuit,
with a pageFault flag, overflow flag, and a 32-bit program counter (PC) register.
1 // 1. CUP = Coalesced SSC, Uniform increment, Periodic event
2 reg [31:0] ssc ;
3 always @posedge(clock) begin
4 if ( reset )
5 ssc <= 0;
6 else
7 ssc <= ssc + 1;
8 end
9 assign doAttack = ( ssc == 32’hDEAD BEEF);
1 // 2. CUS = Coalesced SSC, Uniform increment, Sporadic event
2 reg [31:0] ssc ;
3 always @posedge(pageFault) begin
4 if ( reset )
5 ssc <= 0;
6 else
7 ssc <= ssc + 1;
8 end
9 assign doAttack = ( ssc == 32’hDEAD BEEF);
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1 // 3. CNP = Coalesced SSC, Non−uniform increment, Periodic event
2 reg [31:0] ssc ;
3 always @posedge(clock) begin
4 if ( reset )
5 ssc <= 1;
6 else
7 ssc <= ssc << PC[3:2];
8 end
9 assign doAttack = ( ssc == 32’hDEAD BEEF);
1 // 4. CNS = Coalesced SSC, Non−uniform increment, Sporadic event
2 reg [31:0] ssc ;
3 always @posedge(pageFault) begin
4 if ( reset )
5 ssc <= 0;
6 else
7 ssc <= ssc + PC[3:0];
8 end
9 assign doAttack = ( ssc == 32’hDEAD BEEF);
1 // 5. D−Homogeneous = Distributed SSC, same sub−components
2 wire [31:0] ssc wire ;
3 reg [15:0] lower half ssc ;
4 reg [15:0] upper half ssc ;
5 assign ssc wire = { upper half ssc , lower half ssc };
6
7 // Two CUP sub−counters
8 always @posedge(clock) begin
9 if ( reset ) begin
10 lower half ssc <= 0;
11 upper half ssc <= 0;
12 end
13 else begin
14 lower half ssc <= lower half ssc + 1;
15 upper half ssc <= upper half ssc + 1;
16 end
17 end
18 assign doAttack = ( ssc wire == 32’hDEAD BEEF);
1 // 6. D−Heterogeneous = Distributed SSC, different sub−components
2 wire [31:0] ssc wire ;
3 reg [15:0] lower half ssc ;
4 reg [15:0] upper half ssc ;
5 assign ssc wire = { upper half ssc , lower half ssc };
6
7 // CUS sub−counter
8 always @posedge(pageFault) begin
9 if ( reset )
10 lower half ssc <= 0;
11 else




15 // CNP sub−counter
16 always @posedge(clock) begin
17 if ( reset )
18 upper half ssc <= 0;
19 else
20 upper half ssc <= upper half ssc + PC[3:0];
21 end
22 assign doAttack = ( ssc wire == 32’hDEAD BEEF);
5.5 Bomberman
Now that I have defined what a TTT is, and how it behaves, how do we automatically
locate them within complex RTL designs? To address this question, I design and imple-
ment Bomberman, a dynamic Trojan verification framework.2 To summarize, Bomberman
locates potential TTTs by tracking the sequences expressed by all SSCs in a design, as
SSCs are one of the fundamental building blocks of TTTs. Initially, Bomberman classi-
fies all SSCs as suspicious. Then, any SSCs whose sequence progressions, recorded during
simulation, violate either Properties in §5.4.1, are marked benign.
Bomberman takes as input 1) a design’s HDL, and 2) verification simulation results,
and automatically flags suspicious SSCs that could be part of a TTT. The Bomberman
dynamic analysis framework is broken into two phases:
1. SSC Identification, and
2. SSC Classification.
During the SSC Identification phase, Bomberman identifies all coalesced and distributed
SSCs within the design. During the SSC Classification phase, Bomberman analyzes the
value progressions of all SSCs to identify suspicious SSCs that may comprise a TTT.
Fig. 5.4 illustrates the Bomberman architecture.
2Unfortunately, no commercial verification tool exists to track complex state that defines TTT invari-
ants, i.e., asserting no repeated values or distributed state exhaustion. Moreover, the closest such tools—
JasperGold [26] and VC Formal [156]—deploy bounded static analysis approaches that suffer from state-
































Figure 5.4: Bomberman Architecture. Bomberman is comprised of two stages: A) SSC
Identification, and B) SSC Classification. The first stage (A) identifies all co-
alesced and distributed SSCs in the design. The second stage (B) starts by
assuming all SSCs are suspicious, and marks SSCs as benign as it processes
the values expressed by each SSC during verification simulations.
5.5.1 SSC Identification
The first step in locating TTTs, is identifying all SSCs in the design. Identifying coa-
lesced SSCs is straightforward: any component in the HDL that may be synthesized into a
coalesced collection of flip-flops (or latches §5.7.2) is considered a coalesced SSC. Enu-
merating distributed SSCs is more challenging. Since distributed SSCs are comprised of
various combinations of coalesced SSCs that are interconnected to the host circuit, a naive
approach would be to enumerate the power set of all coalesced SSCs in the design. How-
ever, this creates an obvious state-explosion problem, and is unnecessary. Instead, I take
advantage of the fact that not every component in a circuit is connected to every other
component. Moreover, the structure of the circuit itself tells us what connections between
coalesced SSCs are possible, and thus the distributed SSCs Bomberman must track.
Therefore, I break the SSC Identification phase into two sub-stages: 1) Data-Flow
Graph (DFG) Generation, and 2) SSC Enumeration (Fig. 5.4A). First, I generate a DFG
from a circuit’s HDL, where each node in the graph represents a signal, and each edge rep-
resents connections between signals facilitated by intermediate combinational or sequential
logic. Then, I systematically traverse the graph to enumerate: 1) the set of all coalesced
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SSCs, and 2) the set of all connected coalesced SSCs, or distributed SSCs.
5.5.1.1 DFG Generation
I implement the DFG Generation stage of the SSC Identification phase using the open-
source Icarus Verilog (IVL) [192] compiler front-end with a custom back-end written in
C++. My custom IVL back-end traverses the intermediate HDL code representation gen-
erated by the IVL front-end, to piece together a bit-level signal dependency, or data-flow,
graph. In doing so, it distinguishes between state-saving signals (i.e., signals gated by flip-
flops) and intermediate signals output from combinational logic. Continuous assignment
expressions are the most straightforward to capture as the IVL front-end already creates
an intermediate graph-like representation of such expressions. However, procedural as-
signments are more challenging. Specifically, at the RTL level, it is up to the compiler to
infer what HDL signals will synthesize into SSCs. To address this challenge, I use a sim-
ilar template-matching technique used by modern HDL compilers [73, 87]. The data-flow
graph is expressed using the Graphviz .dot format. Fig. 5.5 shows an example data-flow
graph generated by Bomberman.
5.5.1.2 SSC Enumeration
I implement the SSC Enumeration stage of the SSC Identification phase using a script
written in Python. First, my SSC Enumeration script iterates over every node in the cir-
cuit DFG, and identifies nodes (signals) that are outputs of registers (flip-flops). The
script marks these nodes as coalesced SSCs. Next, the script performs a Depth-First
Search (DFS), starting from each non-coalesced SSC signal node, to piece together dis-
tributed SSCs. The DFS backtracks when an input or coalesced SSC signal is reached.
When piecing together distributed SSCs, Bomberman does not take into account word-
level orderings between root coalesced SSCs. The order of the words, and thus the bits,





















































































Figure 5.5: Hardware Data-Flow Graph. Example data-flow graph, generated by
Bomberman, of an open-source floating-point division unit [121]. Bomberman
cross-references this graph with verification simulation results to identify SSCs
(red). In the graph, rectangles represent registers, or flip-flops, and ellipses rep-
resent intermediate signals, i.e., outputs from combinational logic. Red rectan-
gles indicate coalesced SSCs, while red ellipses represent distributed SSCs.
definition of a TTT trigger (§5.4.1). My definition does not care about the progression of
values expressed by the SSC(s), but only cares if all values are not expressed and individ-
ual values are not repeated. Note, a clever attacker may try to avoid detection by selecting
a slice of a single coalesced SSC to construct a ticking timebomb trigger. However, my im-
plementation of Bomberman classifies a single sliced coalesced SSC as a distributed SSC
with a single root coalesced SSC.
5.5.2 SSC Classification
After all SSCs have been enumerated, Bomberman analyzes the values expressed by ev-
ery SSC during verification simulations to classify whether each SSC is either suspicious—
meaning it could construct a TTT—or benign. Bomberman begins by assuming all SSCs
within the design are suspicious. At every update time within the simulation, Bomberman
checks to see if any SSC expresses a value that causes it to violate either property of my def-
inition (§5.4.1). If a property is violated, the SSC no longer meets the specifications to be
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Algorithm 1: SSC Classification Algorithm
Input: Set, P, of all possible SSCs
Output: Set, S, of all suspicious SSCs
1 S← P;
2 foreach p ∈ P do
3 n← SizeO f (p);
4 Vp← /0; /* previous values of p */
5 foreach t ∈ T do
6 value←ValueAtTime(p, t);
7 if value ∈Vp then
8 Remove p from S;
9 Break;
10 else
11 Add value to Vp;
12 end
13 end
14 if ‖Vp‖== 2n then
15 Remove p from S;
16 end
17 end
part of a TTT, and Bomberman classifies it benign. Bomberman does not care how, when,
what, or the amount an SSC’s value is incremented; rather, Bomberman only monitors
if an SSC repeats a value, or enumerates all possible values. Lastly, Bomberman reports
any remaining suspicious SSCs for manual analysis by verification engineers.
I implement the SSC Classification algorithm—Algorithm 1—using Python. My clas-
sification program (Fig. 5.4B) takes as input a Value Change Dump (VCD) file, encoding
the verification simulation results, and cross-references the simulation results with the set
of suspicious SSCs, initially generated by the SSC Identification stage (Fig. 5.4A). For coa-
lesced SSCs, this is trivial: my analysis program iterates over the values expressed by each
coalesced SSC during simulation, and tests if either property from my definition (§5.4.1) is
violated. SSCs that break my definition of a TTT are marked benign. However, distributed
SSCs are more challenging. To optimize file sizes, the VCD format only records signal
values when they change, not every clock cycle. This detail is important when analyzing
distributed SSCs, whose root coalesced SSCs may update at different times. I address this
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Figure 5.6: Hardware Testbenches. Testbench architectures for each DUT (outlined in
red). For the AES and UART designs, LFSRs generate random inputs for test-
ing. For the RISC-V and OR1200 CPUs, I compile ISA-specific assembly
programs [122, 193] into executables to exercise each design.
detail by time-aligning the root coalesced SSC values with respect to each other to ensure
the recording of all possible distributed SSC values expressed during simulation. Finally,
any remaining suspicious SSCs are compiled into a JSON file, and output for verification
engineers to inspect and make a final determination on whether or not the design contains
TTTs.
5.6 Evaluation
By construction Bomberman cannot produce false negatives since it initially assumes
all SSCs are suspicious, and only marks SSCs as benign if they express values during
simulation that violate the definition of TTT SSC behavior. However, false positives are
possible. To quantify Bomberman’s false positives rate, I evaluate Bomberman against
four real-world hardware designs with TTTs implanted in them. To model a production
simulation-based verification flow, I use a mix of existing test vectors (from each core’s
repository), random test vectors (commonly used to improve coverage), and custom test
vectors (to fill coverage gaps). To contextualize Bomberman’s effectiveness compared to
state-of-the-art TTT defenses, I build an End-to-End (E2E) TTT—that uses a pseudoran-
dom sequence to trigger a privilege escalation within a processor—that evades all defenses
except Bomberman. Lastly, I provide an asymptotic complexity analysis of the Bomberman
framework, and characterize Bomberman’s performance in practice.
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I evaluate Bomberman against four open-source hardware designs: 1) an AES accelera-
tor [136], 2) a UART module [121], 3) a RISC-V CPU [193], and 4) an OR1200 CPU [121].
Fig. 5.6 provides details on the testing architectures I deployed to simulate each IP core. I
also summarize the size and complexity of each hardware design in terms of the number
of registers (i.e., potential SSCs) in Fig. 5.7. The AES, RISC-V, and OR1200 designs are
shown to be the most computationally-intensive designs for Bomberman to analyze, since
they have large registers (≥32-bits), i.e., potentially suspicious SSCs that can increment
almost indefinitely.
AES Accelerator. The AES core operates solely in 128-bit counter (CTR) mode. It
takes a 128-bit key and 128-bits of plaintext (i.e., a counter initialized to a random seed)
as input, and 22 clock cycles later produces the ciphertext. Note, the design is pipelined,
so only the first encryption takes 22 clock cycles, and subsequent encryptions are ready
every following clock cycle. I interface two Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs) to
the DUT to generate random keys and plaintexts to exercise the core (Fig. 5.6A). Upon
testing initialization, the testbench controller resets and initializes both LFSRs (to different
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random starting values) and the DUT. It then initiates the encryption process, and verifies
the functionality of the DUT is correct, i.e., each encryption is valid.
UART Module. The UART module interfaces with a Wishbone bus and contains both
a transmit (TX) and receive (RX) FIFO connected to two separate 8-bit TX and RX shift
registers. Each FIFO holds a maximum of sixteen 8-bit words. The core also has several
CSRs, one of which configures the baud rate, which I set to 3.125 MHz. I instantiate a
Wishbone bus arbiter to communicate with the DUT, and an LFSR to generate random
data bytes to TX/RX (Fig. 5.6B). I also instantiate a UART encoder/decoder to receive,
and echo back, any bytes transmitted from the DUT. Upon initialization, the testbench
controller resets and initializes the Wishbone bus arbiter, LFSR, and DUT, and begins
testing.
RISC-V CPU. The RISC-V CPU contains 32 general-purpose registers, a built-in in-
terrupt handler, and interfaces with other on-chip peripherals through a 32-bit AXI-4 Lite
or Wishbone bus interface. I instantiate an AXI-4 Lite bus arbiter to connect the DUT
with a simulated main memory block to support standard memory-mapped I/O functions
(Fig. 5.6C). The testbench controller has two main jobs after it initializes and resets all
components within. First, it initializes main memory with an executable to be run on the
bare metal CPU. These programs are in the form of .hex files that are compiled and linked
from RISC-V assembly or C programs using the RISC-V cross-compiler toolchain [120].
Second, it monitors the progress of each program execution and receives any output from
an executing program from specific memory addresses. I configure the testbench controller
to run multiple programs sequentially, without resetting the device.
OR1200 CPU. The OR1200 CPU implements the OR1K RISC ISA. It contains a 5-
stage pipeline, instruction and data caches, and interfaces with other peripherals through
a 32-bit Wishbone bus interface. I instantiate a Wishbone bus arbiter to connect the DUT
with a simulated main memory block and a UART module to support standard I/O func-
tions (Fig. 5.6D). The testbench controller has two jobs after it initializes and resets all
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components within. First, it initializes main memory with an executable to be run on the
bare metal CPU. These programs are in the form of .vmem files that are compiled and linked
from OR1K assembly or C programs using the OR1K cross-compiler toolchain [123]. Sec-
ond, it monitors the progress of each program execution and receives any program output
from the UART decoder. Like the RISC-V, I configure the OR1200 testbench controller to
run multiple programs sequentially, without resets in between.
5.6.1.2 System Setup
As described in §5.5, Bomberman interfaces with Icarus Verilog (IVL). IVL is also used
to perform all verification simulations of my four hardware designs. In both cases, I use
version 10.1 of IVL. Both IVL and Bomberman were compiled with the Clang compiler
(version 10.0.1) on a MacBook Pro with a 3.1 GHz Intel Core i7 processor and 16 GB
DDR3 RAM. All RTL simulations and Bomberman analyses were also run on the same
machine.
5.6.2 False Positives
I empirically quantify Bomberman’s false positive rate by analyzing four real world
hardware designs (§5.6.1.1). Additionally, I verify my implementation of Bomberman
does not produce false negatives—as this should be impossible—by implanting all six
TTT variants (§5.4.3) within each design. For each design, I plot the number of suspicious
SSCs flagged by Bomberman over a specific simulation timeline. Based on the TTT trigger
definitions provided in §5.4.1, I categorize SSCs within each plot as follows:
1. Suspicious: a (coalesced or distributed) SSC for which all possible values have not
yet been expressed and no value has been repeated;
2. Constant: a (coalesced or distributed) SSC for which only a single value has been
expressed.















































































































































Figure 5.8: False Positives. Reduction in SSCs classified as suspicious across all four hard-
ware designs over their simulation timelines. A) AES. Bomberman identifies
the SSCs of all six TTT variants implanted with zero false positives. B) UART.
(Same as AES). C) RISC-V. Bomberman flags 19 SSCs as suspicious, six from
implanted TTTs, three from benign performance counters, and ten benign con-
stants resulting from on-chip CSRs. D) OR1200. Bomberman flags nine SSCs
as suspicious, six from implanted TTTs, and three benign constants.
design characteristics. However, suspicious and constant classifications are not mutually
exclusive. By definition (§5.4.1), an SSC that has only expressed a single value during
simulation is suspicious. While constants SSCs are also suspicious, I plot both to enable
Bomberman users to distinguish between SSCs that store configuration settings (commonly
used in larger designs) from SSCs that store sequence progressions (e.g., TTTs or perfor-
mance counters).
AES Accelerator. I configure the AES testbench to execute 75 random encryptions,
i.e., 75 random 128-bit values with 75 (random and different) 128-bit keys, and subse-
quently repeat the same 75 encryptions. I simulate the AES core at 100 MHz. In Fig. 5.8A
I plot the number of suspicious SSCs tracked by Bomberman over the simulation timeline.
During the first 250 clock cycles of simulation, as registers cycle through more than
one value, they are removed from the sets of constants. During the initial 75 random
encryptions, after ≈ 750 clock cycles, the 8-bit registers toggle through all 256 possible
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values, and thus are also eliminated from the sets of suspicious SSCs. However, after the
initial 75 encryptions, the number of false positives is still quite high, as the 32- and 128-
bit registers have yet to toggle through all possible values, or repeat a value. Since these
registers are quite large, toggling through all possible values is infeasible. Driven by the
observation that the data-path of a TTT-free design tracks state from test inputs, not since
the last system reset, I take an alternative approach to eradicate large SSC false positives.
Formally, I repeat the same test case(s) without an intermediate system reset to cause only
non-suspicious SSCs to repeat values (violating Property 1 in §5.4.1). I use this insight to
efficiently minimize suspicious SSC false positives. Since the AES core is a deterministic
state machine with no control-path logic, I simply reset the LFSRs, and repeat the same
75 encryptions. After ≈ 1200 clock cycles, I achieve a false positive rate of 0% while
detecting 100% of the TTT variants implanted in the core.
UART Module. I configure the UART testbench to perform configuration, error, and
TX/RX testing. During the configuration and error testing phases, configuration registers
are toggled between values, and incorrect UART transactions are generated to raise error
statuses. During the TX/RX testing, 16 random bytes are transmitted by the DUT, and
upon being received by the UART decoder, are immediately echoed back, and received by
the DUT. Following my insights from the AES experiments, I transmit and receive the
same set of 16 bytes again, to induce truly non-suspicious SSCs to repeat values. I plot
the number of suspicious SSCs identified by Bomberman over the simulation timeline in
Fig. 5.8B.
During the first ≈ 80k clock cycles (error testing phase), Bomberman eliminates over
50% of all potentially suspicious (coalesced) SSCs, as many of the UART’s registers are
either single-bit CSRs that, once toggled on and off, both: 1) cycle through all possible
values, and 2) repeat a value. Subsequently, during the first TX testing phase, the 16-
byte TX FIFO is saturated causing another 50% reduction in the number of coalesced
constants. Likewise, once the DUT transmits all 16 bytes to the UART decoder, and the
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UART encoder echos them all back, the 16-byte RX FIFO is saturated causing another
reduction in the number of coalesced constants.
After the initial TX/RX testing phase, I are still left with several (suspicious) false
positives. This is because the TX and RX FIFO registers have yet to cycle through all
possible values, nor have they repeated a value. While these registers are small (8-bits),
and continued random testing would eventually exhaustively exercise them, I leverage my
observations from the prior AES simulation: I repeat the previous TX/RX test sequence
causing data-path registers to repeat values, eliminating all false positives. Again, Bomber-
man successfully identifies all TTT variants with zero false positives.
RISC-V CPU. I configure the RISC-V CPU testbench to run a single RISC-V assembly
program that exercises all eight instruction types. The assembly test program was selected
from the open-source RISC-V design repository [193]. These instructions include jumps,
branches, loads, stores, arithmetic register-immediate and register-register, multiplies, and
divides. I simulate the RISC-V core and again plot the number of suspicious SSCs identi-
fied by Bomberman (Fig. 5.8C).
During the execution of the first set of instructions (jumps), Bomberman largely reduces
potential constant and suspicious SSCs. This is because, like the UART module, most
of the registers within the RISC-V CPU are 1-bit CSRs for which enumerating all (2)
possible values is trivial. The remaining 90 suspicious SSCs are slowly eradicated as more
instructions execute, causing the remaining control-path signals to enumerate all possible
values. Similar to repeating the same encryptions during the AES simulation, the assembly
programs were designed to load and store repeated values in the large (≥ 32-bit) registers,
causing them to violate Property 1 (§5.4.1).
In the end, Bomberman identifies 19 suspicious SSCs: 16 coalesced and three dis-
tributed. Upon manual inspection, I identify four of the 16 coalesced SSCs, and two of the
three distributed SSCs, as components of the six implanted (malicious) TTTs. Of the 12
remaining coalesced SSCs, I identify three as benign timeout and performance counters,
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and nine as benign constants that stem from unused CPU features, the hard-coded zero reg-
ister, and the interrupt mask register. Lastly, I identify the single remaining distributed SSC
as a combination of some of the benign coalesced constants. In a real world deployment
scenario, I imagine verification engineers using Bomberman’s insights to tailor their test
cases to maximize threat-specific testing coverage, similar to how verification engineers
today use coverage metrics to inform them of gaps in their current test vectors.
Recall, Bomberman only flags SSCs whose value progressions do not violate the prop-
erties of a TTT (§5.4.1). At most, Bomberman will only flag SSCs as suspicious. It is up to
the designer or verification engineer to make the final determination on whether or not an
SSC is malicious. By locating all (malicious) implanted TTTs and (benign) performance
counters, I validate Bomberman’s correctness.
OR1200 CPU. Lastly, I configure the OR1200 testbench to run eight different OR1K
assembly programs. Like the AES and UART simulations, I configure the testbench to
perform repeated testing, i.e., execute each program twice, consecutively, without an inter-
mediate device reset. The first seven test programs are selected from the open-source OR1K
testing suite [122], while the last program is custom written to exercise specific configura-
tion registers not exercised by the testing suite. I simulate the OR1200 at 50 MHz, and plot
the number of suspicious SSCs identified by Bomberman over the simulation timeline in
Fig. 5.8D.
In the end, Bomberman identifies nine suspicious SSCs, seven coalesced and two dis-
tributed. Four of the seven coalesced SSCs, and both distributed SSCs, are components
of the six implanted TTTs. The remaining three coalesced SSCs are constants, and false
positives. I manually identify these false positives as shadow registers only used when an
exception is thrown during a multi-operand arithmetic instruction sequence.
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5.6.3 Constrained Randomized Verification
Given the size and complexity of modern hardware designs, verification engineers typi-
cally use randomly-generated test vectors to maximize verification coverage. Similarly, for
two of the four designs I study (AES and UART), I use LFSRs to generate random data-
path inputs for test vectors. Thus, I ask the question: does contrained random verification
degrade Bomberman’s performance? To demonstrate Bomberman is test-case agnostic, I
generate 25 random test sequences for both the AES and UART designs by randomly seed-
ing the LFSR(s) in each design’s respective test bench (Fig. 5.6). Note, I do not experiment
with constrained random verification of the RISC-V and OR1200 designs as these require
random instruction stream generators, for which (to the best of my knowledge) none exist
in the open-source community that are compatible with open-source RTL simulators like
IVL or Verilator.3
For the AES design, I generate 25 random sequences of seventy-five 128-bit keys and
plaintexts. For the UART design, I generate 25 random sequences of 16 bytes (to TX/RX).
Similar to the false positive experiments (§5.6.2), each test sequence for each design was
repeated twice, without a system reset in between. Given Bomberman’s inability to pro-
duce false negatives, I only study the effects of randomness on Bomberman’s false positive
rate. Thus, unlike the false positive experiments, no TTT variants were implanted in either
design. In Fig. 5.9, I plot the suspicious SSC traces produced by Bomberman across all
randomly generated test vectors. Across both designs, zero suspicious SSCs (false pos-
itives) are observed at the end of all 25 simulations, and each simulation trace is nearly
identical. Thus, Bomberman’s performance is not test-case specific, rather, it is dependent
on verification coverage, with respect to TTT invariants,4 i.e. Properties 1 & 2 in §5.4.1.
3Google’s RISCV-DV open-source random instruction stream generator is not compatible with either IVL
or Verilator [52].
4Verification coverage with respect to TTT invariants, is not to be confused with generic verification
coverage such as functional, statement, condition, toggle, branch, and FSM coverage. The former entails








Figure 5.9: Randomized Testing. Randomly generated verification test vectors do not af-
fect Bomberman’s performance. Rather, Bomberman’s performance is depen-
dent on verification coverage with respect to SSC Properties 1 & 2 (§5.4.1) that
define the behavior of a TTT. Namely, tests that cause more SSCs to cycle
through all possible values, or repeat a value, reduce false positives.
5.6.4 Comparative Analysis of Prior Work
To demonstrate the need for Trojan-specific verification tools like Bomberman, I pro-
vide a two-fold comparative analysis between Bomberman and existing design-time Trojan
defenses. First, I study the capabilities of each defense in defeating all six TTT variants
described in §5.4.3. I summarize each defense and its effectiveness in Tab. 5.1, and describ-
ing why some defenses fail to defeat all TTT variants below. Armed with this knowledge, I
construct an E2E TTT in Verilog—targeting the OR1200 [121] processor—that is capable
of bypassing all existing defenses except Bomberman. I describe the fundamental building
blocks of my TTT—and the corresponding Verilog components in my implementation—
that enable it to defeat prior defenses.
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Table 5.1: Comparative Security Analysis of TTT Defenses and Bomberman.
Defense UCI [58] FANCI [184] VeriTrust [202] WordRev [99] Power Resets [183] Bomberman
Type Trojan-Agnostic Trojan-Agnostic Trojan-Agnostic TTT-Specific TTT-Specific TTT-Specific
Analysis Dynamic Static Dynamic Static N/A† Dynamic






CUP 3 7 7 3 3 3
CUS 3 7 7 3 7 3
CNP 3 7 7 7 7 3
CNS 3 7 7 7 7 3
D-HMG 7 7 7 7 7* 3
D-HTG 7 7 7 7 7 3
XXX: Coalesced or Distributed SSC
XXX: Uniform or Non-uniform Increment Value
XXX: Periodic or Sporadic Increment Event
† Power Resets [183] are a runtime mechanism, not a verification technique.
* Power resets only defend against homogeneous distributed TTTs compromised of CUP sub-components.
5.6.4.1 Security Analysis of Existing Defenses
There are two approaches for defending against TTTs: 1) Trojan-agnostic, 2) TTT-
specific. Trojan-agnostic techniques are primarily verification focused, and include: FANCI
[184], UCI [58] and VeriTrust [202]. While these approaches differ in implementation
(static vs. dynamic), from above they are similar. All three locate rarely used logic that
comprise most generic Trojan circuits. Unfortunately, researchers have demonstrated sys-
tematic approaches to transform almost any Trojan circuit to evade these techniques, while
maintaining logical equivalence [150, 203]. Alternatively, TTT-specific approaches such
as WordRev [99, 151] and Waksman et al.’s Power Resets [183], attempt to counter only
TTTs. While these approaches work against known TTTs at the time of their respective
publications, they fail to recognize the behavior of all TTT variants presented in this work.
In Tab. 5.1, I summarize each defense, and the TTT variants (§5.4.3 and §5.4.3) they can
defeat. Below, I provide a security analysis of each defense, describing how and what TTT
variants are defeated.
UCI. UCI [58] is a Trojan-agnostic dynamic verification tool that searches HDL for
intermediate combinational logic that does not affect signal values from source to sink dur-
ing verification simulations. Since TTT trigger components—SSCs, increment event, in-
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crement amount—remain active during simulation, UCI would not flag them as suspicious.
However, TTTs also have a comparator that checks if the SSC’s count has reached its acti-
vation state. Since the output of this comparator—the trigger activation signal (Fig. 5.1)—
would remain unchanged during simulation, UCI would flag it. Unfortunately, as Sturton
et al. show [150], having two activation signals—e.g., a distributed TTT—that each ex-
press their activation states under simulation, but never simultaneously, would evade UCI.
As I show in my E2E TTT below (§5.6.4.2), this can be achieved using a distributed SSC
constructed of fast and slow (coalesced) counters that wrap around (repeat values individu-
ally). Since the overall distributed SSC would not violate TTT properties (§5.4.1), it would
still be flagged by Bomberman.
FANCI. FANCI [184] is a Trojan-agnostic static verification framework that locates
potential Trojan logic by computing “control values” for inputs to intermediate combina-
tional logic in a design. Inputs with low control values are weakly-affecting [184], and
most likely Trojan comparator inputs (Fig. 5.1) that indicate the current state of the trig-
ger, e.g. a specific time counter value. Control values can be approximated by randomly
sampling the truth tables of intermediate logic across the design. Unfortunately, Zhang et
al. construct a systematic framework—DeTrust [203]—that distributes trigger comparator
inputs across layers of sequential logic to increase their control values, hiding them from
FANCI. Since any TTT variant can be used with DeTrust-transformed comparator logic,
FANCI cannot identify any TTTs.
VeriTrust. Similar to UCI, VeriTrust [202] is a Trojan-agnostic dynamic verification
framework that locates (unused) Trojan trigger activation signals (Fig. 5.1) in combina-
tional logic cones that drive sequential logic. However, unlike UCI, VeriTrust locates ac-
tivation signals by locating unused inputs—not logic—to the victim logic encapsulating a
Trojan’s payload. This semantic difference enables VeriTrust to detect Trojans irrespective
of their implementations. Unfortunately, using their DeTrust framework [203], Zhang et
al. illustrate how splitting the activation signals of any TTT design across multiple combi-
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national logic cones, separated by layers of sequential logic, evades VeriTrust.
WordRev. WordRev [99, 151] is TTT-specific static analysis tool that identifies SSCs
that behave like counters. WordRev leverages the notion that the carry bit propagates from
the least-significant position to the most-significant position in counter registers. Thus, the
increment logic connecting SSCs must be configured to allow such propagation. However,
this operating assumption causes WordRev to miss distributed TTTs, and TTTs with non-
uniform increment values.
Power Resets. Waksman et al. [183] suggest intermittent power resets as a TTT-
specific defense. Intermittent power resets prevent potential TTT SSCs from reaching their
activation states. This approach requires formally verifying/validating the correct operation
of the DUT for a set amount of time, denoted the validation epoch. Once they guarantee
no TTT is triggered within the validation epoch, the chip can safely operate as long as its
power is cycled in time intervals less than the validation epoch. Unfortunately, as Imeson et
al. [69] point out, this type of defense only works against TTTs with uniform increment val-
ues and periodic increment events, as it is impractical to formally verify non-deterministic
(sporadic and/or non-uniform) designs.
5.6.4.2 End-to-End Supervisor Transition TTT
Using the approaches for defeating each Trojan-agnostic and TTT-specific defense de-
scribed above [150, 203], I systematically construct an E2E TTT (List. V.2) that evades
all defenses, except Bomberman. My Trojan provides a supervisor transition foothold that
enables attackers to bypass system authentication mechanisms and obtain root-level privi-
leges.
Attack Target. My TTT (List. V.2) is based on a supervisor transition foothold Trojan
first described by Sturton et al. in [150]. This Trojan targets a microprocessor circuit, and
enables an attacker to arbitrarily escalate the privilege mode of the processor to supervisor
mode. In List. V.1, I provide a simplified version of the un-attacked processor HDL that
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updates the processor’s supervisor mode register. Under non-trigger conditions, the super-
visor signal—super—is either updated via an input signal—in.super—on the following
clock edge, if the holdn bit is 1 (holdn is active low), otherwise the super signal holds
the same value from the previous clock period. Additionally, the super signal is reset to 1
(supervisor mode) when the processor is reset via the active-low resetn signal.
Listing V.1: Unmodified HDL of the processor’s supervisor-mode update logic. The super-
visor bit (super) is set when either: 1) the processor is put into reset, 2) the
processor was already in supervisor-mode (it stays in the mode), or 3) external
logic (in.super) has triggered the processor to switch to supervisor-mode.
1 always @(posedge clk) begin
2 super <= ∼resetn | (∼holdn & super) | (holdn & in. super) ;
3 end
Listing V.2: Verilog HDL of a TTT that evades all existing design-time Trojan detection
techniques—including UCI [58], FANCI [184], VeriTrust [202], WordRev [99,
151], and power resets [183]—except Bomberman. This TTT alters logic
(List. V.1) that updates the supervisor-mode bit register.
1 // Distributed TTT SSCs to evade UCI
2 reg [15:0] count 1 ; // Assume reset to 16’h0000
3 reg [15:0] count 2 ; // Assume reset to 16’h0000
4
5 // TTT Trigger Deployment Signal
6 reg [6:0] deploy 1; // Assume reset to 7’b0000000
7 reg [6:0] deploy 2; // Assume reset to 7’b0000000
8
9 // Update SSCs non−uniformly and sporadically
10 // to defeat WordRev and Power Resets
11 always @posedge(pageFault) begin
12 count 1 <= count 1 + PC[3:0];
13 count 2 <= count 2 + PC[5:2];
14 end
15
16 // Distribute trigger activation input signal (count 1)
17 // across layers of sequential logic to defeat FANCI.
18 always @(posedge clk) begin
19 if (count 1 [3:0] == ‘DEPLOY 0)
20 deploy 1[0] <= 1;
21 else





24 if (count 1 [15:12] == ‘DEPLOY 3)
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25 deploy 1[3] <= 1;
26 else
27 deploy 1[3] <= 0;
28 end
29
30 always @(posedge clk) begin
31 if (deploy 1 [2:0] == 2’b11)
32 deploy 1[4] <= 1;
33 else deploy 1[4] <= 0;
34 if (deploy 1 [3:2] == 2’b11)
35 deploy 1[5] <= 1;
36 else deploy 1[5] <= 0;
37 if (deploy 1 [5:4] == 2’b11)
38 deploy 1[6] <= 1;
39 else deploy 1[6] <= 0;
40 end
41
42 // Repeat lines 16−−40, but with count 2 and deploy 2
43
44 // Hide trigger activation signals (deploy 1 and deploy 2)
45 // inside fan−in logic cone of three additional signals
46 // (h 1, h 2, and h 3) to evade VeriTrust . Note, holdn prev
47 // and in . super prev are values of holdn and in . super from
48 // previous clock cycles , added to maintain timing .
49 always @(posedge clk) begin
50 holdn <= holdn prev;
51 in . super <= in. super prev ;
52 h 1 <= deploy 1[6];
53 h 2 <= ∼deploy 2[6] & holdn prev & in. super prev | deploy 2 [6];
54 h 3 <= (∼deploy 1[6] | deploy 2 [6]) & (holdn prev & in. super prev ) ;
55 end
56
57 always @(posedge clk) begin
58 super <= ∼resetn | (∼holdn & super) | (h 1 & h 2) | h 3;
59 end
Stealth Characteristics. I systematically construct my TTT (shown in List. V.2) with
several characteristics that enable it to evade all existing Trojan defenses except Bomber-
man. First, armed with Sturton et al.’s insights [150], I deploy a distributed SSC archi-
tecture to evade detection by UCI. Distributed SSCs enable the TTT’s activation signals
to bypass UCI since each coalesced SSC sub-component—count1 and count2—can ex-
press their individual triggered states during verification testing–defined by the ‘DEPLOYX
constants—while the overall distributed SSC does not express its triggered state. Next, I
increment my TTT’s SSCs non-uniformly, to evade WordRev [99, 151] and power re-
sets [183]. Lastly, I deploy DeTrust transformations [203] on the Trojan’s: 1) comparator
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inputs (count1 and count2)—splitting them amongst several layers of sequential logic—
and 2) trigger activation signals (deploy1[6] and deploy2[6])—hiding them inside a logic
cone of three additional signals: h 1, h 2, and h 3. This hides my TTT from FANCI [184]
and VeriTrust [202], respectively. Since Bomberman: 1) is TTT-specific, 2) considers dis-
tributed SSC architectures, and 3) is agnostic of how or when SSCs are incremented, it is
the only defense that can detect this TTT.
5.6.5 Run Time and Complexity Analysis
Since Bomberman is a dynamic verification framework, its run time is roughly pro-
portional to the size of the DUT (number of SSCs and wires, see Fig. 5.7) and simulation
time (number of time steps). Across all designs I study, the run time of Bomberman did
not exceed 11 minutes on a commodity laptop. Compared with other Trojan verification
frameworks [58, 99, 151, 184, 202], Bomberman is two orders of magnitude faster when
analyzing the same circuits; this is due, in part, to Bomberman’s targeted nature. As I show
in Tab. 5.2, Bomberman’s run time on real-world hardware designs scales proportionally
with respect to the number of SSCs and number simulation test cases.
Table 5.2: Bomberman scalability comparison for circuit DFGs with n signals simulated
over c clock cycles.
Analysis Time Space Average
Framework Type Complexity Complexity Run Time
Bomberman Dynamic O(nc) O(nc) 1x Minutes
FANCI [184] Static O(n) O(n) 10x Hours
UCI [58] Dynamic O(n2c) O(nc) 1x Hours
VeriTrust [202] Dynamic O(n2n) O(nc) 10x Hours
WordRev [99] Static Not Reported Not Reported 1x Hours
The Bomberman framework consists of two main components that contribute to its
overall time and space complexities (Fig. 5.4): 1) SSC Enumeration, and 2) SSC Classifi-
cation.5 Below, I provide an in-depth complexity analysis for each stage, and Bomberman




During the SSC Enumeration stage, Bomberman locates signals that are the direct out-
puts of coalesced SSCs, and signals that form distributed SSCs (§5.5.1). For a circuit DFG
with n nodes (each node representing a signal), a maximum fan-in of f for signal nodes,
a maximum logic depth per pipeline stage6 of d, the asymptotic time complexity for enu-
merating SSCs is O(n f d). Since most hardware designs are optimized for either power,
performance (clock speed), and/or area, the maximum logic depth, d, is usually small and
bounded. Therefore, the time complexity is polynomial. To show this, I plot (Fig. 5.10) the
distributions of logic depths within pipeline stages—and the corresponding Bomberman
run time—across the four designs I study, representing both mid-to-high performance and
mid-to-large designs. Additionally, to stress-test Bomberman, I measure its run time in
the worst-case scenario: analyzing the flattened and obfuscated functionally-equivalent
logic model of the most low-performant and low-power Arm processor available [6]. For
all designs, the logic depths were less than 25 across all pipeline stages.7 Additionally, the
maximum fan-in for a signal node is often small—less than 10—and bounded [184], fur-
ther reducing the time complexity to O(n). By extension, the asymptotic space complexity
reduces from O(n+n f ) to O(n), to store the DFG.
While Bomberman’s SSC Enumeration time complexity is bounded by conventional
circuit size and performance constraints, from a security perspective it is important to un-
derstand how an attacker might manipulate these bounds. Fortunately, while an attacker
can control the maximum logic depth in a pipeline stage, d, and the maximum fan-in of
a signal node, f , choosing large values for either in hopes of rendering Bomberman anal-
6The logic depth in a pipeline stage is the number of stages of combinational logic between layers of
sequential logic.
7If I could plot the logic depths within commercial x86 processors in Fig. 5.10, I would expect them to
be smaller than the OR1200, RISC-V, and Arm designs, as the maximum depth of logic per pipeline stage of
GHz processors must be less than eight [63].
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Bomberman RT:    5.457s
Bomberman RT:    4.912s
Bomberman RT:  22.570s
Bomberman RT:  10.840s
Bomberman RT: 643.568s
Figure 5.10: Distributions of Logic Depths per Pipeline Stage. The length of combina-
tional logic chains between any two sequential components in most hardware
designs is bounded to optimize for performance, power, and/or area. High
performance designs have the shortest depths (less than 8 [63]), while even
the flattened and obfuscated logic model of the lowest-performance Arm pro-
cessor available [6] (worst case scenario) has a depth <25. Even in the worst
case, Bomberman’s run time (overlaid for each core), is <11 min. on a com-
modity laptop.
yses computationally infeasible would reveal them: the victim design would be rendered
unusable—either too large or too slow—by its intended customers and the tools would
direct the designer to inspect the Trojan logic.
5.6.5.2 SSC Classification
In the SSC Classification stage, Bomberman analyzes verification simulation traces to
determine if an SSC is suspicious—potentially part of a TTT (Algo. 1). For a circuit DFG
with n nodes (each node representing a signal), and c simulation clock cycles, the asymp-
totic time and space complexities are both O(nc). This accounts for tracking the values
expressed by each SSC over each simulation clock cycle. Since the time and space com-
plexities of the SSC Classification stage dominate, compared with the SSC Enumeration




5.7.1 Test Vector Selection
During the AES and UART false positive evaluations, I witnessed a plateauing reduc-
tion in false positives after executing initial verification tests (Figs. 5.8A–B). Upon a closer
look, I find this initial reduction is a result of test vectors exhaustively exercising small
registers—1- to 16-bit—violating Property 2 in §5.4.1. For large registers—32-bit and
larger—cycling through all register values is not computationally feasible. Thus, to quickly
reduce the number of false positives across both designs, I deploy a repeat testing strategy
(§5.6.2). For most circuit designs, I observe: the state of most benign SSCs is a function
of design inputs. By repeating tests, I induce benign SSCs to repeat a value, violating
Property 1 (§5.4.1).
How do I know which test cases to repeat in order to induce repeated values in benign
SSCs? For designs with unstructured, data-path-only inputs—like the AES design—
repeating any test vector will suffice. Alternatively, for designs that require structured
control-path inputs, inducing repeated SSC values requires activating the same control-
path multiple times while also repeating data-path inputs. Determining which control-
paths to activate, i.e., control-paths that influence specific SSCs, is tantamount to crafting
test vectors with high SSC coverage. Fortunately, Bomberman provides verification engi-
neers with two channels of information to aid in this process: 1) the circuit DFG (Fig. 5.5)
illustrates the control-path that exercises a specific SSC, and 2) the SSC Classification out-
put indicates the extent suspicious SSCs have/have-not been exercised. Together, these
Bomberman insights guide verification engineers in creating test vectors that achieve high
coverage, with respect to Bomberman invariants (Properties 1 and 2 in §5.4.1), therefore
minimizing false positives. For example, in §5.6.2, when analyzing the OR1200 processor,
I noticed designer-provided test vectors [122] did not exercise several CSRs. By referenc-




For Bomberman to locate TTTs in a hardware design, it first locates all SSCs by iden-
tifying signals in the design’s HDL that are inferred as flip-flops during synthesis (§5.5.1).
However, flip-flops are not the only circuit components that store state. SSCs can also
be implemented with latches. However, it is typically considered bad practice to include
latches in sequential hardware designs as they often induce unwanted timing errors. As
a result, HDL compilers in synthesis CAD tools issue warnings when they infer latches
in a design—highlighting the TTT. Nonetheless, to support such (bad) design practices,
I design Bomberman’s data-flow graph generation compiler back-end to also recognize
latches.
5.7.3 TTT Identification in Physical Layouts
Bomberman is designed as an extension into existing front-end verification tool-chains
that process hardware designs (Fig. 2.3B). Under a different threat model—one encapsu-
lating untrusted back-end designers—it may be necessary to analyze physical layouts for
the presence of TTTs. Bomberman can analyze physical layouts for TTTs, provided the
layout (GDSII) file is first reverse-engineered into a gate-level netlist. As noted by Yang et
al. [196], there are several reverse-engineering tools for carrying out this task. Bomberman
also requires HDL device models for all devices in the netlist (e.g., NAND gate). This
informs Bomberman of a device’s input and output signals, which is required to create
a DFG. Fortunately, HDL device models are typically provided as a part of the process
technology IP portfolio purchased by front-end designers.
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5.7.3.1 Memories
Bomberman is designed to handle memories, or large arrays of SSCs, in the same fash-
ion that it handles flip-flop-based SSCs. Namely, Bomberman creates a DFG of the ad-
dressable words within a memory block to curb state-explosion when locating distributed
SSCs. For memories that mandate word-aligned accesses, Bomberman generates a coa-
lesced SSC for every word. For memories that allow unaligned accesses—which represent
a minority, i.e., part of two adjacent words could be addressed simultaneously, Bomber-
man generates a coalesced SSC for every word, and multiple word-sized distributed SSCs
created by sliding a word-sized window across every adjacent memory word pair. In either
case, Bomberman’s DFG filtering mechanism greatly reduces the overall set of potentially
suspicious SSCs.
5.7.3.2 Limitations
Bomberman is capable of detecting all TTTs with zero false negatives, within the con-
straints of my definition (§5.4.1). However, these constraints impose limitations. First,
if an attacker knows Bomberman is in use, they may alter their Trojan to repeat a value
to avoid detection. There are two ways they may do this: 1) add an extra state bit to the
SSC(s) that does not repeat a value, or 2) add additional logic that resets the SSC(s) upon
recognizing specific circuit behavior. The first design would be detected by Bomberman
since, by definition, describes a distributed SSC. However, the second scenario describes a
Trojan that, by definition, is a data-based (cheat code) Trojan [183] not a TTT. Therefore,
it would not be detected by Bomberman. Data-based Trojans [183] are better addressed by
techniques that target rarely used activation signals [58, 202] or comparator inputs [184]
(Tab. 5.1). Second, Bomberman is incapable of detecting TTTs that use analog SSCs, like
the A2 Trojan [196], as there is no notion of analog SSCs in front-end designs.8 Detect-
8While the non-deterministic (sporadic) TTTs proposed by Imeson et al. [69] do use non-simulatable
analog behavior (i.e., phase noise) as an entropy source for the increment event, they do not use analog SSCs.
Thus, they are detectable by Bomberman.
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ing Trojans like A2 require knowledge of the physical layout of the circuit, and are best
addressed during circuit layout [169].
5.8 Related Work
The implantation, detection, and prevention of hardware Trojans across hardware de-
sign phases have been widely studied. Attacks range from design-time attacks [18, 69,
85, 101], to layout-level modifications at fabrication time [17, 90, 196]. On the defensive
side, most work focuses on post-fabrication Trojan detection [3, 13–15, 48, 82, 97, 117,
131, 169], given that most hardware design houses are fab-less, and therefore must out-
source their designs for fabrication. However, as hardware complexity increases, reliance
on 3rd-party IP [19] brings the trustworthiness of the design process into question. Thus,
there is active work in both detection [58, 99, 151, 184, 202] and preventation [182, 183]
of design-time Trojans.
On the attack side, King et al. [85] demonstrate embedding hardware Trojans in a pro-
cessor for the purpose of planting footholds for high-level exploitation in software. They
demonstrate how small perturbations in a microprocessor’s hardware can be exploited to
mount wide varieties of software-level attacks. Lin et al. [101] propose a different class of
hardware Trojans, designed to expose a side-channel for leaking information. Specifically,
they add flip-flops to an AES core to create a power side channel large enough to exfiltrate
key bytes, but small enough that it resides below the device’s power noise margin. While
both attacks demonstrate different payloads, they both require triggering mechanisms to
remain dormant during verification and post-fabrication testing. Thankfully, my defense
is payload-agnostic and trigger-specific. I focus on detecting hardware Trojans by their
trigger. As a byproduct, I can identify any payloads by inspecting portions of the design
that the trigger output influences.
Wang et al. [191] propose the first variant of sporadic TTTs, called Asynchronous
Counter Trojans. Asynchronous Counter Trojans increment pseudo-randomly from a non-
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periodic internal event signal (e.g., Fig. 5.3C and D). Similarly, Imeson et al. [69] propose
non-deterministic TTTs. Non-deterministic TTTs are also sporadic, but they differ from
pseudo-random TTTs in that their event signals are not a function of the state of the victim
device, rather, they are a function of a true source of entropy. Unlike, Waksman et al.’s
power reset defense [183], this nuance is irrelevant to Bomberman, who identifies TTTs by
the values expressed by their SSCs, not the source or predictability of their event signals.
On the defensive side, both design- and run-time approaches have been proposed. At
design-time, Hicks et al. [58] propose a dynamic analysis technique for Unused Circuit
Identification (UCI) to locate potential trigger logic. After verification testing, they replace
all unused logic with logic to raise exceptions at run-time to be handled in software. Simi-
larly, Zhang et al. [202] propose VeriTrust, a dynamic analysis technique focused on the be-
havioral functionality, rather than implementation, of the hardware. Conversely, Waksman
et al. [184] propose FANCI, a static analysis technique for locating rarely used logic based
on computing control values between inputs and outputs. Lastly, Li and Subramanyan et
al. [99, 151] propose WordRev, a different static analysis approach, whereby they search
for counters in a gate-level netlist by identifying groups of latches that toggle when low
order bits are 1 (up-counter), or low order bits are 0 (down-counter). As static analysis
approaches, FANCI and WordRev have the advantage of not requiring verification simula-
tion results. In §5.6.4.2 I leverage prior work on defeating such defenses [150, 181, 203]
to construct a TTT that bypasses these defenses—but Bomberman detects. At run-time,
Waksman et al. [183] thwart TTTs, using intermittent power resets. As shown in §5.6.4.1,
power-resets are also incapable of thwarting all TTT variants.
5.9 Conclusion
Bomberman is an effective example of a threat-specific defense against TTTs. Unlike
prior work, I do not attempt to provide a panacea against all design-time Trojans. Instead,
I define the behavioral characteristics of a specific but important threat, TTTs, and develop
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a complete defense capable of identifying all TTT variants as I define them. Across four
open-source hardware designs, Bomberman detects all six TTT variants, with less than
1.2% false positives.
Bomberman demonstrates the power of threat-specific verification, and seeks to inspire
future threat-specific defenses against hardware Trojans and common hardware bugs. I
believe that no one defense will ever provide the level of security achievable by defense-
in-depth strategies. Thus, by combining Bomberman with existing design-time Trojan de-
fenses [58, 183, 184, 202], along with future threat-specific defenses, I aim to create an
insurmountable barrier for design-time attackers.
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CHAPTER VI
Fuzzing Hardware Like Software
6.1 Introduction
As Moore’s Law [113] and Dennard scaling [44] come to a crawl, hardware engineers
must tailor their designs for specific applications in search of performance gains [37, 55,
78, 106, 118]. As a result, hardware designs become increasingly unique and complex.
For example, the Apple A11 Bionic SoC, released over three years ago in the iPhone 8,
contains over 40 specialized IP blocks, a number that doubles every four years [141]. Un-
fortunately, due to the state-explosion problem, increasing design complexity increases
Design Verification (DV) complexity, and therefore, the probability for design flaws to
percolate into products. Since 1999, 247 total Common Vulnerability Exposures (CVEs)
have been reported for Intel products, and of those, over 77% (or 191) have been reported
in the last four years [42]. While this may come as no surprise, given the onslaught of
speculative execution attacks over the past few years [32, 88, 103, 175, 176], it highlights
the correlation between hardware complexity and design flaws.
Even worse, hardware flaws are permanent and potent. Unlike software, there is no
general-purpose patching mechanism for hardware. Repairing hardware is both costly,
and reputationally damaging [84]. Moreover, hardware flaws subvert even formally ver-
ified software that sits above [196]. Therefore, detecting flaws in hardware designs be-
































Figure 6.1: Fuzzing Hardware Like Software. Unlike prior Coverage Directed Test Gen-
eration (CDG) techniques [22, 49, 91, 148], we advocate for fuzzing software
models of hardware directly, with a generic harness (testbench) and feature rich
software fuzzers. In doing so, we address the barriers to realizing widespread
adoption of CDG in hardware DV: 1) efficient coverage tracing, and 2) design-
agnostic testing.
hardware engineers often spend more time verifying their designs, than implementing
them [47, 188].1 Unfortunately, the multitude of recently-reported hardware vulnerabil-
ities [32, 88, 103, 112, 175, 176] suggests current efforts are insufficient.
To address the threat of design flaws in hardware, engineers deploy two main DV strate-
gies: 1) dynamic and 2) formal. At one extreme, dynamic verification involves driving con-
crete input sequences into a DUT during simulation, and comparing the DUT’s behavior
to a set of invariants, or golden model. The most popular dynamic verification technique
in practice today is known as Constrained Random Verification (CRV) [1, 39, 72, 198].
CRV attempts to decrease the manual effort required to develop simulation test cases by
randomizing input sequences in the hopes of automatically maximizing exploration of the
DUT state-space. At the opposite extreme, formal verification involves proving/disprov-
ing properties of a DUT using mathematical reasoning like (bounded) model checking
and/or deductive reasoning. While (random) dynamic verification is effective at identifying
1It is estimated that up to 70% of hardware development time is spent verifying design correctness [47].
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surface flaws in even complex designs, it struggles to penetrate deep into the design state-
space. In contrast, formal verification is effective at mitigating even deep flaws in small
hardware designs, but fails, in practice, against larger designs.
In search of a hybrid approach to bridge these DV extremes, researchers have ported
software testing techniques to the hardware domain in hopes of improving hardware test
generation to maximize coverage. In the hardware domain, these approaches are referred to
as CDG [22, 39, 47, 54, 72, 91, 163, 185, 204, 206]. Like their software counterparts, CDG
techniques deploy coverage metrics—e.g., HDL line, FSM, functional, etc.—in a feedback
loop to generate tests that further increase state exploration.
While promising, why has CDG not seen widespread adoption in hardware DV? As
Laeufer et al. point out [91], this is likely fueled by several key technical challenges,
resulting from dissimilarities between software and hardware execution models. First,
unlike software, RTL hardware is not inherently executable. Hardware designs must be
simulated, after being translated to a software model and combined with a design-specific
testbench and simulation engine, to form a Hardware Simulation Binary (HSB) (Fig. 6.2).
This level of indirection, increases both the complexity and computational effort in tracing
test coverage of the hardware. Second, unlike most software, hardware requires sequences
of structured inputs to drive meaningful state transitions, that must be tailored to each DUT.
For example, while most software often accepts input in the form of a fixed set of file(s)
that contain a loosely-structured set of bytes (e.g., a JPEG or PDF), hardware often accepts
input from an ongoing stream of bus transactions. Together, these challenges have resulted
in CDG approaches that implement custom: 1) coverage-tracing techniques that still suffer
from poor scalability [72, 91], and 2) test generators that have limited compatibility to a
small class of DUTs, e.g., processors [22, 148, 204].
To supplement traditional dynamic verification methods, I propose an alternative CDG
technique I call Hardware Fuzzing. Rather than translating software testing methods to
the hardware domain, I advocate for translating hardware designs to software mod-
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els and fuzzing those models directly (Fig. 6.1). While fuzzing hardware in the software
domain eliminates coverage-tracing bottlenecks of prior CDG techniques [72, 91, 148],
since software can be instrumented at compile time to trace coverage, it does not inherently
solve the design compatibility issue. Moreover, it creates other challenges I must address.
Specifically, to fuzz hardware like software, I must adapt software fuzzers to:
1. interface with HSBs that: a) contain other components besides the DUT, and b)
require unique initialization.
2. account for differences between how hardware and software process inputs, and its
impact on exploration depth.
3. design a general-purpose fuzzing harness and a suitable grammar that ensures mean-
ingful mutation.
To address these challenges, I first propose and evaluate strategies for interfacing soft-
ware fuzzers with HSBs that optimize performance and trigger the HSB to crash upon
detection of incorrect hardware behavior. Second, I show that maximizing code cover-
age of the DUT’s software model, by construction, maximizes hardware code coverage.
Third, I design an interface to map fuzzer-generated test-cases to hardware input ports. My
interface is built on the observation that unlike most software, hardware requires piecing
together a sequence of inputs to effect meaningful state transitions. Lastly, I propose a new
interface for fuzzing hardware in a design-agnostic manner: the bus interface. Moreover, I
design and implement a generic harness, and create a corresponding grammar that ensures
meaningful mutations to fuzz bus transactions. Fuzzing at the bus interface solves the fi-
nal hurdle to realizing widespread deployability of CDG in hardware DV, as it enables us
to reuse the same testbench harness to fuzz any RTL hardware that speaks the same bus
protocol, irrespective of the DUT’s design or implementation.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of my approach, I design, implement, and open-source
a Hardware Fuzzing Pipeline (HWFP), inspired by Google’s OSS-Fuzz [140], capable
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of fuzzing RTL hardware at scale (Fig. 6.5). Using my HWFP I: 1) compare Hardware
Fuzzing against a conventional CRV technique when verifying over 480 variations of a
sequential FSM circuit, 2) compare Hardware Fuzzing against RFUZZ [91] when fuzzing
four SiFive TileLink peripherals [143], three RISC-V CPUs [134], and an FFT accelera-
tor [133], and 3) detect four bugs across four commercial IP cores from Google’s OpenTitan
silicon Root-of-Trust [105].
My main results are summarized as follows. I
• propose deployment of feature-rich software fuzzers as a CDG approach to address
inefficiencies in hardware DV (§6.4);
• provide empirically-backed guidance on how to: 1) isolate the DUT portion of HSBs,
and 2) minimize overhead of persistent hardware resets, for fuzzing (§6.4.2.1 &
§6.6.3);
• design and implement a bus-specific Hardware Fuzzing harness and grammar to fa-
cilitate fuzzing all bus-based hardware cores (§6.4.2.3, §6.4.2.4 & §C);
• design, implement, and open-source a HWFP that continuously fuzzes RTL hardware
at scale on Google Cloud Platform (GCP) (§6.5);
• demonstrate Hardware Fuzzing provides two orders-of-magnitude reduction in run
time and achieves better FSM coverage than current state-of-the-art CRV schemes
(§6.6.4);
• demonstrate Hardware Fuzzing achieves 24.76% better HDL line coverage (on aver-
age) after 24 hours of fuzzing compared with existing hardware fuzzing approaches,
i.e., RFUZZ [91] (§6.7.1),
• demonstrate Hardware Fuzzing identify all four RTL bugs in OpenTitan cores faster
than alternative approaches (§6.7.2).
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6.2 Background
There are two main hardware verification methods: 1) dynamic and 2) formal. While
there have been significant advancements in deploying formal methods in DV workflows [80,
105, 204], dynamic verification remains the gold standard due to its scalability towards
complex designs [91]. Therefore, I focus on improving dynamic verification by leveraging
advancements in the software fuzzing community. Below, I provide a brief overview of the
current state-of-the-art in dynamic hardware verification, and software fuzzing.
6.2.1 Dynamic Verification of Hardware
Dynamic verification of hardware typically involves three steps:
1. test generation,
2. hardware simulation, and
3. test evaluation.
First, during test generation, a sequence of inputs are crafted to stimulate the DUT. Next,
the DUT’s behavior—in response to the input sequence—is simulated during hardware
simulation. Lastly, during test evaluation, the DUT’s simulation behavior is checked for
correctness. These three steps are repeated until all interesting DUT behaviors have been
explored. How do I know when I have explored all interesting behaviors? To answer this
question, verification engineers measure coverage of both: 1) manually defined functional
behaviors (functional coverage) [171] and 2) the HDL implementation of the design (code
coverage) [77, 130, 159].
6.2.1.1 Test Generation
To maximize efficiency, DV engineers aim to generate as few test vectors as possible
that still close coverage. To achieve this goal, they deploy two main test generation strate-
gies: 1) constrained-random and 2) coverage-directed. The former is typically referred to
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holistically as Constrained Random Verification (CRV), and the latter as Coverage Directed
Test Generation (CDG). CRV is a partially automated test generation technique where
manually-defined input sets are randomly combined into transaction sequences [1, 198].
While better than an entirely manual approach, CRV still requires some degree of manual
tuning to avoid inefficiencies, since the test generator has no knowledge of test coverage.
Regardless, CRV remains a popular dynamic verification technique today, and its principles
are implemented in two widely deployed (both commercially and academically) hardware
DV frameworks: 1) Accellera’s Universal Verification Methodology (UVM) framework
(SystemVerilog) [1] and 2) the open-source cocotb (Python) framework [177].
To overcome CRV shortcomings, researchers have proposed CDG [22, 39, 47, 49, 54,
72, 91, 148, 163, 185, 204, 206], or using test coverage feedback to drive future test gen-
eration. Unlike CRV, CDG does not randomly piece input sequences together in hopes of
exploring new design state. Rather, it mutates prior input sequences that explore uncovered
regions of the design to iteratively expand the coverage boundary. Unfortunately, due to
deployability challenges, e.g., slow coverage tracing and limited applicability to a small set
of DUTs, CDG has not seen widespread adoption in practice [91]. In this paper, I recognize
that existing software fuzzers provide a solution to many of these deployability challenges,
and therefore advocate for verifying hardware using software verification tools. The cen-
tral challenges in making this possible are adapting software fuzzers to verify hardware,
widening the scope of supported designs, and increasing automation of verification.
6.2.1.2 Hardware Simulation
While there are several commercial [28, 107, 157] and open-source [145, 192] hard-
ware simulators, most work in the same general manner, as shown in Fig. 6.2. First, they
translate hardware implementations (described in HDL) into a software model, usually in
C/C++. Next, they compile the software model and a testbench—either translated from











Figure 6.2: Hardware Simulation Binary (HSB). To simulate hardware, the DUT’s HDL
is first translated to a software model, and then compiled/linked with a test-
bench (written in HDL or software) and simulation engine to form a Hardware
Simulation Binary (HSB). Executing this binary with a sequence of test inputs
































Figure 6.3: Hardware Fuzzing. Fuzzing hardware in the software domain involves: trans-
lating the hardware DUT to a functionally equivalent software model (1) us-
ing a SystemVerilog compiler [145], compiling and instrumenting a Hardware
Simulation Binary (HSB) to trace coverage (2), crafting a set of seed input files
(3) using our design-agnostic grammar (§ 6.4.2.4), and fuzzing the HSB with a
coverage-guided greybox software fuzzer [104, 155, 201] (4–6).
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gether, all three components form an Hardware Simulation Binary (HSB) (Fig. 6.2) that can
be executed to simulate the design. Lastly, the HSB is executed with the inputs from the
testbench to capture the design’s behavior. Ironically, even though commercial simulators
convert the hardware to software, they still rely on hardware-specific verification tools,
likely because software-oriented tools fail to work on hardware models—without the
lessons in this paper. To fuzz hardware in the software domain, I take advantage of the
transparency in how an open-source hardware simulator, Verilator [145], generates an HSB.
Namely, I intercept the software model of the hardware after translation, and instrument/-
compile it for coverage-guided fuzzing (Fig. 6.3).
6.2.1.3 Test Evaluation
After simulating a sequence of test inputs, the state of the hardware (both internally
and its outputs) are evaluated for correctness. There are two main approaches for verify-
ing design correctness: 1) invariant checking and 2) (gold) model checking. In invariant
checking, a set of assertions (e.g., SVAs or software side C/C++ assertions) are used to
check properties of the design have not been violated. In model checking, a separate model
of the DUT’s correct behavior is emulated in software, and compared to the DUT’s sim-
ulated behavior. I support such features and adopt both invariant violations and golden
model mismatches as an analog for software crashes in my hardware fuzzer.
6.2.2 Software Fuzzing
Software fuzzing is an automated testing technique designed to identify security vulner-
abilities in software [154]. Thanks to its success, it has seen widespread adoption in both
industry [23] and open-source [140] projects. In principle, fuzzing typically involves the
following three main steps [116]: 1) test generation, 2) monitoring test execution, and 3)
crash triaging. During test generation, program inputs are synthesized to exercise the target
binary. Next, these inputs are fed to the program under test, and its execution is monitored.
133
Lastly, if a specific test causes a crash, that test is further analyzed to find the root cause.
This process is repeated until all, or most, of the target binary has been explored. Below I
categorize fuzzers by how they implement the first two steps.
6.2.2.1 Test Generation
Most fuzzers generate test cases in one of two ways, using: 1) a grammar, or 2) mu-
tations. Grammar-based fuzzers [7, 76, 114, 127, 186, 187] use a human-crafted grammar
to constrain tests to comply with structural requirements of a specific target application.
Alternatively, mutational fuzzers take a correctly formatted test as a seed, and apply muta-
tions to the seed to create new tests. Moreover, mutational fuzzers are tuned to be either: 1)
directed, or 2) coverage-guided. Directed mutational fuzzers [8, 20, 35, 124, 189, 197, 210]
favor mutations that explore specific region within the target binary, i.e., prioritizing explo-
ration location. Conversely, coverage-guided mutational fuzzers [104, 132, 139, 155, 180,
201] favor mutations that explore as much of the target binary as possible, i.e., prioritizing
exploration completeness. For this work, I favor the use of mutational, coverage-guided
fuzzers, as they are both design-agnostic, and regionally generic.
6.2.2.2 Test Execution Monitoring
Fuzzers monitor test execution using one of three approaches: 1) blackbox, 2) white-
box, or 3) greybox. Fuzzers that only monitor program inputs and outputs are classified
as blackbox fuzzers [114, 127, 179]. Alternatively, fuzzers that track detailed execution
paths through programs with fine-grain program analysis (source code required) and con-
straint solving are known as whitebox fuzzers [24, 33, 38, 50, 65, 149, 189, 199]. Lastly,
greybox fuzzers [7, 20, 57, 124, 128, 132, 139, 155, 180, 186, 187, 197, 201, 210] offer a
trade-off between black- and whitebox fuzzers by deploying lightweight program analysis
techniques, such as code-coverage tracing. Since Verilator [145] produces raw C++ source
code from RTL hardware, my approach can leverage any software fuzzing technique—
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white, grey, or blackbox. In my current implementation, I deploy greybox fuzzing, due to
its popularity in the software testing community.
6.3 Threat Model
Like Chapter V, I again focus on the design-time attack threat model (§2.3.2). My
HWFP can fuzz any hardware design produced from any of the first three steps in the
hardware design process (Fig. 2.1), provided the design is described in valid HDL, like
VHDL or Verilog. I assume the design is not provided in any encrypted format–e.g., an
encrypted third party IP block—or if it is, an un-encrypted physical layout of the design is
provided in the form of a GDSII file, such that netlist HDL can be reverse engineered from
the layout [165]. I do not assume the verification engineer utilizing the HWFP has any
knowledge regarding the implementation of the design, except for knowledge pertaining to
example inputs and (correct) corresponding outputs of the DUT.
6.4 Hardware Fuzzing
To take advantage of advances in software fuzzing for hardware DV, I propose trans-
lating hardware designs to software models, and fuzzing the model directly. I call this
approach, Hardware Fuzzing, and illustrate the process in Fig. 6.3. Below, I first moti-
vate my approach by describing how hardware is already translated to the software domain
for simulation, and that software fuzzers provide a solution to a key technical challenge
in CDG: scalable coverage tracing. Then, I pose several challenges in adapting software
fuzzers to fuzz HSBs (in a design-agnostic fashion), and present solutions to overcome
these challenges.
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6.4.1 Why Fuzz Hardware like Software?
I observe two key benefits of fuzzing hardware in the software domain. First, hardware
is already translated to a software model for simulation purposes (§6.2.1.2). Second, un-
like prior CDG approaches [91, 148], I recognize that software fuzzers already provide an
efficient solution for tracing coverage. Below I explain how RTL hardware is translated to
executable software, and why software fuzzers implicitly maximize hardware coverage by
generating tests that maximize coverage of the HSB.
6.4.1.1 Translating HDL to Software
Today, simulating RTL hardware involves translating HDL into a functionally equiva-
lent software (C/C++) model that can be compiled and executed (§6.2.1.2). To accomplish
this, most hardware simulators [145, 192] contain an RTL compiler to perform the trans-
lation. Therefore, I leverage a popular open-source hardware simulator, Verilator [145], to
translate SystemVerilog HDL into a cycle-accurate C++ model for fuzzing.
Like many compilers, Verilator first performs lexical analysis and parsing (of the HDL)
with the help of Flex [126] and Bison [166], to generate an Abstract Syntax Tree (AST).
Then, it performs a series of passes over the AST to resolve parameters, propagate con-
stants, replace don’t cares (Xs) with random values, eliminate dead code, unroll loops/gen-
erate statements, and perform several other optimizations. Finally, Verilator generates C++
(or SystemC) code representing a cycle-accurate model of the hardware. It creates a C++
class for each Verilog module, and organizes classes according to the original HDL module
hierarchy [204].
To interface with the model, Verilator exposes public member variables for each in-
put/output to the top-level module, and a public eval() method (to be called in a loop) in
the top C++ class. Each input/output member variable is mapped to single/arrayed bool,
uint32_t, or uint64_t data types, depending on the width of each signal. Each call to
eval() updates the model based on the current values assigned to top-level inputs and in-
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ternal states variables. Two calls represent a single clock cycle (one call for each rising and
falling clock edges).
6.4.1.2 Tracing Hardware Coverage in Software
To efficiently explore a DUT’s state space, CDG techniques rely on tracing coverage
of past test cases to generate future test cases. There are two main categories of cover-
age metrics used in hardware verification [77, 130, 159]: 1) code coverage, and 2) func-
tional coverage. The coarsest, and most used, code coverage metric is line coverage. Line
coverage measures the percentage of HDL lines that have been exercised during simula-
tion. Alternatively, functional coverage measures the percentage of various high-level de-
sign functionalities—defined using special HDL constructs like SystemVerilog Coverage
Points/Groups—that are exercised during simulation. Regardless of the coverage metric
used, tracing HDL coverage during simulation is often slow, since coverage traced in the
software (simulation) domain must be mapped back to the hardware domain [77].
In an effort to compute DUT coverage efficiently, and in an HDL-agnostic manner,
prior CDG techniques develop custom coverage metrics, e.g., multiplexer coverage [91],
that can be monitored by instrumenting the RTL directly. However, this approach has two
drawbacks. First, the hardware must be simulated on an FPGA (simulating within software
is just as slow). Second, the authors provide no indication that their custom coverage
metrics actually translate to coverage metrics DV engineers care about.
Rather than make incremental improvements to existing CDG techniques, I recognize
that: 1) software fuzzers provide an efficient mechanism—e.g., binary instrumentation—
to trace coverage of compiled C++ hardware models (HSBs), and 2) characteristics of
how Verilator translates RTL hardware to software makes mapping software coverage to
hardware coverage implicit. On the software side, there are three main code coverage met-
rics of increasing granularity: 1) basic block, 2) basic block edges, and 3) basic block
paths [116]. The most popular coverage-guided fuzzers—AFL [201], libFuzzer [104], and
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honggfuzz [155]—all trace edge coverage. On the hardware side, Verilator conveniently
generates straight-line C++ code for both blocking and non-blocking2 SystemVerilog state-
ments [204], and injects conditional code blocks (basic blocks) for SystemVerilog Asser-
tions and Coverage Points. Therefore, optimizing test-generation for edge coverage of
the software model of the hardware during simulation, translates to optimizing for
code, FSM, and functional coverage of the RTL hardware itself. I demonstrate this
artifact in §6.6.4, §6.7.1–6.7.2, and Appendix C.
6.4.2 Driving Hardware with Software Fuzzers
While software fuzzers contain efficient mechanisms for tracing coverage of HSBs—
e.g., binary instrumentation—interfacing them with HSBs, in a design-agnostic manner is
non-trivial. Below, I highlight several challenges in fuzzing HSBs with software fuzzers,
and propose solutions to overcome them.
6.4.2.1 Interfacing Software Fuzzers with HSBs
Naı̈vely, a DV engineer may interface the HSB directly with a software fuzzer (like [104,
155, 201]) by compiling the HSB source code alongside the testbench harness (Algo. 2)
and simulation engine with one of the fuzzer-provided wrappers for Clang. However, they
would be ignoring two key differences between typical software applications and HSBs
that may degrade fuzzer performance. First, HSBs have other components—a testbench
and simulation engine (Fig. 6.2)—that are not part of the DUT. While the DUT is manip-
ulated through the testbench and simulation engine, instrumenting all components HSBs
actually degrades fuzzer performance (§6.6.3.1). Additionally, unlike software, the DUT
software model must be reset and initialized, prior to processing any inputs. Depending on
the size of the DUT, this process can require special configuration of the testbench, i.e., ini-
tializing the fuzzer to snapshot the hardware simulation process after reset and initialization
2Verilator imposes an order on the non-blocking assignments since C++ does not have a semantically
equivalent assignment operator [145, 204]. Regardless, this ordering does not effect code coverage.
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of the DUT (§6.6.3.2).
6.4.2.2 Interpreting Fuzzer-Generated Tests
For most software, a single input often activates an entire set of state transitions within
the program. Consequently, the most popular software fuzzers assume the target binary
reads a single dimensional input—e.g., a single image or document—from either a file,
stdin, or a byte array [104, 155, 201]. As Laeufer et al. point out [91], the execution
model of hardware is different. In an HSB, a sequence of inputs is required to activate
state transitions within the DUT. For example, a 4-digit lock (with a keypad) only has a
chance of unlocking if a sequence of four inputs (test cases) are provided. Fuzzing this
lock with single test cases (digits), will fail. Likewise, fuzzing HSBs with software fuzzers
that employ a single-test-case-per-file model will also fail. Therefore, to stimulate hard-
ware with software fuzzers, I interpret single dimensional fuzzer-generated tests in two
dimensions: space and time. I implement this interface in the form of a generic fuzzing
harness (testbench)—shown in Algo. 2—that continuously: 1) reads byte-level portions of
fuzzer-generated test files, 2) maps these bytes to hardware input ports, and 3) advances the
simulation clock by calling the model’s eval() method twice, until there are no remaining
bytes to process. With my fuzzing harness, I transform one-dimensional test inputs, into a
two-dimensional sequence of inputs.
6.4.2.3 Bus-Centric Harness
While the multi-dimensional fuzzing interface I develop enables fuzzer-generated tests
to effect state transitions in hardware, it is not design-agnostic. Specifically, the ports of a
hardware model are not iterable (Algo. 2: line 4). A DV engineer would have to create a
unique fuzz harness (testbench) for each DUT they verify. To facilitate DUT portability,
I take inspiration from how hardware engineers interface IP cores within an SoC [41].
Specifically, I propose fuzzing IP cores at the bus interface using a bus-centric harness.
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Algorithm 2: Generic Hardware Fuzzing harness (testbench) that maps one-
dimensional fuzzer-generated test files to both spatial and temporal dimensions.
Input: fuzz test file.hwf
1 dut←Vtop();
2 t f ← open( f uzz test f ile.hw f );
3 while tf not empty do
4 foreach port ∈ dut.inputs do
5 tf.read((uint 8t*) port, sizeo f (port));
6 for k← 1 to 2 do





To implement this harness, I could alter my prior harness (Algo. 2) by mapping bytes
from fuzzer-generated test files to temporal values for specific signals of a bus-protocol
of my choice. However, this would create an exploration barrier since bus-protocols re-
quire structured syntax, and most mutational fuzzers lack syntax awareness [200]. In other
words, the fuzzer would likely get stuck trying to synthesize a test file, that when mapped
to spatio-temporal bus signal values, produces a valid bus-transaction. Instead, I implement
a harness that decodes fuzzer-generated test files into sequences of properly structured bus
transactions using a bus-centric grammar I describe below. My current bus-centric harness
is implemented around the TL-UL bus protocol [70] with a 32-bit data bus, and illustrated
in Fig. 6.13.
6.4.2.4 Bus-Centric Grammar
To translate fuzzer-generated test files into valid bus transactions I construct a Hardware
Fuzzing grammar. I format my grammar in a compact binary representation to facilitate
integration with popular greybox fuzzers that produce similar formats [104, 155, 201].
To match my bus-centric harness, I implement my grammar around the same TL-UL bus




Figure 6.4: Hardware Fuzzing Instruction. A bus-centric harness (testbench) reads bi-
nary Hardware Fuzzing Instructions from a fuzzer-generated test file, decodes
them, and performs TL-UL bus transactions to drive the DUT (Fig.6.13). Our
Hardware Fuzzing Instructions comprise a grammar (Tbl. 6.1) that aid syntax-
blind coverage-guided greybox fuzzers in generating valid bus-transactions to
fuzz hardware.
contain: 1) an 8-bit opcode, 2) 32-bit address field, and 3) 32-bit data field. The opcode
within each instruction determines the bus transaction the harness performs. I describe the
mappings between opcodes and TL-UL bus transactions in Table 6.1.
Note, there are two properties of my grammar that leave room for various harness (test-
bench) implementations, which I study in Appendix C. First, while I define only three
opcodes in my grammar, I represent the opcode with an entire byte, leaving it up to the
harness to decide how to map Hardware Fuzzing opcode values to testbench actions. I do
this for two reasons: 1) a byte is the smallest addressable unit in most software, facilitating
the development of utilities to automate generating compact binary seed files (that comply
with my grammar) from high-level markdown languages, and 2) choosing a larger opcode
field enables adding more opcodes in the future, should I need to support additional op-
erations in the TileLink bus protocol[70]. Second, of the three opcodes I include, not all
require address and data fields. Therefore, it is up to the harness to decide how it should
process Hardware Fuzzing instructions. While different implementations may choose to
read fixed size instruction frames, from my empirical analysis in Appendix C, I decide
to implement a harness that processes variable size instructions frames, depending on the
opcode (Table 6.1).
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wait no no advance the clock one period
read yes no TL-UL Get (read)
write yes yes TL-UL PutFullData (write)
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Figure 6.5: Hardware Fuzzing Pipeline (HWFP). We design, implement, and open-
source a HWFP that is modeled after Google’s OSS-Fuzz [140]. Our HWFP
enables us to verify RTL hardware at scale using only open-source tools, a
rarity in hardware DV.
6.5 Hardware Fuzzing Pipeline
To fuzz hardware at scale I design, implement, and open-source a Hardware Fuzzing
Pipeline (HWFP) modeled after Google’s OSS-Fuzz (Fig. 6.5). First, my pipeline builds a
Docker image (from the Ubuntu 20.04 base image) containing a compiler (LLVM version
12.0.0), RTL simulator (Verilator [145] version 4.0.4), software fuzzer, the target RTL hard-
ware, and a generic fuzzing harness (§6.4.2.3). From the image, a container is instantiated
on a GCP VM that:
1. translates the DUT’s RTL to a software model with Verilator [145],
2. compiles/instruments the DUT model, and links it with the generic fuzzing harness
(§6.4.2.3) and simulation engine to create an HSB (Fig. 6.2),
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3. launches the fuzzer for a set period of time, using the timeout utility,
4. traces final HDL coverage of fuzzer-generated tests with Verilator [145],
5. saves fuzzing and coverage data to a Google Cloud Storage (GCS) bucket, and lastly
6. tears down the VM.
Note, for benchmarking, all containers are instantiated on their own GCP n1-standard-2
VM with two vCPUs, 7.5 GB of memory, 50 GB of disk, running Google’s Container-
Optimized OS. In my current implementation, I use AFL [201] (version 2.57b) as my
fuzzer, but my HWFP is designed to be fuzzer-agnostic.
Unlike traditional hardware verification toolchains, my HWFP uses only open-source
tools, allowing DV engineers to save money on licenses, and spend it on compute. This not
only enhances the deployability of my approach, but makes it ideal for adopting alongside
existing hardware DV workflows. This is important because rarely are new DV approaches
adopted without some overlap with prior (proven) techniques, since mistakes during hard-
ware verification have costly repercussions.
6.6 Feasibility Evaluation
In the first part of my evaluation, I address two technical questions around fuzzing
software models of RTL hardware with software fuzzers. First, how should I interface
coverage-guided software fuzzers with HSBs? Unlike most software, HSBs contain other
components—a testbench and simulation engine (Fig. 6.2)—that are not the target of test-
ing, yet the fuzzer must learn to manipulate in order to drive the DUT. Second, how does
Hardware Fuzzing compare with traditional dynamic verification methods, i.e., CRV, in
terms of time to coverage convergence? To address this first set of questions, I perform




































A) Constrained Random Verification B) Hardware Fuzzing
n
Figure 6.6: Digital Lock FSM. We use a configurable digital lock (FSM shown here) to
demonstrate: 1) how to interface software fuzzers with hardware simulation
binaries, and 2) the dvantages of Hardware Fuzzing (vs. traditional CRV).
The digital lock FSM can be configured in two dimensions: 1) total number of
states and 2) width (in bits) of input codes.
6.6.1 Digital Lock Hardware
In this half of my evaluation, I fuzz various configurations of a digital lock, whose FSM
and HDL are shown in Fig. 6.6 and List. VI.1, respectively. I choose to study this design
since the complexity of its state space is configurable, and therefore, ideal for stress testing
various DV methodologies. Specifically, the complexity is configurable in two dimensions:
1) the total number of states is configurable by tuning the size, N, of the single state register,
and 2) the probability of choosing the correct unlocking code sequence is adjustable by
altering the size, M, of the comparator/mux that checks input codes against hard-coded
(random) values (List. VI.1). I develop a utility in Rust, using the kaze crate [161], to auto-
generate 480 different lock state machines of various complexities, i.e., different values of
N, M, and random correct code sequences.
Listing VI.1: SystemVerilog of Lock with N=log2(#states) and M-bit secret codes set to
random values.
1 module lock(
2 input reset n ,
3 input clk ,
4 input [M−1:0] code,
5 output unlocked
6 ) ;
7 logic [N−1:0] state ;
8 logic [M−1:0] correct codes [N];
9
10 // Secret codes set to random values
11 for (genvar i = 0; i < N; i++) begin : secret codes




15 assign unlocked = ( state == ’1) ? 1’b1 : 1’b0;
16
17 always @(posedge clk) begin
18 if (! reset n ) begin
19 state <= ’0;
20 end else if (!unlocked && code == correct codes[ state ]) begin
21 state <= state + 1’b1;
22 end else begin




6.6.2 Digital Lock HSB Architectures
To study these designs, I construct two HSB architectures (Fig. 6.7) using two hard-
ware DV methodologies: CRV and Hardware Fuzzing. The CRV architecture (Fig. 6.7A)
attempts to unlock the lock through a brute-force approach, where random code sequences
are driven into the DUT until the unlocked state is reached. If the random sequence fails
to unlock the lock, the DUT is reset, and a new random sequence is supplied. If the se-
quence succeeds, an SVA is violated, which terminates the simulation. The random code
sequences are constrained in the sense that only valid code sequences are driven into the
DUT, i.e., 1) each code in the sequence is in the range [0,2M) for locks with M-bit code
comparators, and 2) sequences contain exactly 2N−1 input codes for locks with 2N states.
The CRV testbench is implemented with the cocotb [177] framework and simulations are
run with Verilator [145].
Alternatively, the Hardware Fuzzing HSB (Fig. 6.7B) takes input from a software fuzzer
that generates code sequences for the DUT. The fuzzer initializes and checkpoints, a pro-
cess running the HSB (Fig. 6.2), and repeatedly forks this process and tries various code
sequence inputs. If an incorrect code sequence is supplied, the fuzzer forks a new process
(equivalent to resetting the DUT) and tries again. If the correct code sequence is provided,
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Figure 6.7: Digital Lock HSB Architectures. (A) A traditional CRV architecture: ran-
dom input code sequences are driven into the DUT until the unlocked state is
reached. (B) A software fuzzer generates tests to drive the DUT. The fuzzer
monitors coverage of the DUT during test execution and uses this information
to generate future tests. Both HSBs are configured to terminate execution upon
unlocking the lock using an SVA in the testbench that signals the simulation
engine (Fig. 6.2) to abort.
CRV and Hardware Fuzzing is that the fuzzer traces coverage during hardware simulation,
and will save past code sequences that get closer to unlocking the lock. These past se-
quences are then mutated to generate future sequences. Thus, past inputs are used to craft
more intelligent inputs in the future. To interface the software fuzzer with the HSB, I:
1. implement a C++ testbench harness from Algo. 2 that reads fuzzer-generated bytes
from stdin and feeds them directly to the code input of the lock.
2. instrument the HSB containing the DUT by compiling it with afl-clang-fast++.
6.6.3 Interfacing Software Fuzzers with Hardware
There are two questions that arise when interfacing software fuzzers with HSBs. First,
unlike most software applications, software models of hardware are not standalone binaries.
They must be combined—typically by either static or dynamic linking—with a testbench
and simulation engine to form an HSB (§6.2.1.2). Of these three components—DUT, test-
bench, and simulation engine—I seek to maximize coverage of only the DUT. I do not want
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to waste fuzzing cycles on the testbench or simulation engine. Since coverage tracing in-
strumentation provides an indirect method to coarsely steer the fuzzer towards components
of interest [20], it would be considered good practice to instrument just the DUT portion
of the HSB. However, while the DUT is ultimately what I want to fuzz, the fuzzer must
learn to use the testbench and simulation engine to manipulate the DUT. Therefore, what
components of the HSB should I instrument to maximize fuzzer performance, yet ensure
coverage convergence?
Second, when simulating hardware, the DUT must be reset to a clean state before it
can start processing inputs. Traditionally, the testbench portion of the HSB performs this
reset by asserting the DUT’s global reset signal for a set number of clock cycles. Since the
fuzzer instantiates, and repeatedly forks the process executing the HSB, this reset process
will happen hundreds, or (potentially) thousands of times per second as each test execution
is processed. While some software fuzzers [104, 201] enable users to perform initializa-
tion operations before the program under test is forked—meaning the DUT reset could be
performed once, as each forking operation essentially sets the HSB back to a clean state—
-this may not always the case. Moreover, it complicates fuzzer–HSB integration, which
contradicts the whole premise of my approach, i.e., low-overhead, design-agnostic CDG.
Therefore, I ask: is this fuzzing initialization feature required to fuzz HSBs?
6.6.3.1 Instrumenting HSBs for Fuzzing
To determine the components of the HSB I should instrument, I measure the fuzzing run
times to achieve approximate full FSM coverage3 of several lock designs, i.e., the time it
takes the fuzzer to generate a sequence of input codes that unlocks each lock. I measure this
by modifying the fuzzer to terminate upon detecting the first crash, which I produce using
a single SVA that monitors the condition of the unlocked signal (List. VI.1). Specifically,
using lock designs with 16, 32, and 64 states, and input codes widths of four bits, I construct
3I use the term approximate when referring to full FSM coverage, since I are not excising the lock’s reset
state transitions (Fig. 6.6) in these experiments.
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Figure 6.8: Instrumentation Level vs. Coverage Convergence Rate. Distribution of
fuzzer run times required to unlock various sized digital locks (code widths
are fixed at four bits), i.e., achieve ≈ full FSM coverage. For each HSB, we
vary the components we instrument for coverage tracing. Run times are nor-
malized to the median DUT-only instrumentation level (orange) across each
lock size (red line). While the fuzzer uses the testbench and simulation engine
to manipulate the DUT, instrumenting only the DUT does not hinder the cov-
erage convergence rate of the fuzzer. Rather, it improves it when DUT sizes are
small, compared to the simulation engine and testbench (Fig. 6.9).
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HSBs following the architecture shown in Fig. 6.7B. For each HSB, I vary the components
I instrument by using different compiler settings for each component. First, I (naı̈vely)
instrument all components, then only the DUT. Next, I fuzz each HSB 50 times, seeding
the fuzzer with an empty file in each experiment.
I plot the distribution of fuzzing run times in Fig. 6.8. Since fuzzing is an inherently
random process, I plot only the middle third of run times across all instrumentation levels
and lock sizes. Moreover, all run times are normalized to the median DUT-only instrumen-
tation run times (orange) across each lock size. In addition to plotting fuzzing run times,
I plot the number of basic blocks within each component of the HSB in Fig. 6.9. Across
all lock sizes, I observe that only instrumenting the DUT does not handicap the fuzzer,
but rather improves the rate of coverage convergence! In fact, I perform a Mann-Whitney
U test, with a 0.05 significance level, and find all the run-time improvements to be statis-
tically significant. Moreover, I observe that even though the run-time improvements are
less significant as the DUT size increases compared to the simulation engine and testbench
(Fig. 6.9), instrumenting only the DUT never handicaps the fuzzer performance.
Key Insight: Instrumenting only the DUT portion of the HSB does not impair the
fuzzer’s ability to drive the DUT, rather, it improves fuzzing speed.
6.6.3.2 Hardware Resets vs. Fuzzer Performance
To determine if DUT resets present a performance bottleneck, I measure the degradation
in fuzzing performance due to the repeated simulation of DUT resets. I take advantage
of a unique feature of a popular greybox fuzzer [201] that enables configuring the exact
location of initializing the fork server.4 This enables the fuzzer to perform any program-
specific initialization operations once, prior to forking children processes to fuzz. Using
this feature, I repeat the same fuzzing run time analysis performed in §6.6.3.1, except I
4By default, AFL [201] instantiates a process from the binary under test, pauses it, and repeatedly forks
it to create identical processes to feed test inputs to. The component of AFL that performs process forking is
known as the fork server.
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Figure 6.9: Basic Blocks per Simulation Binary Component. We break down the number
of basic blocks that comprise the three components within HSBs of different
size locks (Fig. 6.6 & List. VI.1), generated by Verilator [145]: simulation
engine and testbench (TB), and DUT. As locks increase in size, defined by the
number of FSM states (code widths are fixed to 4 bits), so do the number of
basic blocks in their software model.
instrument all simulation binary components, and compare two variations of the digital
lock HSB shown in Fig. 6.7B. In one testbench, I use the default fork server initialization
location: at the start of main(). In the other testbench, I initialize the fork server after the
point where the DUT has been reset.
Fig. 6.10 shows my results. Again, I drop outliers by plotting only the middle third of
run times across all lock sizes and fork server initialization points. Additionally, I normalize
all run times to the median “after DUT reset” run times (orange) across each lock size.
From these results, I apply the Mann-Whitney U test (with 0.05 significance level) between
run times. This time, only locks with 8 and 16 states yield p-values less than 0.05. This
indicates the overhead of continuously resetting the DUT during fuzzing diminishes as the
DUT increases in complexity. Additionally, I note that even the largest digital locks I study
(64 states), are smaller than the smallest OpenTitan core, the RISC-V Timer, in terms of
number of basic blocks in the software model (Fig. 6.9 & Table 6.2).
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Figure 6.10: Hardware Resets vs. Fuzzer Performance. Fuzzing run times across across
digital locks (similar to Fig. 6.8) with different fork server initialization loca-
tions in the testbench to eliminate overhead due to the repeated simulation of
hardware DUT resets. DUT resets are only a fuzzing bottleneck when DUTs
are small, reducing fuzzer–HSB integration complexity.
Figure 6.11: Hardware Fuzzing vs. CRV. Run times for both Hardware Fuzzing (A) and
CRV (B) to achieve ≈ full FSM coverage of various digital lock (Fig. 6.6)
designs—i.e., time to unlock the lock—using the testbench architectures
shown in Fig. 6.7. Run times are averaged across 20 trials for each lock
design—defined by a (# states, code width) pair—and DV method combi-
nation. Across these designs, Hardware Fuzzing achieves full FSM coverage
faster than traditional CRV approaches, by over two orders of magnitude.
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Key Insight: Overhead from simulating hardware resets while fuzzing is minimal,
especially in large designs, further reducing fuzzer–HSB integration efforts.
6.6.4 Hardware Fuzzing vs. CRV
Using the techniques I learned from above, I perform a run-time comparison analysis
between Hardware Fuzzing and CRV,5 the current state-of-the-art hardware dynamic veri-
fication technique. I perform these experiments using digital locks of various complexities,
from 2 to 64 states, and code widths of 1 to 8 bits. The two HSB architectures I compare
are shown in Fig. 6.7, and discussed in §6.6.2. Note, the fuzzer was again seeded with an
empty file to align its starting state with the CRV tests.
Similar to my instrumentation and reset experiments (§6.6.3) I measure the fuzzing run
times required to achieve ≈ full FSM coverage of each lock design, i.e., the time to unlock
each lock. I illustrate these run times in heatmaps shown in Fig. 6.11. I perform 20 trials
for each experiment and average these run times in each square of a heatmap. While the
difference between the two approaches is indistinguishable for extremely small designs,
the advantages of Hardware Fuzzing become apparent as designs increase in complexity.
For medium to larger lock designs, Hardware Fuzzing achieves full FSM coverage faster
than CRV by over two orders-of-magnitude, even when the fuzzer is seeded with an empty
file. Moreover, many CRV experiments were terminated early (after running for five days)
to save money on GCP instances.
Key Insight: Hardware Fuzzing is a low-cost, low-overhead CDG approach for hard-
ware DV.
5CRV is widely deployed in any DV testbenches built around the cocotb [177] or UVM [1] frameworks,
e.g., all OpenTitan [105] IP core testbenches.
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Figure 6.12: Hardware Fuzzing vs. RFUZZ. Fuzzing eight different hardware designs,
including an FFT accelerator, RISC-V CPUs, and TileLink communication
peripherals, with my Hardware Fuzzing approach vs. RFUZZ [91] (Fig. 6.1),
yields 24.76% better HDL coverage (on average) after 24 hours, across all
cores.
6.7 Practicality Evaluation
In the second part of my evaluation, I address two remaining questions. First, how does
Hardware Fuzzing compare with prior RTL fuzzing schemes, e.g., RFUZZ [91], in terms
of HDL code coverage? While Laeufer et al. were the first to demonstrate fuzzing RTL
with RFUZZ [91], I argue for an entirely different approach (Fig. 6.1), fuzzing software
models of RTL hardware, rather than the RTL hardware itself. Lastly, how does Hardware
Fuzzing perform in practice commercial-grade hardware IP? To address these questions,
I perform E2E fuzzing analyses on several open-source hardware designs, including four
commercial-grade cores from Google’s OpenTitan [105] SoC, four SiFive TileLink periph-
erals, three RISC-V CPUs, and an FFT accelerator.
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6.7.1 Hardware Fuzzing vs. RFUZZ
Unlike my approach, RFUZZ instruments RTL hardware directly by injecting coverage-
tracing hardware into the RTL when it is compiled from a high-level HDL, like FIRRTL,
to Verilog. As a result, RFUZZ is only compatible with hardware designs described using
high-level HDLs, like Chisel [11] or FIRRTL [98]. Unfortunately, most industry hardware
designs are still written in (System)Verilog. Moreover, RFUZZ does not exploit any bus-
specific harnesses, rather, it requires design-specific harnesses that are fed fuzzer-generated
bit-vectors to hardware input ports, as described in Algo. 2 and demonstrated in the fuzzing
harness built for the digital lock in Fig. 6.7b.
To demonstrate the benefits of my approach vs. RFUZZ, I compare the HDL line cov-
erage achieved by both approaches over the course of fuzzing eight different hardware
designs for 24 hours. Specifically, I fuzz the same eight hardware designs in the original
RFUZZ [91], including the I2C, SPI, PWM, and UART SiFive TileLink IP blocks [143],
three RISC-V Sodor CPUs [134], and an FFT accelerator [133]. For each core, I use the
same RFUZZ-generated test harness across both approaches, but use different fuzzing mech-
anisms, as highlighted in Fig. 6.1. Specifically, RFUZZ uses a custom fuzzer that directly
measures RTL coverage using Verilog-level instrumentation, while my (Hardware Fuzzing)
approach uses a software fuzzer (i.e., AFL) that measures RTL coverage using HSB-level
instrumentation. For each core, I perform 10 trials with both fuzzing techniques, using
empty seed files, and compare the best case results (i.e., highest coverage) using RFUZZ,
with the worst case results (i.e., lowest coverage) using my Hardware Fuzzing approach.
In Fig. 6.12, I plot my results. After 24 hours of fuzzing, across all cores, the average
HDL line coverage improvement using my Hardware Fuzzing approach over RFUZZ was
24.76%, while the minimum and maximum improvements I 13.90% and 37.41%, respec-
tively. Lastly, I apply the Mann-Whitney U test (with 0.05 significance level) between all
fuzzing trials across all cores, and observe p-values less than 0.05. This further confirms






























Figure 6.13: OpenTitan HSB Architecture. A software fuzzer learns to generate fuzzing
instructions (Fig. 6.4)—from .hwf seed files—based on a hardware fuzzing
grammar (§6.4.2.4). It pipes these instructions to stdin where a generic
C++ fuzzing harness fetches/decodes them, and performs the corresponding
TileLink bus operations to drive the DUT. SVAs are evaluated during execu-
tion of the HSB, and produce a program crash (if violated), that is caught and
reported by the software fuzzer.
Key Insight: Fuzzing hardware in the software domain yields better HDL coverage
than prior techniques, i.e. RFUZZ [91].
6.7.2 Fuzzing OpenTitan IP
To address the last question—How does Hardware Fuzzing perform in practice on
commercial-grade hardware?—I fuzz four IP blocks from Google’s OpenTitan silicon
root-of-trust SoC[105], including the: AES, HMAC, KMAC, and RISC-V Timer cores.
While each core performs different functions,6 they all conform to the OpenTitan Com-
portability Specification [41], implying they are all controlled via reads and writes to
memory-mapped registers over a TL-UL bus. By adhering to a uniform bus protocol, I
are able to re-use a generic fuzzing harness (Fig. 6.13), facilitating the deployability of my
6For more information on the functionalities of each IP block, see Appendix B.
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Table 6.2: OpenTitan IP Core Complexity in HW and SW Domains.
IP Core HW LOC SW LOC # Basic Blocks* # SVAs†
AES 4,562 38,036 3,414 53
HMAC 2,695 18,005 1,764 30
KMAC 4,585 119,297 6,996 44
RV Timer 677 3,111 290 8
* Number of basic blocks in compiled software model with O3 opti-
mization.
† Number of SystemVerilog Assertions included in IP HDL at time
of writing.
approach. Below, I highlight the functionality of each IP core. Additionally, in Table 6.2, I
report the complexity of each IP core in both the hardware and software domains, in terms
of Lines of Code (LOC), number of basic blocks, and number of SVAs provided in each
core’s HDL. Software models of each hardware design are produced using Verilator, as I
describe in §6.4.1.1.
6.7.2.1 Fuzzing OpenTitan IP with Empty Seeds
Unlike most software applications that are fuzzed [140], I observe that software models
of hardware are quite small (Table 6.2). So, like the RFUZZ experiments, I decided to
experiment fuzzing each OpenTitan core using a single empty seed file as starting input,
this time for only one hour. I plot the results of this experiment in Fig. 6.14. After only
one hour of fuzzing with no proper starting seeds, I achieve over 88% HDL line coverage
across three of the four OpenTitan IP cores I study, and over 65% coverage of the remaining
design.
6.7.2.2 Fuzzing for Bugs in OpenTitan IP
While coverage is an important metric, the ultimate goal of fuzzing hardware is to
automatically uncover bugs, before they percolate into fabricated silicon. Therefore, in
my final evaluation, I demonstrate the effectiveness of Hardware Fuzzing at finding four
RTL bugs, one in each OpenTitan IP block I study. Specifically, in the AES, HMAC, and
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Figure 6.14: Coverage vs. Time Fuzzing with Empty Seeds. Fuzzing four OpenTi-
tan [105] IP cores for one hour, seeding the fuzzer with an empty file in each
case, yields over 88% HDL line coverage in three out of four designs.
Table 6.3: Hardware Fuzzing RTL Bug Discovery Times.




RV Timer Comparison 4.4
RV Timer cores, I implant artificial FSM, padding, and comparison bugs, respectively, and
craft corresponding SVAs to produce HSB crashes upon encountering incorrect hardware
behaviors. Additionally, for the KMAC core, I craft an SVA to detect an FSM bug that
was reported on the OpenTitan public GitHub (Issue #6408) by OpenTitan DV engineers.7
In Table 6.3, I plot the time it took my HWFP to detect each bug when seeded with a
set of inputs that simply resets and initializes each DUT to perform its prescribed tasks.
Namely, for the AES core, my seed configures the device to operate in CTR mode. For
the HMAC core, my seed configures the device to perform SHA256 hashes. For the RV
Timer core, my seed arms the timer. Lastly, for the KMAC core, my seed configures the
device to perform KMAC operations in cSHAKE hashing mode. Across each core I study,
I are able to detect all implanted bugs in less than 10 hours, with initialization seeds that
are orders-of-magnitude less complex than conventional dynamic verification testbenches.
7https://github.com/lowRISC/opentitan/issues/6408
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Key Insight: Hardware Fuzzing detects bugs in commercial-grade hardware IP.
6.8 Discussion
6.8.1 Detecting Bugs During Fuzzing
The focus of Hardware Fuzzing is to provide a scalable yet flexible solution for inte-
grating CDG with hardware simulation. However, test generation and hardware simulation
comprise only two-thirds of the hardware verification process (§6.2.1). The final, and ar-
guably most important, step is detecting incorrect hardware behavior, i.e., test evaluation
in §6.2.1.3. For this there are two approaches: 1) invariant checking and 2) (gold) model
checking. In both cases, I trigger HSB crashes upon detecting incorrect hardware behavior,
which software fuzzers log. For invariant checks, I use SVAs that send the HSB process the
SIGABRT signal upon assertion violation. Likewise, for gold model checking testbenches
any mismatches between models results in a SIGABRT.
6.8.2 Additional Bus Protocols
To provide a design-agnostic interface to fuzz RTL hardware, I develop a design-
agnostic testbench harness (Fig. 6.13). My harness decodes fuzzer-generated tests using
a bus-specific grammar (§6.4.2.4), and produces corresponding TL-UL bus transactions
that drive a DUT. In my current implementation, my generic testbench harness conforms
to the TL-UL bus protocol [70]. As a result, I can fuzz any IP core that speaks the same
bus protocol (e.g., all OpenTitan cores [105]). To fuzz cores that speak other bus protocols
(e.g., Wishbone, AMBA, Avalon, etc.), users can simply write a new harness for the bus
they wish to support.
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6.8.3 Hardware without a Bus Interface
For hardware cores that perform I/O over a generic set of ports that do not conform to
any bus protocol, I provide a generic testbench harness that maps fuzzer-generated input
files across spatial and temporal domains by interpreting each fuzzer-generated file as a
sequence of DUT inputs (Algo. 2). I demonstrate this Hardware Fuzzing configuration
when fuzzing various digital locks (Fig. 6.7B). However, if inputs require any structural
dependencies, I advise developing a grammar and corresponding testbench—similar to my
bus-specific grammar (§6.4.2.4)—to aid the fuzzer in generating valid test cases. Designers
can use the lessons in this paper to guide their core-specific grammar designs.
6.8.4 Limitations
While Hardware Fuzzing is both efficient and design-agnostic, there are some limita-
tions. First, unlike software there is no notion of a hardware sanitizer, that can add safe-
guards against generic classes of hardware bugs for the fuzzer to sniff out. While I envision
hardware sanitizers being a future active research area, for now, DV engineers must create
invariants or gold models to check design behavior against for the fuzzer to find crashing
inputs. Second, there is notion of analog behavior in RTL hardware, let along in trans-
lated software models. In its current implementation, Hardware Fuzzing is not effective
against detecting side-channel vulnerabilities that rely on information transmission/leak-
age through analog domains.
6.9 Related Work




Laeufer et al. ’s RFUZZ [91] is the most relevant prior work, which attempts to build a
full-fledged design-agnostic RTL fuzzer. To achieve their goal, they propose a new RTL
coverage metric—mux toggle coverage—that measures if the control signal to a 2:1 multi-
plexer expresses both states (0 and 1). Unlike Hardware Fuzzing, they instrument the RTL
directly, by injecting additional HDL into the design, and develop their own custom RTL
fuzzer (Fig. 6.1). Unfortunately, this has three drawbacks. First, RFUZZ is only compatible
with hardware written in high-level HDLs, like Chisel [11] or FIRRTL [98], that can instru-
mented when compiled to Verilog. Second, RFUZZ requires some designs be modified to
have reset times on the order of one to two clock cycles. Third, it is unclear how their mux
toggle coverage maps to other RTL coverage metrics that DV engineers also care about,
e.g., FSM and functional coverage [77, 159]. Gent et al. [49] also propose an automatic
test pattern generator based on custom coverage metrics, for which they too instrument the
RTL directly to trace. Unfortunately, like RFUZZ, the deployability and scalability of their
approach remains in question, given their coverage tracing method.
6.9.2 Design-Specific
Unlike the design-agnostic approaches, several researchers propose CDG techniques
exclusively for processors. Zhang et al. [204] propose Coppelia, a tool that uses a cus-
tom symbolic execution engine (built on top of KLEE [24]) on software models of the
RTL. Coppelia’s goal is to target specific security-critical properties of processors; Hard-
ware Fuzzing enables combining such static methods with fuzzing (i.e., concolic execu-
tion [149]) for free, overcoming the limits of symbolic execution alone. Hur et al. [67] pro-
pose DIFUZZRTL that combines RFUZZ with golden model checking to find bugs in CPUs.
However, Hardware Fuzzing produces better coverage than RFUZZ (§6.7.1), and can be
combined with invariant or with golden model checking to detect bugs. Lastly, two other
processor-specific CDG approaches are Squillero’s MicroGP [148] and Bose et al. ’s [22]
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that use a genetic algorithms to generate random assembly programs that maximize RTL
code coverage of a processor. Unlike Hardware Fuzzing, these approaches require custom
DUT-specific grammars to build assembly programs from.
6.10 Conclusion
Hardware Fuzzing is an effective solution to CDG for hardware DV. Unlike prior work,
I take advantage of feature-rich software testing methodologies and tools, to solve a long-
standing problem in hardware DV. To make my approach attractive to DV practitioners, I
solve several key deployability challenges, including developing generic interfaces (gram-
mar & testbench) to fuzz RTL in a design-agnostic manner. Using my generic grammar
and testbench, I show that my Hardware Fuzzing approach can achieve over 88% HDL
code coverage of three out of four commercial-grade hardware designs I study in only one
hour, with no knowledge of the DUT design or implementation. Moreover, I demonstrate
that approach can also detect various implanted bugs in the same designs, in less than 10
hours. Finally, compared to standard dynamic verification practices and prior RTL fuzzing
techniques, with Hardware Fuzzing, I achieve over two orders-of-magnitude and 13.90%
coverage convergence improvements, respectively.
6.11 Citation
Work from this chapter was partially completed while interning at Google, and is
co-authored by Kang G. Shin, Alex Chernyakovsky, Garret Kelly, Dominic Rizzo, and
Matthew Hicks. This work can be cited as [172].
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CHAPTER VII
Conclusion & Future Directions
7.1 Conclusion
The ultimate goal of this research is to make security a first class optimization objective—
alongside power, performance, and area—throughout the hardware development life cycle.
In this dissertation, I developed four techniques to aid in the design and verification of
secure hardware. Specifically, I addressed two security threats related to: 1) fabricating sil-
icon at untrusted foundries, and 2) integrating untrusted third-party IP into larger (trusted)
designs. Unlike software, hardware cannot be patched once deployed. Any flaws or se-
curity vulnerabilities in hardware have detrimental financial repercussions to companies
that experience them. As hardware becomes increasingly sophisticated and application-
specific, it is more important than ever to root out hardware flaws before fabrication, and to
prevent malicious tampering of designs at untrusted foundries.
To summarize my contributions to the field, I take a bottom-up approach to securing IC
hardware: starting at the layout-level, before moving to the behavioral (RTL) level. First, I
presented a framework to compute metrics that quantify the overall security of an IC layout
to fabrication-time modification. The goal of this framework is to provide an optimization
feedback mechanism to Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tools to enhance the security
of IC layouts. Using this measurement framework, I developed the first routing-based
preventative defense against foundry-side attacks, called T-TER (Chapter IV). Unlike prior
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defenses, T-TER does not require hard layout constraints that make deployment intractable
in real-world designs.
At the behavioral (RTL) level, I developed verification solutions to vet untrusted third-
party IP for hardware Trojans. In Chapter V, I presented the first dynamic verification
technique—Bomberman—capable of detecting TTTs with zero false negatives. Lastly, us-
ing Bomberman’s insights, I developed a design-agnostic technique to fuzz hardware like
software to automatically identify specific RTL hardware vulnerabilities, using feature-rich
coverage-guided software fuzzers (Chapter VI). Hardware fuzzing is an exciting research
domain as it brings together several recent advancements in coverage-guided software test-
ing to solve stagnant hardware verification problems.
7.2 Future Directions
While my research has made strides towards securing hardware, it has only scratched
the surface in what I believe to be the future of computer security research. Specifically,
my work has brought to light several new challenges that I summarize here.
7.2.1 Security as an Optimization Objective during IC Layout
In Chapter III, I presented a framework for computing security metrics of an IC lay-
out. While these metrics provide IC layout engineers with concrete insights into how their
designs might be vulnerable to fabrication-time attacks, they do not provide an automated
mechanism to address any issues that may come to light. Ultimately, the goal of this frame-
work is to be tightly integrated into PaR EDA tools, such that the tools themselves can
optimize IC layouts for security. I envision future work performing this integration to de-
velop an E2E solution for hardening IC layouts against fabrication-time modifications.
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7.2.2 Directed Fuzzing for Trojan Detection
The Bomberman toolchain presented in Chapter V demonstrates the effectiveness of
Trojan-specific verification at eliminating the possibility of false negatives when vetting un-
trusted third-party IP for Trojans. Unfortunately, as my results show, the false positive rate
of this technique is largely dependent on the verification test coverage of TTT invariants—
e.g., repeated or exhausted counter values—Bomberman monitors. While Bomberman
itself provides insight into how to improve the said test coverage, it requires manual effort
on behalf of the design verification engineer. Moreover, it assumes design verification en-
gineer’s have intimate knowledge of the implementation of the DUT, which is not the case
when vetting third-party IP for Trojans. To address this issue, I foresee future work deploy-
ing security-critical invariant monitors, like [59], with hardware fuzzing (Chapter VI), to
automatically optimize Trojan-specific detection schemes like Bomberman.
7.2.3 Fuzzing Hardware with Sparse Memories
In Chapter VI, I demonstrated the advantage of deploying software fuzzing tools to
the hardware verification domain. Using this technique, I fuzzed several cores from the
OpenTitan root-of-trust SoC, including the AES, HMAC, KMAC, and timer cores. One
thing all of these cores have in common is they are all loosely-coupled accelerators. In
other words, unlike a processor, they do not interface with sparse memories. Rather, they
accept control- and data-path inputs directly from a bus interface, process these inputs, and
produce outputs over the same interface. To tailor my approach to such designs, I create a
bus-specific grammar and harness to interpret fuzzer-generated inputs as a sequence of bus
transactions to drive these DUTs.
Now, consider the scenario where the DUT is a CPU that processes control- and data-
path inputs from a large, sparse memory. To adapt software fuzzers to such a DUT, I
envision creating an ISA-specific grammar and harness to interpret fuzzer-generated in-
puts as a valid executable program. However, assuming memory is initialized to a clean
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state prior to loading a fuzzer-generated program, most program memory accesses would
go to empty memory regions, resulting in fewer interesting state transitions. To increase
the probability of the fuzzer exploring interesting hardware states, we need to develop a
CPU-specific test mutator that constrains program memory accesses to small, yet random,
memory regions.
7.2.4 Hardware Sanitizers
Another key challenge in my hardware fuzzing work was developing a mechanism to
signal to the software fuzzer that a hardware bug was found. Traditionally, when fuzzing
software, this is accomplished using software sanitizers that instrument the program under
test such that it crashes when common abnormal behavior is observed, such as a buffer
overflow, use-after-return, or memory leak error. Unfortunately, there is no such construct
in the hardware domain, as hardware flaws have not been well categorized. To detect
incorrect hardware behavior during simulations, hardware verification engineers use golden
models or invariant (e.g., SystemVerilog Assertions) checks. In my hardware fuzzing work,
I translated these checks to software-level assertions so the fuzzer could detect incorrect
hardware behavior. Unfortunately, defining golden models or invariant checks is tedious
and requires DUT implementation knowledge. My vision going forward is to develop
a hardware sanitizer to automate instrumenting software models of RTL hardware with






Route Distances of OR1200 Layouts
A target density of 50–90% was held across each layout, while target clock frequency
and max transition time parameters were varied from 100 MHz to 1000 MHz and 100 ps to
300 ps respectively. Each heatmap in Figures A.1–A.3 is intended to be read column-wise,
where each column is a histogram. The color intensity within a heatmap column indicates
the percentage of (critical-net, trigger-space) pairs, within that column, that are within a
range of distance away. The y-axis reports the distance in terms of standard deviations
from the overall mean net-length in each design. The x-axis reports the trigger space sizes
in number of contiguous placement sites. Designs with smaller trigger-spaces and long
route distances are more resistant to fabrication-time attacks. Namely, a heatmap column
that is completely dark indicates no (critical-net, trigger-space) pairs, or attack points, and




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A.3: Route Distance Results for OR1200 at 90% Density.
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APPENDIX B
Descriptions of OpenTitan IP Blocks
AES
The OpenTitan AES core implements the Advanced Encryption Standard with key sizes
of 128, 192, and 256 bits, and with the following cipher block modes: ECB, CBC, CFB,
OFB, and CTR. Configuration settings, keys, and plaintext are delivered to the core through
TileLink write operations to memory-mapped registers in a documented address range.
Likewise, ciphertext is retrieved from the core through TileLink read operations. The core
targets medium performance (one clock cycle per round of encryption). It implements a
128-bit wide data path—shared by encryption and decryption operations—that translates to
encryption/decryption latencies of 12, 14, and 16 clock cycles per 128-bit plaintext block,
in 128, 192, and 256 bit key modes, respectively. Of the cores I study, it is the second most
complex in terms of LOC in both the hardware (HDL) and software domains (Table 6.2).
HMAC
The OpenTitan HMAC implements a SHA-256 hash message authentication code gen-
erator for the purpose of checking the integrity of incoming messages. The HMAC core
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can operate in two modes: 1) SHA-256 mode only, or 2) HMAC mode. In the former
mode, the core simply computes the SHA-256 hash of a provided message. In the latter
mode, the core computes the HMAC (defined in RFC 2104 [89]) of a message using the
SHA-256 hashing algorithm and a provided secret key. Regardless of mode, the SHA-256
engine operates on 512-bit message chunks at any given time, provided to the core through
a message FIFO. Input messages can be read little- or big-endian and likewise, message
digests can be stored in output registers either little- or big-endian. Configuration settings,
input messages, HMAC keys, and operation commands are delivered to the core through
TileLink write operations to memory-mapped registers. Likewise, message digests are re-
trieved from the core through TileLink read operations. In its current state, the core can
hash a single 512-bit message in 80 clock cycles, and can compute its HMAC in 340 clock
cycles. Of the cores I study, it is approximately half as complex as the AES core, in terms
of LOC in both the hardware and software domains (Table 6.2).
KMAC
The OpenTitan KMAC core is similar to the HMAC core, except it implements a Kec-
cak Message Authentication Code [83] and SHA-3 hashing algorithms. However, com-
pared to the HMAC core, the KMAC core is more complex, as there are several more
configurations. Specifically, there are many SHA-3 hashing functions that are supported—
SHA3-224/256/384/512, SHAKE128/256, and cSHAKE128/256—and the Keccak− f func-
tion (by default) operates on 1600 bits of internal state. Like the HMAC core, the KMAC
core can simply compute hashes or message authentication codes depending on operation
mode, and input messages/output digests can be configured to be read/stored in little- or
big-endian. The time to process a single input message block is dominated by computing
the Keccak− f function, which takes 72 clock cycles for 1600 bits of internal state, in the
current implementation of the core. Configuration settings, input messages, output digests,
keys, and operation commands are all communicated to/from the core through TileLink
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writes/reads to memory-mapped registers.
Of the cores I study, the KMAC core is the most complex, especially in the software
domain (Table 6.2). The software model of the KMAC core contains almost 120k lines of
C++ code. This is mostly an artifact of how Verilator maps dependencies between large
registers and vectored signals: it creates large multidimensional arrays and maps each cor-
responding index at the word granularity. Fortunately, this artifact is optimized away during
compilation, and the number of basic blocks in the DUT portion of the HSB is reduced.
RV-Timer
The OpenTitan RISC-V timer core is the simplest core I fuzz. It consists of a single
64-bit timer with 12-bit prescaler and an 8-bit step configurations. It can also generate
system interrupts upon reaching a pre-configured time value. Like the other OpenTitan




Optimizing the Hardware Fuzzing Grammar
Recall, to facilitate widespread adoption of Hardware Fuzzing I design a generic test-
bench fuzzing harness that decodes a grammar and performs corresponding TL-UL bus
transactions to exercise the DUT (Fig. 6.13). However, there are implementation questions
surrounding how the grammar should be decoded (§6.4.2.4):
1. How should I decode 8-bit opcodes when the opcode space defines less than 28 valid
testbench actions?
2. How should I pack Hardware Fuzzing instruction frames that conform to my gram-
mar?
Opcode Formats
In its current state, I define three opcodes in my grammar that correspond to three
actions my generic testbench can perform (Table 6.1): 1) wait one clock cycle, 2) TL-UL
read, and 3) TL-UL write. However, I chose to represent these opcodes with a single byte
(Fig. 6.4). Choosing a larger field than necessary has implications regarding the fuzzability
of my grammar. In its current state, 253 of the 256 possible opcode values may be useless
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depending on how they are decoded by the testbench. Therefore I propose, and empirically
study, two design choices for decoding Hardware Fuzzing opcodes into testbench actions:
• Constant: constant values are used to represent each opcode corresponding to a sin-
gle testbench action. Remaining opcode values are decoded as invalid, and ignored.
• Mapped: equal sized ranges of opcode values are mapped to valid testbench actions.
No invalid opcode values exist.
Instruction Frame Formats
Of the three actions my testbench can perform—wait, read, and write—some require
additional information. Namely, the TL-UL read action requires a 32-bit address field, and
the TL-UL write action requires 32-bit data and address fields. Given this, there are two
natural ways to decode Hardware Fuzzing instructions (Fig. 6.4):
• Fixed: a fixed instruction frame size is decoded regardless of the opcode. Address
and data fields could go unused depending on the opcode.
• Variable: a variable instruction frame size is decoded. Address and data fields are
only appended to opcodes that correspond to TL-UL read and write testbench actions.
No address/data information goes unused.
Results
To determine the optimal Hardware Fuzzing grammar, I fuzz four OpenTitan IP blocks—
the AES, HMAC, KMAC, and RV-Timer—for 24 hours using all combinations of opcode
and instruction frame formats mentioned above. For each core I seed the fuzzer with 8–
12 binary Hardware Fuzzing seed files (in the corresponding Hardware Fuzzing grammar)
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rv_timer | HW Line (VLT)
Grammar (Opcode Format | Frame Format)
Constant | Variable Constant | Fixed Mapped | Variable Mapped | Fixed
Figure C.1: Coverage Convergence vs. Hardware Fuzzing Grammar. Various software
and hardware coverage metrics over fuzzing time across four OpenTitan [105]
IP cores and hardware fuzzing grammar variations (§C). In the first row, we
plot line coverage of the software models of each hardware core computed
using kcov. In the second row, we plot basic block coverage computed using
LLVM. In last row, we plot HDL line coverage (of the hardware itself) computed
using Verilator [145]. From these results we formulate two conclusions: 1)
coverage in the software domain correlates to coverage in the hardware do-
main, and 2) the Hardware Fuzzing grammar with variable instruction frames
is best for greybox fuzzers that prioritize small test files.
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a single wait operation instruction due to its simplicity. For each experiment, I extract and
plot three DUT coverage metrics over fuzz times in Fig. C.1. These metrics include: 1) line
coverage of the DUT software model, 2) basic block coverage of the same, and 3) line cov-
erage of the DUT’s HDL. Software line coverage is computed using kcov [79], software
basic block coverage is computed using LLVM [96], and hardware line coverage is com-
puted using Verilator [145]. Since I perform 10 repetitions of each fuzzing experiment,
I average and consolidate each coverage time series into a single trace.
From these results I draw two conclusions. First, variable instruction frames seem to
perform better than fixed frames, especially early in the fuzzing exploration. Since AFL
prioritizes keeping test files small, I expect variable sized instruction frames to produce
better results, since this translates to longer hardware test sequences, and therefore deeper
possible explorations of the (sequential) state space. Second, the opcode type seems to
make little difference, for most experiments, since there are only 256 possible values, a
search space AFL can explore very quickly. Lastly, I point out that for simple cores, like
the RV-Timer, Hardware Fuzzing is able to achieve ≈85% HDL line coverage in less than
a minute (hence I do not plot the full 24-hour trace).
Key Insights:
1. Hardware Fuzzing instructions with variable frames are optimal for fuzzers that
prioritize small input files, therefore resulting in longer temporal test sequences.
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